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Although we affirmed his conviction on direct appeal, see State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734 (1976), the defendant has maintained his innocence since his conviction and has instituted numerous collateral proceedings in an effort to secure his freedom.1 Since 2000, the defendant has succeeded in obtaining multiple rounds of DNA testing of fingernail clippings taken from Randall’s body.

In State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 737 (1976), the defendant was convicted of first degree murder.

Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949); State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 755 (1976).

Similarly, in State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734 (1976), the defendant challenged the sufficiency of a search warrant affidavit on the grounds that the affiant had intentionally omitted certain exculpatory information.

Furthermore, the decision to grant a motion to sequester the jury is within the sound discretion of the trial court, see State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 751, 367 A.2d 1320, 1333 (1976), and is not required simply because of media attention, United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1298 (7th Cir.), cert.

In the context of closing argument, a prosecutor may “draw[ ] reasonable inferences from the evidence which [do] not exceed the bounds of legitimate advocacy.” State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 750, 367 A.2d 1320, 1333 (1976) (citing State v. Bacon, 114 N.H. 306, 310, 319 A.2d 636, 640 (1974)).

State v. Sands, 123 N.H. at 604, 467 A.2d at 223; *187 State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 743-44, 367 A.2d 1320, 1328 (1976).

Collateral consequences arise during the sentencing stage of the criminal process, where due process requirements are less stringent.

This court has more recently stated that our review of a judge’s ruling on a suppréssion motion “necessarily must reflect the contextual, commonsensical, and fact-based nature of any probable cause determination.

Our determination, then, necessarily must reflect the contextual, commonsensical, and fact-based nature of any probable cause determination.

A judge exercises wide discretion in choosing the sources and types of evidence on which to rely in imposing sentence.

denied, 442 U.S. 931 (1979); Breest v. Helgemoe, 117 N.H. 40, 369 A.2d 612 (1977); State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 367 A.2d 1320 (1976); Breest v. Cunningham, Civ.

On appeal, we affirmed the conviction and upheld the validity of the certification proceeding.

A finding of probable cause to support a search warrant does not require more than a showing of “a strong probability that the facts alleged are true.” State v. Comeau, 114 N.H. 431, 434, 321 A.2d 590, 592 (1974); see State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 744, 367 A.2d 1320, 1328 (1976).

State v. Marcotte, 123 N.H. at 248, 459 A.2d at 280; State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 743, 367 A.2d 1320, 1328 (1976).

Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30 (1981); State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 754, 367 A.2d 1320, 1335-36 (1976); see Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648, 654 (2d Cir. 1977); U.S. Const. art. I, § 9; N.H. Const. pt.

State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 743, 367 A.2d 1320, 1328 (1976); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965).

State v. Perron, 118 N.H. at 246, 385 A.2d at 225; State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 751, 367 A.2d 1320, 1333 (1976).

State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 743-44, 367 A.2d 1320, 1328 (1976); State v. Salsman, 112 N.H. 138, 140-42, 290 A.2d 618, 619-21 (1972).

The allegations based on the arresting officer’s observations set forth in the application, when considered as a whole, sufficiently established probable cause.

State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 754-55, 367 A.2d 1320, 1336 (1976); State v. Gobin, 96 N.H. 220, 223, 73 A.2d 430, 432 (1950).

In considering a defense motion for a directed verdict, however, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.

State v. Dupuy, 118 N.H. 848, 395 A.2d 851 (1978); State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 367 A.2d 1320 (1976).

State v. Dupuy, 118 N.H. 848, 850, 395 A.2d 851, 852 (1978); State v. Breest, 116 N.H. *597 734, 741, 367 A.2d 1320, 1326 (1976).

On appeal to this court, he raised at least eight legal arguments that were answered in a lengthy opinion affirming his conviction.

In reviewing a denial of “a directed verdict for the defendant, the evidence must be construed most favorably to the State.” State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 741, 367 A.2d 1320, 1326 (1976).

State v. Dupuy, 118 N.H. 848, 395 A.2d 851 (1978); State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 367 A.2d 1320 (1976).

State v. Dupuy, 118 N.H. 848, 395 A.2d 851 (1978); State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 741, 367 A.2d 1320, 1326 (1976).

The test for review is that the State must show that the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the State with all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, was sufficient for the jury to find that the State had proved the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

In reviewing a trial court’s denial to set aside the verdict based on the insufficiency of the evidence, “this court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, which is entitled to all reasonable inferences that arise from the evidence.” State v. Berry, 117 N.H. 352, 355, 373 A.2d 355, 357 (1977); see State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 741, 367 A.2d 1320, 1326 (1976).

In reviewing denials of “motions for dismissal and for a directed verdict for the defendant, the evidence must be construed most favorably to the State,” State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 741, 367 A.2d 1320, 1326 (1976); “the defendant must show that the evidence viewed in its entirety, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences, was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the crime charged.” State v. Casey, 113 N.H. 19, 19, 300 A.2d 325, 326 (1973); acc

The established rule is that on review the evidence must be considered “in the light most favorable to the State with all reasonable inferences therefrom.” State v. Canney, 112 N.H. 301, 303, 294 A.2d 382, 383 (1972); accord, State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 367 A.2d 1320 (1976).

This court has previously upheld the 1973 jury-trial conviction of the defendant for murder in the first degree.

The evidence itself was clearly relevant and it was not of the type so inherently prejudicial that we could say the judge abused his discretion in admitting it.

the evidence must be construed most favorably to the State.” State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 741, 367 A.2d 1320, 1326 (1976).

We hold that on the evidence before the court, viewed in its entirety, it could be found that the defendants entered the premises without permission.

Although the trial court allowed defendant to challenge the search on the grounds that the affidavit submitted by Deputy LeBoeuf contained material misrepresentations, this court has never decided whether or not a defendant has the right to challenge a facially sufficient affidavit.

RSA 607:41-b, -c (Supp. 1972) now RSA 651:45-b, -c; see State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 367 A.2d 1320 (1976).