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When deciding whether a statement is an excited utterance, the trial court must consider, in addition to the time elapsed, “all other circumstances surrounding the statements,” including the nature of the exciting event and the declarant’s state of mind.

case law”), with Pepin, 156 N.H. at 274-75 (victim’s 911 call, made several hours after the defendant stopped beating her, constituted excited utterance), State v. Bonalumi, 127 N.H. 485, 489 (1985) (wife’s statement made within an hour of her husband’s arrest constituted an excited utterance), State v. Plummer, 117 N.H. 320, 325 (1977) (statement constituted an excited utterance when given more than three hours after startling event).

Second, the test for insanity does not define or limit the varieties of mental diseases or defects that can form the basis for a claim of insanity, State v. Plummer, 117 N.H. 320, 327 (1977).

Although the comments of the commission may be useful in interpreting the Criminal Code, see State v. Plummer, 117 N.H. 320, 326, 374 A.2d 431, 435 (1977), they are not law.

The trial court, therefore, properly excluded the testimony of the defendant’s expert.

offspring of insanity: if it was, a criminal intent did not produce it”); State v. Abbott, 127 N.H. 444, 448-49, 503 A.2d 791, 794 (1985) (“whether an individual had a *253 mental disease, and whether an act was the product of that disease”); State v. Sadvari, 123 N.H. 410, 414, 462 A.2d 102, 104 (1983) (“whether the crimes were the product of that mental disease or defect”); State v. Plummer, 117 N.H. 320, 327, 374 A.2d 431, 435 (1977) (“defendant’s actions are the product of such a disease”);

Due to that alcohol dependence and the progression of that illness over the period of 10 years, the defendant was unable to perform [sic] the necessary prerequisite criminal intent to misappropriate his client’s funds as alleged in the indictment.” Relying on State v. Plummer, 117 N.H. 320, 374 A.2d 431 (1977), and State v. Glidden, 127 N.H. 359, 499 A.2d 1349 (1985), the State moved to bar testimony about the effect of the defendant’s alcoholism on his ability generally to form a specific inten

Compare State v. Lynch, 94 N.H. 52, 53, 45 A.2d 885, 886 (1946) (statement made by nine-year-old to mother four days after alleged sexual assault, and after talking with sheriff about the incident, not spontaneous) with State v. Bonalumi, 127 N.H. at 489, 503 A.2d at 789 (one-hour lapse) and State v. Plummer, 117 N.H. 320, 325, 374 A.2d 431, 434 (1977) (three to four hours).

Id.; State v. Plummer, 117 N.H. 320, 325, 374 A.2d 431, 434 (1977); State v. Martineau, 114 N.H. 552, 556, 324 A.2d 718, 721 (1974); see Bennett v. Bennett, 92 N.H. 379, 386, 31 A.2d 374, 380 (1943).

This court has stated that chronic alcoholism may be considered a defense to criminal action, but that the defense is subject to the same rules and procedures as an insanity defense.

He further stated that the jury was to use any evidence introduced during the trial to resolve the factual question of whether the defendant in this case had a mental disease or defect at the time of the commission of the offense, and whether the crimes were the product of that mental disease or defect.

State v. Koucoules, 343 A.2d 860, 873 (Me. 1974); Commonwealth v. Harmond, 382 N.E.2d 203, 206 (Mass. 1978); cf. State v. Plummer, 117 N.H. 320, 327, 374 A.2d 431, 435 (1977).

RSA 626:4; State v. Caldrain, 115 N.H. 390, 342 A.2d 628 (1975); State v. Warren, 114 N.H. 196, 317 A.2d 566 (1974); State v. Plummer, 117 N.H. 320, 374 A.2d 431 (1977).