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Neither the State nor the Federal Constitution “prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt” or “requires them to do so as a matter of course.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994); see State v. Belkner, 117 N.H. 462, 471 (1977); State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436, 439 (1976).

While we currently require the discovery to be inadvertent under our state constitutional analysis, see Davis, 149 N.H. at 700-01, we have also stated that inadvertency is not required for guns as they are “dangerous in themselves.” State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436, 439 (1976) (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 471).

State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436, 438 (1976) (holding gunshots in home justified warrantless police entry to determine whether there was a victim); see also United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1336-37 (11th Cir. 2002) (listing cases and situations in which endangerment to life justified warrantless entry), cert.

In State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436 (1976), the police responded to a reported argument between the defendant and his wife at their mobile home.

Likewise, in State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436, 437-38 (1976), the police were justified in entering the defendant’s home following a standoff during which a gunshot was fired, when the police believed “that there might be a victim [inside] in need of immediate assistance.” This exception, thus, allows the police to conduct warrantless searches in the course of th

In State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436 (1976), the police responded to a reported argument between the defendant and his wife at their mobile home.

(citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971)); State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436, 438, 362 A.2d 194, 196 (1976).

t rests in law upon the State in any true suppression hearing, see State v. Palamia, 124 N.H. 333, 336, 470 A.2d 906, 907-08 (1983) (to justify admitting fruits of warrantless arrest); State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915, 396 A.2d 554, 555 (1978) (to show post -Miranda waiver); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 146, 370 A.2d 1153, 1153 (1977) (to show voluntariness of statement); State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436, 437, 362 A.2d 194, 195 (1976) (to show lawfulness of search and seizure).

We have also stated that “exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless search where there is a compelling need for immediate official action and a risk that the delay inherent in obtaining a warrant will present a substantial threat of imminent danger to life or public safety.” State v. Theodosopoulos, supra at 580, 409 A.2d at 1139; see also State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436, 438, 362 A.2d 194, 195 (1976).

Once the bag had been removed from the defendant’s pocket, the marijuana was in plain view, and its seizure was appropriate.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 471 (1971); State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436, 439, 362 A.2d 194, 196 (1976).

t was “discovered during a search with a warrant and as a practical matter such evidence was observed either prior to the discovery of the specified object or so nearly contemporaneously with its discovery so as to render the plain view seizure permissible.” This ruling is consistent with the “plain view” doctrine set out in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971); see State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436, 438, 362 A.2d 194, 196 (1976).

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971); State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436, 438, 362 A.2d 194, 196 (1976).

State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 409 A.2d 1134 (1979), Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436, 437-38, 362 A.2d 194, 195 (1976).

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967); State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436, 362 A.2d 194 (1976); Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement under the Fourth Amendment, 22 Buffalo L. Rev. 419, 426 (1973).

State v. Black, *472 116 N.H. 886, 368 A.2d 1177 (1976); State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436, 362 A.2d 194 (1976); State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 329 A.2d 376 (1974).

The remaining instructions are clear and unobjectionable and close with the following sentence: “But where our belief in a fact is so uncertain that we would hesitate to undertake something of importance and seriousness equal to these cases upon the strength of it, then there is a reasonable doubt.” This is the accepted definition of reasonable doubt approved by this court (State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436, 362 A.2d 194 (1976); State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 761-62, 329 A.2d 376, 385 (1974); State v