Cited by

Doe v. State, 114 N.H. 714, 717 (1974) (in absence of any sound reason of policy or otherwise for unfair discrimination produced by literal reading of statute, court rejected interpretation that would bar defendant whose only sentence following conviction was a fine from seeking annulment of that conviction); State v. Carpentino, 166 N.H. 9, 20

II, art. 52; see also Doe v. State, 114 N.H. 714, 718 (1974) (explaining that the pardon power “is an act of executive grace”).

Legislative history serves as a valuable aid in ascertaining the meaning of statutes, Doe v. State, 114 N.H. 714, 717, 328 A.2d 784, 786 (1974), and we resort to such aid where the statutes are ambiguous, Appeal of Public Serv.

The legislature has the constitutionally recognized authority to define criminal acts and to prescribe punishments, Doe v. State, 114 N.H. 714, 718, 328 A.2d 784, 787 (1974); N.H. CONST, pt.

The State argues, however, that the defendant cannot rely on RSA 651:5 I because Doe v. State, 114 N.H. 714, 716, 328 A.2d 784, 786 (1974), stands for the proposition that persons who are ordered to pay a fine as part of their sentence are not entitled to an annulment of their record.

is included in the greater punishment of imprisonment.

He cites Doe v. State, 114 N.H. 714, 828 A.2d 784 (1974), as authority for his position.

State v. McPhail, 116 N.H. 440, 362 A.2d 199 (1976); Doe v. State, 114 N.H. 714, 328 A.2d 784 (1974).

To hold otherwise would lead to an absurd and illogical result.

Saide v. Helgemoe, Warden, 116 N.H. 640, 365 A.2d 1043 (1976), decided this day; Doe v. State, 114 N.H. 714, 328 A.2d 784 (1974).

Doe v. State, 114 N.H. 714, 328 A.2d 784 (1974); Chaloux v. Chaloux Oil Co., 103 N.H. 539, 176 A.2d 192 (1961).

The statute should be construed reasonably to permit the district court to assume jurisdiction over this *699 misdemeanor and not so interpreted as to produce an illogical result.

The unfortunate and impractical result of the construction urged by the defendant also dictates its rejection (Doe v. State, 114 N.H. 714, 328 A.2d 784 (1974)), but in any event defendant places an unwarranted reliance on the use of the word “crime” in RSA 594:1 I (1974) and the relationship of the definition in RSA 625:9 II (b) (1974) to arrests.

It is established law that the legislature has the “power to enact laws defining crimes and to fix the degree, extent and method for punishment.” Doe v. State, 114 N.H. 714, 718, 328 A.2d 784, 787 (1974); N.H. Const. pt.

RSA 167:14(1964); cf. Doe v. State, 114 N.H. 714, 717, 328 A.2d 784, 786 (1974); Plymouth School Dist.

Doe v. State, 114 N.H. 714, 328 A.2d 784 (1974); General Electric Co. v. Dole Company, 105 N.H. 477, 202 A.2d 486 (1964).

The Criminal Code provides in RSA 651:3 III, except for certain crimes not relevant here, that all sentences shall be concurrent, and RSA 625:2 II provides that for an offense committed prior to the effective date of the criminal code, “the court may, with the consent of the defendant, impose sentence under the provisions of this code.” The defendant notes that in Doe v. State, 114 N.H. 714, 716, 328 A.2d 784, 785 (1974) we stated that RSA 625:2 II provided that a defendant “may, at his election