Cited by

(citations omitted)), and Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502, 374 A.2d 954 (1977) ("The police power and the right to private property must be considered together as interdependent, the one qualifying and limiting *201 the other."

However, it immediately quoted the Metzger rule for resolving as-applied challenges to zoning ordinances — namely a “balancing of the injury or loss to the landowner against the gain to the public.” Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 501 (1977).

In order to respect the property owner’s rights, it is also necessary to determine whether the ordinance is “nevertheless arbitrary and unreasonable as applied to the plaintiffs land.” Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 501 (1977) (emphasis added).

Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 501 (1977).

Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 503 (1977).

To determine the validity of zoning laws, the “police power and the right to private property must be considered together as interdependent, the one qualifying and limiting the other.” Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502, 374 A.2d 954, 957 (1977) (quotation omitted).

Such requirements are usually justified “on the basis that they are a method of determining lot sipe to prevent overcrowding.” Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502, 374 A.2d 954, 957 (1977).

(designating entire twenty-four foot width of private way as fire lane unduly restricted fundamental property rights where fifteen feet would be sufficient); see also Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 503, 374 A.2d 954, 958 (1977) (zoning ordinance requiring 200 feet of frontage for public vehicle access an unreasonable regulation where 123 feet of frontage provided ready access).

Burrows, 121 N.H. at 598, 432 A.2d at 20; cf. Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 503, 374 A.2d 954, 958 (1977) (holding that ordinance which generally promotes public welfare is unreasonable and unconstitutional as applied to landowner’s property).

2, 12; Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502, 374 A.2d 954, 957 (1977).

Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 501, 374 A.2d 954, 957-58 (1977).

2 & 12; RSA 677:19; Town of Hampton v. Brust, 122 N.H. 463, 468, 446 A.2d 458, 460 (1982); Colby v. Town of Rye, 122 N.H. 991, 992, 453 A.2d 1270, 1271 (1982); Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502, 374 A.2d 954, 957 (1977); State v. Paille, 90 N.H. 347, 352, 9 A.2d 663, 666 (1939).

The plaintiff contends in his brief that “where a zoning regulation, as applied to a particular property, is unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate public purpose, or the gain to the public is slight but the harm to the citizen or his property is great, the exercise of the police power becomes arbitrary and unreasonable.” Although the plaintiff relies on Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 503, 374 A.2d 954, 958 (1977), he fails to recognize that the case concerned a challenge to the val

They argue that the requested enforcement of the ordinance would violate State Constitutional norms under the holdings of Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981), L. Grossman & Sons, Inc. v. Town of Gilford, 118 N.H. 480, 387 A.2d 1178 (1978), and Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 374 A.2d 954 (1977).

Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502, 374 A.2d 954, 957 (1977).

Metzger v. Brentwood, 115 N.H. 287, 343 A.2d 24 (1975) (road discontinued subject to gates and bars is not a “right of way” as that term is used in town’s zoning ordinance); see also Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 374 A.2d 954 (1977) (same); Bancroft v. Town of Canterbury, 118 N.H. 453, 457, 388 A.2d 199, 203 (1978) (amendment intended to make it possible for planning boards to have jurisdiction over discontinued highways subject to gates and bars).

Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 30, 411 A.2d 147, 151-52 (1980) (quoting Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502, 374 A.2d 954, 958 (1977)).

The term refers to a person’s right to “possess, use, enjoy and dispose of a thing and is not limited to the thing itself.” Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. at 597, 432 A.2d at 19 (citing Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502, 374 A.2d 954, 957 (1977)).

Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 503, 374 A.2d 954, 958 (1977).

Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502-03, 374 A.2d 954, 958 (1977).

Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. at 30, 411 A.2d at 151-52; Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502, 374 A.2d 954, 958 (1977).

Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502, 374 A.2d 954, 957 (1977); see L. Grossman & Sons, Inc. v. Town of Gilford, 118 N.H. 480, 482-83, 387 A.2d 1178, 1180 (1978).

Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969); Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502-03, 374 A.2d 954, 957-58 (1977).

This guarantee has been deemed so specific as to “ ‘necessarily limit [] all subsequent grants of power to deal adversely with it.’ ” Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502, 374 A.2d 954, 957 (1977) (quoting Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N.H. 64, 68, 174 A. 193, 196 (1934)).

L. Grossman & Sons, Inc. v. Town of Gilford, 118 N.H. at 483, 387 A.2d at 1180; Metzger v. Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502-03, 374 A.2d 954, 958 (1977); see Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 298, 266 A.2d 103, 108 (1970).

Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 503, 374 A.2d 954, 958 (1977).

This provision of our Bill of Rights “has been held to be so specific that it ‘necessarily limits all subsequent grants of power to deal adversely with it.’ ” Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502, 374 A.2d 954, 957 (1977) (quoting Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N.H. 64, 68, 174 A. 193, 196 (1934)).

Land/Vest Props., Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 117 N.H. at 822-23, 379 A.2d at 204; Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502, 374 A.2d 954, 957 (1977); Robbins Auto Parts, Inc. v. City of Laconia, supra at 237, 371 A.2d at 1169.

L. Grossman & Sons, Inc. v. Town of Gilford, 118 N.H. 480, 483, 387 A.2d 1178, 1180 (1978); Land/Vest Props., Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 117 N.H. 817, 821, 379 A.2d 200, 205 (1977); Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502-03, 374 A.2d 954, 957-58 (1977).

Grossman & Sons, Inc. v. Town of Gilford, 118 N.H. 480, 387 A.2d 1178 (1978); Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 374 A.2d 954 (1977).

See, e.g., Sundell v. New London, 119 N.H. 839, 409 A.2d 1315 (1979); Metzger v. Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502-03, 374 A.2d 954, 957-58 (1977).

Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502, 374 A.2d 954, 958 (1977).

“The determination of this question requires a balancing of *264 the injury or loss to the landowner against the gain to the public.” Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 501, 374 A.2d 954, 957 (1977).

Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 374 A.2d 954 (1977); Treat v. *527 State, 117 N.H. 6, 369 A.2d 214 (1977); Tilton v. Sharpe, 84 N.H. 43, 146 A. 159 (1929).

In Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502, 374 A.2d 954, 957 (1977), we said that New Hampshire Constitution part I, article 2, which guarantees to all persons the right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, has been held to be so specific that it “ ‘necessarily limits all subsequent grants of power to deal adversely with it.’ ” New Hampshi

Metzger v. Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 374 A.2d 954 (1977); Robbins v. Laconia, 117 N.H. 235, 371 A.2d 1167 (1977); N.H. CONST, pt.