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In determining whether an error was harmless, we ask not “whether the evidence, apart from that erroneously admitted, would support a finding of guilt, but whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict.” State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976).

Assuming for purposes of this appeal that the introduction of the check was error, however, the error was harmless.

“[I]t is not a question whether the evidence, apart from that erroneously admitted, would support a finding of guilt, but whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt *204 that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict.” State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976).

Bailey, 127 N.H. at 421, 503 A.2d at 767; State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976).

State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976) (where it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict, error is harmless and court will uphold the conviction).

The erroneous admission of hearsay evidence is harmless when it can be said “beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict.” State v. Elwell, 132 N.H. 599, 607, 567 A.2d 1002, 1007 (1989); State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976).

State v. Sampson, 132 N.H. 343, 348, 565 A.2d 1040, 1043 (1989) (citing State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976)).

Under these circumstances, the jury might have drawn entirely different inferences from all the evidence if the hearsay evidence had not been admitted.

This error was harmless, however, because we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence of the courtroom identification did not affect the verdict.

As we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the videotaped testimony, in the absence of the required showing by the State, did not affect the verdict, see State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976), we hold that the defendant’s confrontation rights under part I, article 15 of the State Constitution were violated.

State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976); see also State v. Nadeau, 126 N.H. 120, 125, 489 A.2d 623, 626 (1985).

The State concedes it was error for the judge to decide this question as a matter of law, but argues in turn that this error was *634 harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, see State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976), and that we should therefore affirm Williams’s fraud convictions.

VI, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

In State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976), we explained the doctrine of harmless error: “[I]t is not a question whether the evidence, apart from that erroneously admitted, would support a finding of guilt, but whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict.” The screwd

assuming arguendo that introduction of the invoice was error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

To rule that the erroneous introduction of the blood sample evidence was harmless, we must be able to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict.

The erroneous admission of hearsay evidence is harmless when it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict was not affected.

h of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply.” VI J. WlGMORE, Evidence § 1766, at 250 (Chadbourn rev. 1976) (emphasis in original); see also State v. Varagianis supra; State v. McPherson supra; Ellsworth v. Watkins, 101 N.H. 51, 53, 132 A.2d 136, 138 (1957); State v. Wentworth, 37 N.H. 196, 217 (1858), cited in VI J. WlGMORE, supra at 251-52; cf. State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 592, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976), explained in State v. Varagianis supra (statement clearly admitted for its t

Given the obviously damaging nature of the hearsay testimony, we cannot conclude that the erroneous admission of the statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976), and we accordingly reverse the defendant’s conviction.

It is unnecessary, however, to decide whether the Florida arrest was pretextual in any sense that might have tainted the seizure, because even on the assumptions most favorable to the defendant, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the introduction of the evidence in question could not have been anything worse than harmless error.

We will order a new trial if the State is not able to show “beyond a reasonable doubt that the [improper statements] did not affect the verdict.” State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976).

Taken together, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the court’s errors did not affect the jury’s verdict.

In determining the gravity of an error, this court asks “whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict.” State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976).

The two-issue rule, however, is not the law in New Hampshire, and runs counter to the principle enunciated by this court in State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 366 A.2d 497 (1976).

not for the truth of the matter asserted.” The defendant further avers that, on virtually identical facts, we reversed a drug sale conviction in State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 366 A.2d 497 (1976).

Moreover, we cannot say that, had the evidence been admitted, it would have had no effect on the jury’s verdict.

Nevertheless, this court will reverse an erroneous ruling when it substantially affects the rights of a party.

Because the prosecutor’s attempt to bolster the State’s witness by a reference to a polygraph test was, therefore, not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976), we must reverse and remand for a new trial.

The evidence for the defendant’s guilt, as recounted above, was so strong that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper question could not have affected the verdict.

“In this State the test for determining in a criminal case whether error can be harmless is ‘whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict.’” State v. Welch, 120 N.H. 687, 688, 421 A.2d 142, 142-43 (1980) (quoting State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976)).

Accordingly, we conclude that under our harmless error standard, the State has not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to give the special jury instruction to cure the prosecutor’s improper comment did not affect the verdict.

State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976); see State v. LaBranche, 118 N.H. 176, 179, 385 A.2d 108, 110 (1978).

State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 693, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976); see United States v. Thomann, 609 F.2d 560, 563 (1st Cir. 1979).

When irrelevant evidence is improperly admitted, the critical question is “whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict.” State v. LaBranche, 118 N.H. 176, 179, 385 A.2d 108, 110 (1978) (quoting State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976)).

In this State, the test for determining harmless error in a criminal case is “whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict.” State v. Welch, 120 N.H. 687, 688, 421 A.2d 142, 142-43 (1980) (quoting State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976)).

State v. Beaulieu, 119 N.H. 400, 404, 402 A.2d 178, 181 (1979); State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 693, 336 A.2d 497, 498 (1976).

State v. Welch, 120 N.H. 687, 688, 421 A.2d 142, 142-43 (1980); State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976).

We are asked in this case to determine whether the automatic standing rule adopted by this court in State v. Crump, 107 N.H. 62, 65, 217 A.2d 183, 186 (1966), and more recently affirmed in State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 693, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976), constitutes the standard by which searches must be judged or whether the “legitimate expectation of privacy” doctrine, expressed more recently by the United States Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) and United States v. Sal

State v. LaBranche, 118 N.H. 176, 179, 385 A.2d 108, 110 (1978) (quoting State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976)).

We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous admission of the hearsay testimony in this case did not affect the verdict and *43 that, therefore, the error was harmless.

State v. Scarlett, 118 N.H. 904, 907, 395 A.2d 1244, 1246-47 (1978); State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976).

In this State the test for determining in a criminal case whether error can be harmless is “whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict.” State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976); State v. LaBranche, 118 N.H. 176, 179, 385 A.2d 108, 110 (1978).

State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 693, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976); State v. Fernandez, 113 N.H. 5, 7, 300 A.2d 55, 56-57 (1973).

State v. Labranche, 118 N.H. 176, 179, 385 A.2d 108, 110 (1978); State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694, 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976); accord, Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86—87 (1963).

the State has failed to recognize the proper harmless error test regarding inadmissible evidence as set forth in State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 366 A.2d 497 (1976).