Cited by

Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 297 (1974) (holding that contacting and withdrawing assets from New Hampshire banks “falls within the ambit of the phrase ‘transacts any business’” in RSA 510:4, I).

ute, RSA 510:4, I (1997), permits jurisdiction over “[a]ny person who is not an inhabitant of this state and who, in person or through an agent, transacts any business within this state, commits a tortious act within this state, or has the ownership, use, or possession of any real or personal property situated in this state.” Because we construe the long-arm statute broadly, see Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 296-97, 319 A.2d 626, 627-28 (1974), personal jurisdiction over nonresidents may be ex

Although we construe our statutes providing personal jurisdiction over nonresidents “to the full constitutional limit,” Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 296, 319 A.2d 626, 627-28 (1974), we also consistently require strict compliance with statutory requirements for service of process.

However, we have held that the legislature intended RSA 510:4, I, “to be construed in the broadest legal sense to encompass personal, private and commercial transactions.” Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 297, 319 A.2d 626, 628 (1974) (citations omitted).

Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 296, 319 A.2d 626, 628 (1974); see also McGee v. International Life Ins.

In Camire v. Scieszka, 116 N.H. 281, 283, 358 A.2d 397, 399 (1976), we held that the test for in personam jurisdiction first *816 enunciated in Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 296, 319 A.2d 626,627-28 (1974), applies to quasi in rem jurisdiction as well.

83, 358 A.2d at 399, that is, a forum state may exert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); see Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 296, 319 A.2d 626, 628 (1974).

We have previously stated that the objective of this statute is “to allow the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporations to the full extent of the constitutional limit.” Engineering Associates v. B & L Liquidating Corp., 115 N.H. 508, 511, 345 A.2d 900,902 (1975);Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 296-97, 319 A.2d 626, 627-28 (1974).

Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 319 A.2d 626 (1974); RSA 510:4 I *206 (Supp. 1975).

This court has said that jurisdiction under a statute providing methods of acquiring in personam jurisdiction would be exercised to the full constitutional limit.

Second, it has to be consistent with principles of fair play and substantial justice.” Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 296, 319 A.2d 626, 628 (1974).

Finally the accident happened in the State of the defendant Hough’s residence and we are unable to discern any basis here to require him to defend himself in another jurisdiction.

On a prior appeal to this court, it was held that the New Hampshire courts had jurisdiction over the defendant in these actions under RSA 510:4 1 (Supp. 1975).

2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965); see Roy v. Transairco Inc., 112 N.H. 171, 291 A.2d 605 (1972); Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 319 A.2d 626 (1974); Kinchla v. Baumner, 114 N.H. 818, 330 A.2d 112 (1974).

Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 296, 319 A.2d 626, 627-28 (1974); Roy v. Transairco, Inc., 112 N.H. 171, 173, 291 A.2d 605, 606 (1972).

Therefore, so long as the defendants were not residents of this State at the time of service of process and a tortious act in this State has been alleged under RSA 510:4 I (Supp. 1973), we hold that our courts do have jurisdiction.