Cited by

Sousa v. State, 115 N.H. 340, 342 (1975) (citing Bow v. Plummer, 79 N.H. 23 (1918)).

land for recreational purposes in exchange for immunity from liability for 1 Although there was no right to recover in tort against the State under the common law, see Sousa v. State, 115 N.H. 340, 342-43 (1975), the State’s sovereign immunity “is the exception, rather than the rule, in tort cases,” Bergeron v. City of Manchester, 140 N.H. 417, 420 (1995).

III The State is immune from suit in its courts without its consent.

Lake Winnipesaukee Resort, 159 N.H. at 45; Sousa v. State, 115 N.H. 340, 342 (1975).

In New Hampshire, the State is immune from suit in its courts without its consent.

Thus, neither the statute nor the board’s compliance with it violate the petitioner’s right to equal protection.

LaRoche, Adm’r v. Doe, 134 N.H. 562, 567, 594 A.2d 1297, *209 1301 (1991); Sousa v. State, 115 N.H. 340, 345, 341 A.2d 282, 285-86 (1975).

Similarly, the bill provides no indication that justice will be anything but “complete [ ], and without any denial.” Finally, as “conformably to the laws” means in accordance with the rules of statutory and common law, cf. Sousa v. State, 115 N.H. 340, 343, 341 A.2d 282, 284 (1975) (civil suits), it simply refers back to the bill at issue here.

(3 Beeler) 311, 69 S.W.2d 887 (1934), the offered precedents do not persuade us that New Hampshire courts may hear an action where the State Legislature has not vested the courts with subject matter jurisdiction by “‘prescribing] the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued and the manner in which such suit will be conducted.’” Sousa v. State, 115 N.H. 340, 344, 341 A.2d 282, 285 (1975) (quoting Wooster v. Plymouth, 62 N.H. 193, 204 (1882)); see also Bow v. Plumer, 79 N.H. 23, 25, 10

Sovereign immunity was originally a common law doctrine, see Sousa v. State, 115 N.H. 340, 342, 341 A.2d 282, 284 (1975); it was, however, codified by the legislature in 1978, see RSA ch. 99-D (Supp. 1988).

That use and practice reflected the State’s immunity both to tort liability, Sousa v. State, 115 N.H. 340, 342, 341 A.2d 282, 284 (1975), *90 and to suit in its own courts without its consent.

immune from suit in its courts [unless it] consents]...” Sousa v. State, 115 N.H. 340, 342, 341 A.2d 282, 283 (1975).

The first is that the State is immune from suit in its own courts without its consent.

In our opinion, it is not necessary that we reach the ques *190 tion of whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as incorporated in RSA 99-D:l (Supp. 1981), is constitutional in order to resolve the appeals presently before us. We have held that the State may waive its immunity and permit suits to be brought by parties injured by the negligence of State agents.

Dunaisky v. State, 122 N.H. at 282, 444 A.2d at 534; Sousa v. State, 115 N.H. 340, 344, 341 A.2d 282, 285 (1975).

Assuming arguendo that the New Hampshire Hospital owed the plaintiffs a duty to conform its conduct to a certain standard of care, and that the plaintiffs could prove that the hospital had acted unreasonably and caused their injuries, they would not be able to recover against the State because sovereign immunity is the “law of [this] state.” RSA 99-D:l (Supp. 1981); see Sousa v. State, 115 N.H. 340, 342, 341 A.2d 282, 283 (1975).

This court has held that the rights guaranteed by part I, article 14 “are necessarily relative.” Sousa v. State, 115 N.H. 340, 343, 341 A.2d 282, 284 (1975); Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 205, 209, 304 A.2d 881, 885 (1973).