Cited by

Trottier v. City of Lebanon, 117 N.H. 148, 150, 370 A.2d 275 (1977) (citation omitted).

Where, as here, no definition is provided in the ordinance itself, we must look to the ordinance as a whole and attempt to discern the meaning intended by the framers.” Trottier v. City of Lebanon, 117 N.H. 148, 150 (1977) (citation omitted).

Trottier v. City of Lebanon, 117 N.H. 148, 150 *110 (1977) (“The administrative construction of [an] ordinance by the zoning authorities.

Trottier v. City of Lebanon, 117 N.H. 148, 150 (1977).

“[A zoning] ordinance is not confiscatory if it has a reasonable tendency to promote the public welfare and gives due regard, under all the facts and circumstances, to plaintiff’s property rights.” Trottier v. City of Lebanon, 117 N.H. 148, 151 (1977).

Trottier v. City of Lebanon, 117 N.H. 148, 151 (1977).

“Interpretation of a zoning ordinance is a question of law for this court,” Conforti v. City of Manchester, 141 N.H. 78, 79, 677 A.2d 147, 149 (1996) (quotation and ellipsis omitted), which requires us to *570 determine “the intent of the enacting body,” Trottier v. City of Lebanon, 117 N.H. 148, 150, 370 A.2d 275, 277 (1977).

Trottier v. City of Lebanon, 117 N.H. 148, 150-51, 370 A.2d 275, 277 (1977); see also RSA 483:4, XVII (1992) (“ ‘River’ means a flowing body of water or a segment or tributary of such water body.”).

Trottier v. City of Lebanon, 117 N.H. 148, 150, 370 A.2d 275, 276 (1977).

Trottier v. City of Lebanon, 117 N.H. 148, 150, 370 A.2d 275, 277 (1977).

This conclusion is consistent not only with the town’s administrative interpretation, which is entitled to consideration, see Trottier v. City of Lebanon, 117 N.H. 148, 150, 370 A.2d 275, 277 (1977), but also with the common-sense expectation that provisions of a zoning ordinance for the most restrictive single residential use of land probably would not include permission to keep large grazing animals.

Our decision in Trottier v. City of Lebanon, 117 N.H. 148, 370 A.2d 275 (1977), sets forth the rules of law that govern in this case.

Win-Tasch Corp. v. Town of Merrimack, 120 N.H. 6, 10, 411 A.2d 144, 147 (1980); Trottier v. City of Lebanon, 117 N.H. 148, 150, 370 A.2d 275, 276-77 (1977); RSA 31:78.

We have stated that “the hardship to a property owner justifying invalidation of a zoning ordinance as it affects his premises is not a *481 hardship which he has himself assumed or induced.” Trottier v. City of Lebanon, 117 N.H. 148, 151, 370 A.2d 275, 277 (1977), quoting 8 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.44, at 103 (3rd ed. 1976).

The construction of the grandfather clause is a question of law, Trottier v. City of Lebanon, 117 N.H. 148, 370 A.2d 275 (1977), and the master is not bound by the zoning board’s decision.

The construction of the terms in a zoning ordinance is a matter of law.

*786 In construing language not defined in the body of the ordinance we also “look to the ordinance as a whole and attempt to discern the meaning intended by the framers.” Trottier v. City of Lebanon, 117 N.H. 148, 150, 370 A.2d 275, 277 (1977).

No different result is required by Trottier v. Lebanon, 117 N.H. 148, 370 A.2d 275 (1977), because there plaintiff had no frontage on a “street,” nor by KBW, Inc. v. Bennington, 115 N.H. 392, 342 A.2d 653 (1975) which, unlike this case, involved a subdivision.