Cited by

“In this State a view is evidence.” State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 757 (1974).

State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 757 (1974) (holding that, although “the basic layout might have been gleaned from photographs and testimony, we cannot say it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow the view”).

In conformity with the practice in most States, the proceedings of the grand jury are secret.

Furthermore, the prosecutor did not utilize the fact of the defendant’s silence, nor did she comment upon it at any time.

“The basis for granting a mistrial is the existence of some circumstances which indicates that justice may not be done if the trial continues to verdict.” State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 757 (1974), cert.

“In conformity with the practice in most States the proceedings of the grand jury in this State are secret.” State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 755, 329 A.2d 376, 381 (1974).

Our constitution does not grant defendants the right to examine grand jury testimony.

State v. Heath, 129 N.H. 102, 109, 523 A.2d 82, 87 (1986); State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 753-54, 329 A.2d 376, 380 (1974), cert.

“The basis for granting a mistrial is the existence of some circumstance[] which indicates that justice may not be done if the trial continues to verdict.” State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 757, 329 A.2d 376, 382 (1974), cert.

“The basis for granting a mistrial is the existence of some circumstance[] which indicates that justice may not be done if the trial continues to a verdict.” State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 757, 329 A.2d 376, 382 (1974), cert.

done,” thereby justifying a mistrial.

“Whether to allow a view is by statute within the ‘discretion’ of the trial court (RSA 519:21), and its ruling will not be disturbed unless plainly wrong.” State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 757, 329 A.2d 376, 382 (1974), cert.

In situations falling between these two, where the motion to reopen is filed during jury deliberations, we have held that “[t]he decision whether or not to reopen a criminal case is within the discretion of the trial court.” State v. Booten, 114 N.H. 750, 761, 329 A.2d 376, 384 (1974), cert.

“The basis for granting a mistrial is the existence of some circumstances which indicates that justice may not be done if the trial continues to verdict.” State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 757, 329 A.2d 376, 382 *555 (1974).

This judicial discretion is, of course, limited today by the rule in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny, mandating the disclosure of exculpatory evidence, and we do not foreclose the possibility that factual and procedural peculiarities of a given case may ground a claim to some particular discovery as an element of fundamental fairness.

In exercising its discretion the trial court considers defendant’s need for the information and the effect disclosure will have on the prosecution.” State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 754, 329 A.2d 376, 380 (1974), cert.

The standard for reversible error in a prosecutor’s opening statement is that the prosecutor must be shown to have acted in bad faith, the opening statement must be completely unsupported by the evidence, and the defendant must be prejudiced thereby.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966); State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 760, 329 A.2d 376, 384 (1974), cert.

In State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 329 A.2d 376 (1974), cert.

The trial court’s general voir dire of the jury in this case, together with the court’s curative jury instructions, were designed to remedy possible prosecutorial error which might have prejudiced the defendant, State v. Radziewicz, 122 N.H. 205, 213, 443 A.2d 142, 147 *90 (1982), and have led ultimately to an unjust verdict.

There is no constitutional right to examine grand jury testimony under the State or the Federal Constitutions.

State v. Comparone, 110 N.H. 398, 399, 269 A.2d 131, 132 (1970); see State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 761, 329 A.2d 376, 384 (1974), cert.

In New Hampshire, “[i]t has long been the policy of the law, in furtherance of justice, that the investigations and deliberations of a grand jury should be conducted in secret, and that for most intents and purposes, all its proceedings should be legally sealed against divulgence.” Opinion of the Justices, 96 N.H. 530, 531, 73 A.2d 433, 434 (1950) (citation omitted); see State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 755, 329 A.2d 376, 381 (1974), cert.

State v. Pugliese, 120 N.H. 728, 730, 422 A.2d 1319, 1320-21 (1980); State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 757, 329 A.2d 376, 382 (1974), cert.

In this jurisdiction, the trial court has the discretion to allow a view, RSA 519:21, and the “[¡Information that a jury obtains from a view is evidence which it is authorized to use in reaching a verdict.” Chouinard v. Shaw, 99 N.H. 26, 27, 104 A.2d 522, 523 (1954); see State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 757, 329 A.2d 376, 382 (1974), cert.

State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 753-55, 329 A.2d 376, 380-82 (1974); United States v. Bryant, 563 F.2d 1227, 1230 (5th Cir. 1977).

There is no indication that the prosecutor at any time withheld from the defendant information in his possession.

If the defendant’s prior conviction were admissible in this case solely for impeachment of the defendant’s credibility, we would be faced with the difficult task of determining on balance whether the prosecutor’s comments compel a new trial even in the face of the limiting instruction.

State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 757, 329 A.2d 376, 382 (1974); see Arizona v. Washington, 98 S. Ct. 824 (1978).

In its detailed charge, the court several times referred to “reasonable doubt,” stating the substance if not the exact wording of RSA 625:10.

Determination of jury prejudice from news articles is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.

State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 329 A.2d 376 (1974); Boeckenhaupt v. United States, 392 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1968).

ectionable and close with the following sentence: “But where our belief in a fact is so uncertain that we would hesitate to undertake something of importance and seriousness equal to these cases upon the strength of it, then there is a reasonable doubt.” This is the accepted definition of reasonable doubt approved by this court (State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436, 362 A.2d 194 (1976); State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 761-62, 329 A.2d 376, 385 (1974); State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 289, 235 A.2d 117, 124

On motions for dismissal and for a directed verdict for the defendant, the evidence must be construed most favorably to the State.

The defendant’s exception to the denial of his motion for a mistrial is overruled.

State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 761-62, 329 A.2d 376, 385 (1974); State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 289, 235 A.2d 117, 124 (1967); Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954).

Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial.

State v. Conklin, 115 N.H. 331, 341 A.2d 770 (1975); State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 756, 329 A.2d 376, 383 (1974); cf. ABA Standards, Fair Trial and Free Press §§ 3.2, 3.4, 3.5(6) (e) and (f), 3.6 (Approved Draft 1968).

VI, XIV; State v. Jackson, 69 N.H. 511, 512, 43 A. 749, 750 (1898); State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 329 A.2d 376 (1974); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 353 (1966).