Cited by

Because the trooper had no protected property right in his job, the procedure the State chooses to afford him accords with the mandates of the Due Process Clause.

As we have previously stated, “[a]n agency must follow its own regulations and a discharge procured in the face of a substantial violation of those regulations is invalid.” Colburn v. Personnel Commission, 118 N.H. 60, 63, 382 A.2d 907, 909 (1978) (citation omitted).

“An agency must follow its own regulations and a discharge procured in the face of a substantial violation of those regulations is invalid.” Colburn v. Personnel Commission, 118 N.H. 60, 63, 382 A.2d 907, 909 (1978).

“None of our decisions have held as a matter of State law that public employment per se becomes a protected property right of the employee.” Colburn v. Personnel Commission, 118 *745 N.H. 60, 64, 382 A.2d 907, 909 (1978) (quoting Desmarais v. State Personnel Comm’n, 117 N.H. 582, 588, 378 A.2d 1361, 1364 (1977)).

“The law of this State is well settled that an administrative agency must follow its own rules and regulations.” Appeal of the City of Nashua, 121 N.H. 874, 876, 435 A.2d 1126, 1127-28 (1981); Colburn v. Personnel Comm’n, 118 N.H. 60, 63, 382 A.2d 907, 909 (1978).

This distinction supports, though it does not necessarily limit, the general rule that an administrative officer may act on a written record of testimony by witnesses whom he has not personally seen or heard.

Upon our reading of the record, we find that the board made basic findings which supported its decision that the site was unsuitable as a sanitary landfill and which, in turn, were supported by the record.

Appeal of Parker, 121 N.H. 986, 988, 437 A.2d 283, 284 (1981); Colburn v. Personnel Commission, 118 N.H. 60, 64, 382 A.2d 907, 909 (1978).

*988 As to the due process rights to which a State employee is entitled, it is well settled that the “extent of an employee’s property interest in his employment, and consequently the degree of due process attendant upon his separation therefrom, is determined by applicable state law.” McIntosh v. Personnel Comm’n, 117 N.H. 334, 336, 374 A.2d 436, 437 (1977); see Colburn v. Personnel Commission, 118 N.H. 60, 64, 382 A.2d 907, 909 (1978) (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-45 (1976) and Per

Colburn v. Personnel Commission, 118 N.H. 60, 63, 382 A.2d 907, 909 (1978); see Hunt v. Personnel Comm’n, 115 N.H. 713, 716-17, 349 A.2d 605, 607-08 (1975).

Colburn v. Personnel Commission, 118 N.H. 60, 64, 382 A.2d 907, 909 (1978); Clark v. Manchester, 113 N.H. 270, 273-75, 305 A.2d 668, 671-72 (1973).

Colburn v. Personnel Commission, 118 N.H. 60, 65, 382 A.2d 907, 910 (1978); Scarborough v. Arnold, 117 N.H. 803, 806, 379 A.2d 790, 793 (1977).

Colburn v. Personnel Comm’n, 118 N.H. 60, 382 A.2d 907 (1978); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).

e.g., Colburn v. Personnel Commission, 118 N.H. 60, 382 A.2d 907 (1978); Society for the Protection of N.H. Forests v. Site Evaluation Comm., 115 N.H. 163, 337 A.2d 778 (1975).

Thus the indigency exception to RSA 98:14-a, recognized in Colburn v. Personnel Commission, 118 N.H. 60, 382 A.2d 907 (1978), is inapposite.

Colburn v. Personnel Comm'n, 118 N.H. 60, 382 A.2d 907 (1978); O'Loughlin v. N.H. Personnel Commission, 117 N.H. 999, 380 A.2d 1094 (1977).

Although the plaintiff attempted to contradict this testimony, “[t] he commission may of course credit or discredit any evidence presented to it.” O ’Loughlin v. N.H. Personnel Commission, 117 N.H. at 1002, 380 A.2d at 1096; Colburn v. Personnel Commission, 118 N.H. 60, 382 A.2d 907 (1978).