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For instance, we have concluded that exhaustion is not required when “the agency at issue lacks authority to act.” McNamara, 157 N.H. at 74; see Metzger v. Brentwood, 115 N.H. 287, 290 (1975); see also 3 E. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning § 55:13, at 55-27 to 55-29 (2012) (exhaustion is not required when administrative body lacks power to grant relief).

‘We have recognized that the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine is flexible, and that exhaustion is not required under certain circumstances.” Konefal, 143 N.H. at 258; see Metzger v. Brentwood, 115 N.H. 287, 290 (1975).

Konefal, 143 N.H. at 258, 723 A.2d 30; see Metzger v. Brentwood, 115 N.H. 287, 290, 343 A.2d 24 (1975).

Generally, parties must exhaust their administrative remedies before appealing to the courts.

We have recognized that the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine is flexible, and that exhaustion is hot required under certain circumstances.

“The rule requiring administrative remedies to be exhausted prior to appealing to the courts is based on the reasonable policies of encouraging the exercise of administrative expertise, preserving *332 agency autonomy and promoting judicial efficiency.” Metzger v. Brentwood, 115 N.H. 287, 290, 343 A.2d 24, 26 (1975) (decided under prior law).

For example, in Metzger v. Brentwood, 115 N.H. 287, 292, 343 A.2d 24, 27-28 (1975), a zoning ordinance prohibited issuance of a building permit unless the applicant’s property fronted on a “public right of way.” We upheld the zoning board of adjustment’s determination that a road closed subject to gates and bars was not a “public right of way” because, under the stat

John H. v. Brunette, 127 N.H. 40, 44, 500 A.2d 350, 352 (1985); see also Metzger v. Brentwood, 115 N.H. 287, 290, 343 A.2d 24, 26 (1975).

Fisher v. Town of Boscawen, 121 N.H. 438, 440, 431 A.2d 131, 132 (1981); Metzger v. Brentwood, 115 N.H. 287, 290-91, 343 A.2d 24, 26 (1975).

Olson v. Litchfield, 112 N.H. 261, 262, 296 A.2d 470, 471 (1972) is authority, albeit more general, for the same proposition, which thus construes the jurisdictional mandate to seek a rehearing from a local legislative body by the same limiting standard applied when a motion for rehearing before a ZBA is claimed to be prerequisite to appeal, see Metzger v. Brentwood, 115 N.H. 287, 290-91, 343 A.2d 24, 26-27 (1975).

Metzger v. Brentwood, 115 N.H. 287, 290, 343 A.2d 24, 26 (1975) (citing 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 20.01, at 56 (1958) (Supp. 1970, at 648)).

Metzger v. Brentwood, 115 N.H. 287, 343 A.2d 24 (1975) (road discontinued subject to gates and bars is not a “right of way” as that term is used in town’s zoning ordinance); see also Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 374 A.2d 954 (1977) (same); Bancroft v. Town of Canterbury, 118 N.H. 453, 457, 388 A.2d 199, 203 (1978) (amendment intended

The rehearing process “is geared to the proposition that the board of adjustment shall have a first opportunity to correct any action it has taken, if correction is necessary, before an appeal to the court is filed.” Bourassa v. Keene, 108 N.H. 261, 263, 234 A.2d 112, 113 (1967); see Metzger v. Brentwood, 115 N.H. 287, 290-91, 343 A.2d 24, 26 (1975).

The determination of the legal status of the road was not a matter upon which the board need be given an opportunity to act, and the *417 plaintiffs did not waive their right to have the issue judicially determined because of their failure to appeal the decision of the planning board.

Tremblay v. Town of Hudson, 116 N.H. 178, 179, 355 A.2d 431, 432 (1976); Metzger v. Brentwood, 115 N.H. 287, 290-91, 343 A.2d 24, 26-27 (1975).

Tremblay v. Town of Hudson, 116 N.H. 178, 179-80, 355 A.2d 431, 432 (1976); Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 115 N.H. 287, 290-91, 343 A.2d 24, 26 (1975).

Metzger v. Town of Brentwood, 115 N.H. 287, 343 A.2d 24 (1975).

RSA 282:5 G(l) (Supp. 1975); Metzger v. Brentwood, 115 N.H. 287, 343 A.2d 24 (1975).

Plaintiffs therefore did not have the required two hundred feet frontage as required by the ordinance for a building permit.

Tremblay v. Hudson, 116 N.H. 178, 355 A.2d 431 (1976); Metzger v. Brentwood, 115 N.H. 287, 343 A.2d 24 (1975).

Metzger v. Brentwood, 115 N.H. 287, 291, 343 A.2d 24, 27 (1975); K. Davis, Administrative Law Text § 20.09 (3d ed. 1972); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 433-36 (1965).

The possibility that a fourth hearing would have reached a different result is small in comparison to the burden which the hearing would impose.