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“The rationale for enforcing promises restricting the use of land as equitable servitudes is that he who takes land with notice of a restriction upon it will not in equity and good conscience be permitted to act in violation of the terms of these restrictions.” Traficante v. Pope, 115 N.H. 356, 359 (1975) (quotation omitted).

It is well-established that a trial court may grant injunctive relief to abate a nuisance, see, e.g., Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 782 (2003), or to enforce property rights, see, e.g., Traficante v. Pope, 115 N.H. 356, 359 (1975).

“[A]n equitable servitude is a property interest in a burdened land, appurtenant to the benefited land,” which rests on a determination that the original promisor and promisee intended to benefit a particular lot.

*717 Covenants may be enforced between original parties and their successors “depending on the nature of the promise [within a covenant] and on the type of relief requested.” Traficante v. Pope, 115 N.H. 356, 358, 341 A.2d 782, 784 (1975) (citations omitted).

We need not decide whether these requirements should be relaxed for purely legal issues, however, because the interpretation of restrictive covenants requires a finding of intent, see Traficante v. Pope, 115 N.H. 356, 359, 341 A.2d 782, 784 (1975), and as such involves mixed questions of fact and law, “a common subject of collateral estoppel,” Caouette v. Town of New Ipswich, 125 N.H. 547, 555, 484 A.2d 1106, 1112 (1984).

Arnold v. Chandler, 121 N.H. 130, 134, 428 A.2d 1235, 1237 (1981); Traficante v. Pope, 115 N.H. 356, 359-60, 341 A.2d 782, 784-85 (1975).

Corp., 116 N.H. 814, 817, 367 A.2d 599, 601 (1976), and that restrictions on the use of land by private parties have been particularly important in our century, when the value of property often depends upon maintaining the character of the neighborhood within which the property is situated.

The restriction must be such that it “touches and concerns” the land.

Because no such agreement appears in any of the deeds conveying the land now owned by the defendants, we hold that the restrictions are not enforceable as restrictive or “real covenants” running with the land.

Nashua Garden Corp. v. Gordon, 118 N.H. 379, 382, 386 A.2d 1278, 1280 (1978); Traficante v. Pope, 115 N.H. 356, 341 A.2d 782 (1975).

Corp., 116 N.H. 814, 817, 367 A.2d 599, 601 (1976), it remains fundamental that the primary tool for determining whether grantees of lots in a subdivision may enforce such covenants is the “language of the instruments.” Traficante v. Pope, 115 N.H. 356, 360, 341 A.2d 782, 785 (1975).

Traficante v. Pope, 115 N.H. 356, 341 A.2d 782 (1975); Sun Valley Beach, Inc. v. Watts, 98 N.H. 428, 102 A.2d 504 (1954).

In Traficante v. Pope, 115 N.H. 356, 358, 341 A.2d 782, 784 (1975), we noted that private land use restrictions “have been particularly important in the twentieth century when the value of property often depends in large measure upon maintaining the character of the neighborhood in which it is situated.” They are particularly useful in the development