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Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it considered only the narrow question of the character of Strang’s entry into the gazebo and failed to do a full premises liability analysis according to our precedent.

At that time, we followed the traditional three-pronged classification of entrants on land in determining the obligations of landowners.

Asplundh moved for summary judgment, arguing first, that based upon this court’s holding in Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552 (1976), it, as legal occupant of the State-owned land at the time the accident occurred, owed no duty of care to Dr. White because he had entered its work area despite directives that he stay away.

The defendant’s argument, limiting the analysis to a dictionary definition, amounts to a “dry classification [that] puts the emphasis at the wrong placet].” Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 556 (1976) (abandoning distinctions between invitee, licensee and trespasser by adopting traditional negligence principles).

In Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552 (1976), we held that “owners and occupiers of land shall be governed by the test of reasonable care under all the circumstances in the maintenance and operation of their property.” Id.

Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 557, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (1976); see also Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 397-99, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973).

See, e.g., Tanquay v. Marston, 127 N.H. 572, 577, 503 A.2d 834, 837 (1986); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 553, 364 A.2d 631, 632 (1976); Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 397, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973).

Under New Hampshire law, “owners and occupiers of land shall be governed by the test of reasonable care under all the circumstances in the maintenance and operation of their property.” Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 557, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (1976).

The standard of ordinary negligence imposes a duty of due care on the party that owes the duty.

Burns v. Bradley, 120 N.H. at 545, 419 A.2d at 1071 (abolition of distinctions between invitees, licensees and trespassers in Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 364 A.2d 631 (1976) applied prospectively, in part because it overruled long-settled precedent); Hampton Nat’l Bank, 114 N.H. at 75, 314 A.2d at 658 (invalidation of long-standing practice of attaching a person’s checking account without notice or an opportunity to be heard applied prospectively, because plaintiff w

She acted out of fear that trespassers would be injured, a concern that was equally justifiable, whether it proceeded from altruism or from apprehension that under existing New Hampshire law she could be held liable for a trespasser’s injuries.

This basis for the rule is currently without justification, given the modern rejection of the licensee-invitee distinction in New Hampshire.

In the case of Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 553, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (1976), the court extended the duty to use reasonable care under all of the circumstances to owners and occupiers of land.

In Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 364 A.2d 631 (1976), we abolished the distinctions between an invitee, a licensee, and a trespasser for the purpose of determining the standard of care owed by a landowner to a person on his property.

Before trial, neither party objected to having the legal standard set forth in Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 364 A.2d 631 (1976) applied.

In Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 364 A.2d 631 (1976), decided six months after the plaintiffs accident, this court abolished the distinctions between invitee, licensee, and trespasser for purposes of determining the standard of care owed by landowners to persons coming onto their property.

Plaintiff argues that our recent holding in Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 364 A.2d 631 (1976), requires that this case go to the jury for determination of whether the defendants breached any duty owed to the plaintiff.