Cited by

The council notes that “[s]maller employers handle only smaller jobs” and “[l]arger jobs are handled only by larger employers.” The council further contends that “larger employers are likely to have a greater effect on the level of apprentice and journeyman wages than smaller employers.” We are not persuaded that these differences justify a difference in hiring ratios.

Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 17, 332 A.2d 168, 170 (1975); see Campbell Marine Const., Inc. v. Town of Gilford, 132 N.H. 495, 497, 567 A.2d 184, 185 (1989).

at 690-91, 506 A.2d at 312-13; see also Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 20, 332 A.2d 168, 172 (1975).

Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 18, 332 A.2d 168, 170-71 (1975) (part I, article 2 was amended in 1974 providing that equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged on the basis of, inter alia, creed or gender).

However, the equal protection doctrine mandates only that those who are similarly situated be similarly treated.

Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 17-18, 332 A.2d 168, 170-71 (1975); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 931-32, 424 A.2d 825, 830-31 (1980).

In Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 332 A.2d 168 (1975), we considered the constitutionality of the time limitation contained in RSA 556:10, and applied a rational basis test.

The defendant argues that section II creates a constitutionally impermissible classification which treats criminal defendants-indicted for negligent homicide under section II differently from similar defendants charged with negligent homicide under section I of the statute.

Merrill v. City of Manchester, 124 N.H. 8, 15, 466 A.2d 923, 928 (1983); Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 14 -15, 18, 332 A.2d 168, 170-71 (1975).

Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 931-32, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980); Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 18, 332 A.2d 168, 171 (1975).

(Supp. 1981) (recodified by Laws 1983, ch. 447) is treating similarly situated persons dissimilarly.

*943 See also Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 20, 332 A.2d 168, 172 (1975).

The issue before us is whether, under the circumstances presented in this case, RSA 281:12 (Supp. 1979) and:22 violate “the equal protection mandate that ‘those who are similarly situated be similarly treated.’ ” Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 931, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980) (quoting Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 661, 665, 406 A.2d 704, 706 (1979) and Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 17, 332 A.2d 168, 170 (1975)).

The issue is whether any of these classifications violates the equal protection mandate that “those who are similarly situated be similarly treated.” Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 661, 665, 406 A.2d 704, 706 (1979), quoting Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 17, 332 A.2d 168, 170 (1975).

The plaintiffs attack this result, arguing that the limitation contained in RSA 556:11 requiring suit within two years of the death of the decedent violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.

When a fundamental interest is involved, “State statutes are subjected to strict judicial scrutiny with the result that there must be a compelling state interest to sustain the legislation.” Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 18, 332 A.2d 168, 170-71 (1975).

The equal protection clause mandates that “those who are similarly situated be similarly treated.” Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 17, 332 A.2d 168, 170 (1975); U.S. CONST, amend.

Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 332 A.2d 168 (1975) (holding that the time allowed for substituting an administrator in an estate’s pending tort action must be the same in every county).

The equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and of part I, article 2 of the New Hampshire Constitution do not require complete equality, but they do require that persons similarly situ ated be similarly treated.See Opinion of the Justices, 115 N.H. 222, 223 (1975); Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 332 A.2d 168 (1975).

This rate system is neither based upon a suspect classification nor infringes upon a fundamental right, and is therefore not subject to strict judicial scrutiny.

Valley Bank v. State, 115 N.H. 15, 335 A.2d 652 (1975);Belkner v. Preston, Íl5 N.H. 151, 332 A.2d 168 (1975).

Valley Bank v. State, 115 N.H. 151, 335 A.2d 652 (1975); Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 332 A.2d 168 (1975).

Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 17-19, 332 A.2d 168, 170, 171 (1975); Valley Bank v. State, 115 N.H. 151, 154-55, 335 A.2d 652, 654 (1975); 31 Am.

Absent some fundamental right or suspect classification, the equal protection test to be applied is whether there is a rational basis for distinguishing between groups who are treated differently.

Consequently the test of constitutionality is whether the classification in the ordinance is reasonable and not arbitrary and bears a rational rela *649 tionship to a permissible state objective.

The fourteenth amendment requires that there be a rational relationship between the purpose of the statute and the classifications which it makes.

Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 17, 332 A.2d 168, 170 (1975); Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St.

While equal protection does not require complete equality in the face of factual differences, it does mandate that those who are similarly situated be similarly treated.

Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15, 332 A.2d 168 (1975); Peters v. University of N.H., 112 N.H. *155 120, 121, 289 A.2d 396, 397 (1972).