Cited by

State v. Kay, 115 N.H. 696, 698 (1975) (declining to adopt interpretation of consumer protection statute that would “nullify[ ] to an appreciable extent the purpose of the statute”).

The legislature will not be presumed to pass an act leading to an absurd result *512 and nullifying, to an appreciable extent, the purpose of the statute.

We do not presume that the legislature would pass an act leading to an absurd result, however, see State v. Kay, 115 N.H. 696, 698 (1975), and we will consider other indicia of legislative intent where the literal reading of a statutory term would compel an absurd result.

“We will construe statutes so as to effectuate their evident purpose,” Quality Carpets v. Carter, 133 N.H. 887, 889, 587 A.2d 254, 255 (1991) (quotation omitted), and will not apply a construction that nullifies, to an appreciable extent, that purpose, see State v. Kay, 115 N.H. 696, 698, 350 A.2d 336, 338 (1975).

Nevertheless, we do not assume that the legislature would enact statutory language that would lead to an absurd result.

Because “[i]t is not to be presumed that the legislature would pass an act leading to an absurd result and nullifying to an appreciable extent the purpose of the statute,” State v. Kay, 115 N.H. 696, 698, 350 A.2d 336, 338 (1975), Ashland’s interpretation cannot stand.

Conferring immunity only to those who post their land so as to prevent OHRV use would defeat this purpose, and construing the statute in this manner would deny immunity to those land owners who allow OHRV use and who the legislature clearly intended to be immune.

“It is not to be presumed that the legislature would pass an act leading to an absurd result and nullifying *472 to an appreciable extent the purpose of the statute.” State v. Kay, 115 N.H. 696, 698, 350 A.2d 336, 338 (1975); see RSA 625:3.

State v. Woodman, 114 N.H. 497, 500, 323 A.2d 921, 923-24 (1974); State v. Kay, 115 N.H. 696, 698, 350 A.2d 336, 338 (1975).

State v. Kay, 115 N.H. 696, 698, 350 A.2d 336, 338 (1975) (interpretation productive of absurd result is to be avoided).

“It is not to be presumed that the legislature would pass an act leading to an absurd result and nullifying to an appreciable extent the purpose of the statute.” State v. Kay, 115 N.H. 696, 698, 350 A.2d 336, 338 (1975).

We will not presume that in enacting RSA 651:3 and RSA 651-A:23 the legislature intended the absurd result that the defendant’s argument entails.

To construe the class immunized by RSA 169-C:31 (Supp. 1983) to include the alleged perpetrators of child abuse would constitute an untenable construction.

We will not presume that the legislature intended such an illogical result, or one so opposed to the evident purpose of the statute.

We will not construe the statute to produce such an illogical result.

“It is not to be presumed that the legislature would pass an act leading to an absurd result and nullifying to an appreciable extent the purpose of the statute.” State v. Kay, 115 N.H. 696, 698, 350 A.2d 336, 338 (1975).

State v. Kay, 115 N.H. 696, 350 A.2d 336 (1975); see also RSA 21:1.

We will give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in a statute, Corson v. Brown Products, Inc., 119 N.H. 20, 23, 397 A.2d 640, 642 (1979), unless such an interpretation would lead to an absurd, State v. Slayton, 116 N.H. 613, 615, 367 A.2d 575, 577 (1976), unjust, In re Sargent, 116 N.H. 77, 82, 354 A.2d 404, 407 (1976), or illogical result.

This is the only way in which the amendment can be construed consistently with the thrust of the entire chapter.