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We have stated that the legislative purpose of the juvenile laws is not penal, but protective; that the child shall not be punished for breach of law or regulation, but to provide the child with an opportunity to become a worthy citizen.

amounts to double jeopardy.” State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 669 (1977).

Merrill, 124 N.H. at 14-15; State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666 (1977) (observing that “[i]t is a basic principle of statutory construction that a legislative enactment will be construed to avoid conflict with constitutional rights wherever reasonably possible”).

n meaning of the words used, RSA 80:89, VII pertains to “[t]he duty of the municipality to notify former owners,” the municipality’s duty to “distribute proceeds pursuant to RSA 80:88,” and “the former owners’ right of repurchase.” The trial court then decided that the statutory scheme was “open to two interpretations, one making it constitutional and the other not.” See State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666 (1977) (explaining that “[i]t is a basic principle of statutory construction that a legisl

“It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a legislative enactment will be construed to avoid conflict with constitutional rights wherever reasonably possible.” State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666 (1977).

at 643; see also State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666 (1977) (“It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a legislative enactment will be construed to avoid conflict with constitutional rights wherever reasonably possible.”).

We interpret statutes to avoid conflict with constitutional rights wherever reasonably possible.

Your second question asks whether enactment of HB 301 would “impinge upon an accused’s right to due process in violation of Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution.” When we interpret statutes already in effect, they are “construed to avoid conflict with constitutional rights wherever reasonably possible.” State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666, 377 A.2d 608, 610 (1977).

State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666-67, 377 A.2d 608, 610 (1977); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).

State v. Bauer, 337 N.W.2d 209, 210 (Iowa 1983); see State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666, 377 A.2d 608, 610 (1977) (stating that “[although guidelines do not appear in a statute, a reviewing court may, by resort to judicial construction, cure an otherwise unconstitutionally vague provision”).

State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666, 377, A.2d 608, 610 (1977); Crowell v. Benson, supra at 62.

In her argument, the defendant notes first that this court has already recognized that due process applies to juvenile certification hearings.

They emphasize the underlying purposes of RSA chapter 169-B, to provide confidentiality and thus to promote the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders, who would otherwise be objects of the public opprobrium engendered by the adult criminal process.

In the second case, we stated: “Although guidelines do not appear in a statute, a reviewing court may, by resort to judicial construction, cure an otherwise unconstitutionally vague provision.” State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666, 377 A.2d 608, 610 (1977) (citations omitted).

State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666, 377 A.2d 608, 610 (1977) (citations omitted).

In so concluding that the time limitations are not jurisdictional, we have not ignored our obligation to construe a statute so as to *37 avoid unconstitutionality, where that is possible.

If the court orders transfer to superior court, it shall provide a written statement of findings and reasons for such transfer to the minor.” The eight factors set forth in the statute were evidently derived from eight virtually identical factors listed by this court in State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 668, 377 A.2d 608, 611 (1977), which factors *352 were quoted verbatim from an appendix to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966).

In State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 377 A.2d 608 (1977), annual figures were cited reflecting that of 4,510 delinquency petitions formally filed in 1976 (a smaller number than total police-juvenile interaction), only 63 led to transfer for trial as adults.

as being ‘not penal but protective; not that the child shall be punished for breach of law, but that he shall have a better chance to become a worthy citizen.’” State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666, 377 A.2d 608, 610 (1977) (quoting In re Perham, 104 N.H. 276, 276, 184 A.2d 449, 450 (1962)); In re Poulin, 100 N.H. 458, 458, 129 A.2d 672, 673 (1957).

This court must construe statutes so as “to avoid conflict with constitutional rights whenever reasonably possible.” State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666, 377 A.2d 608, 610 (1977); see State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 57, 426 A.2d 457, 459 (1981).

an adult renders the entire sentencing process in his case invalid per se, because a juvenile of less than seventeen cannot waive certification pursuant to RSA 169:21-b (1975) (now in RSA 169-B:26), and further that the procedures the district court followed for his certification as an adult did not conform to the standards of Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966); see State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 667-68, 377 A.2d 608, 610-11 (1977).

That the title is phrased otherwise merely reflects the fact that the vast majority of cases are heard in district court and are not transferred to superior court.

“If possible a statute will be interpreted with the presumption that the legislature intended to confine its action within constitutional bounds.” State v. Millette, 112 N.H. 458, 465, 299 A.2d 150, 154 (1972); see State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666, 377 A.2d 608, 610 (1977).

other than the [defendant] shall not be admitted into evidence in any prosecution under this chapter [RSA ch. 632-A (Supp. 1979)].” In determining the statute’s constitutionality, we must bear in mind that “[i]t is a basic principle of statutory construction that a legislative enactment will be construed to avoid conflict with constitutional rights wherever reasonably possible.” State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666, 377 A.2d 608, 610 (1977).

Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528-31 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-68 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22, passim (1967); State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666-69, 377 A.2d 608, 610-12 (1972).

“It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a legislative enactment will be construed to avoid conflict with constitutional rights wherever reasonably possible.” State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666, 377 A.2d 608, 610 (1977); Sibson v. State, 110 N.H. 8, 11, 259 A.2d 397, 400 (1969).

We take this step because we believe that the legislature would prefer this course to outright invalidation.

A four-page order setting forth findings required by RSA 169:21 and State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 377 A.2d 608 (1977), was issued by Pautelas, J. The superior court remanded the case for an “evidentiary hearing” because there was no verbatim transcript of the district court proceedings accompanying the file.

A different construction of the statute is preferable; “[i]t is a basic principle of statutory construction that a legislative enactment will be construed to avoid conflict with constitutional rights wherever reasonably possible.” State v. Smagula, 117 N.H. 663, 666, 377 A.2d 608, 610 (1977).