Cited by

State v. Dean, 115 N.H. 520, 522 (1975) (“[T]he legislature has the power to enact laws defining crimes and to fix the degree, extent and method for punishment.” (quotation omitted)).

Deciding whether to impose a mandatory penalty for a criminal act is a policy decision that the New Hampshire Constitution empowers the legislature to make.

Our constitution “does not prohibit the legislature from constricting the independent exercise of judicial discretion by the requirement of mandatory sentences.” State v. Dean, 115 N.H. 520, 523 (1975).

Duquette, 154 N.H. at 747; State v. Dean, 115 N.H. 520, 523 (1975).

f an offense” as “an element that does not relate exclusively to the statute of limitations, jurisdiction, venue or to any other matter similarly unrelated to (1) the harm sought to be prevented by the definition of the offense, or (2) any justification or excuse for the prescribed conduct.” “The primary purpose of the habitual offender statute is to foster safety on the highways.” State v. Dean, 115 N.H. 520, 524 (1975).

In this respect, the penalty imposed upon an habitual offender is primarily for the protection of the public in removing from the highways an operator who is a dangerous and persistent offender.” State v. Dean, 115 N.H. 520, 524 (1975) (citation omitted; emphasis added).

The legislature, however, may choose to constrict the independent exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing.

State v. Dean, 115 N.H. 520, 522 (1975) (holding that a specific provision of the habitual offender statute controlled over a general provision of the Criminal Code).

State v. Dean, 115 N.H. 520, 523, 345 A.2d 408, 411 (1975) (“the exercise of the judicial privilege of suspension can be withdrawn by statutory language expressing a clear legislative intent that a sentence is to be mandatorily imposed”).

A trial court has broad discretion in sentencing, but it cannot impose a sentence that violates statutory requirements.

“The primary purpose of the habitual offender statute is to foster safety,” State v. Dean, 115 N.H. 520, 524, 345 A.2d 408, 411 (1975) (citing State v. Bowles, 113 N.H. at 574, 311 A.2d at 302), by removing “irresponsible drivers from the highways of the State,” State v. Bowles, 113 N.H. at 574, 311 A.2d at 302.

State v. Mullen, 119 N.H. 703, 705-09, 406 A.2d 698, 699-702 (1979); State v. Dean, 115 N.H. 520, 522-24, 345 A.2d 408, 410-11 (1975).

State v. Mullen, supra at 708, 406 A.2d at 701; see State v. Dean, 115 N.H. 520, 523, 345 A.2d 408, 411 (1975).

He argued that the court has both the statutory authority, RSA 504:1 (Supp. 1977); RSA 651:20, and the inherent common law power, e.g., State v. Dean, 115 N.H. 520, 522-23, 345 A.2d 408, 410 (1975), to suspend his sentence.

“Is the sentencing provision of RSA 262-A:62 I as amended unconstitutional for failure to set forth a maximum jail sentence?” Question I Question No. I is answered by reference to the cases of State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 300 A.2d 315 (1973), and State v. Dean, 115 N.H. 520, 345 A.2d 408 (1975).

The statute does not require a mandatory minimum sentence (Cf State v. Dean, 115 N.H. 520, 345 A.2d 408 (1975)), and under the provisions of the Criminal Code (RSA 625:2 II; State v. McMillan, 115 N.H. 268, 339 A.2d 21 (1975)) the trial court’s discretion in sentencing has been enlarged beyond what it was when the offense was charged.