Cited by

“[P]ublic knowledge of the considerations upon which governmental action is based and of the decisions taken is essential to the democratic process.” Carter v. Nashua, 113 N.H. 407, 416 (1973) (citation omitted).

8 N.H. 616, 621, 392 A.2d 582, 586 (1978) (“not all procedural irregularities require a reviewing court to set aside an administrative decision; material prejudice to the complaining party must be shown”); cf. RSA 676:4, IV (1996) (planning board’s actions reversed for procedural defects only when “defects create serious impairment of opportunity for notice and participation”); Carter v. Nashua, 113 N.H. 407, 415, 308 A.2d 847, 853 (1973).

The purpose of this chapter is to ensure both the greatest possible public access to the actions, discussions and records of all public bodies, and their accountability to the people.” RSA 91-A:1 (1990); see Carter v. Nashua, 113 N.H. 407, 416, 308 A.2d 847, 853 (1973); see also N.H. Const. pt.

Second, they claim that financial hardship, while not alone sufficient to justify a variance, may become so unduly oppressive because of conditions unique to the property that a variance must be granted if it would not adversely affect the public interest, would observe the ordinance’s spirit, and serve justice.

see Carter v. City of Nashua, 113 N.H. 407, 419, 308 A.2d 847, 855 (1973) (financial hardship that is unduly oppressive because of conditions of the property distinguishing it from other properties similarly restricted could constitute unnecessary hardship).

Just as reasonable conditions may be attached by a zoning board of adjustment to approval of a variance to a zoning ordinance, Carter v. Nashua, 113 N.H. 407, 417-18, 308 A.2d 847, 854 (1973), or by a planning board to approval of a site plan, Sklar Realty, Inc. v. Town of Merrimack, 125 N.H. 321, 328, 480 A.2d 149, 152 (1984), so too may the PUC attach reasonable conditions in consideration of the interests of local residents when it grants a utility’s petition for exem

Although financial difficulties are a hardship, they are not necessarily “undue.” Cf. Carter v. Nashua, 113 N.H. 407, 419, 308 A.2d 847, 855 (1973).

Carter v. City of Nashua, 113 N.H. 407, 308 A.2d 847 (1973); Hardiman v. Town of Dover, 111 N.H. 377, 284 A.2d 905 (1971).

that they shall conform to the ordinances,” Stone v. Cray, 89 N.H. 483, 489, 200 A. 517, 522 (1938), thereby reserving to the municipality the ability to regulate the procedure before the board through adoption of an ordinance.

Furthermore, if the holder of the permit proceeds to erect a structure which differs from the one authorized by the permit the city can institute proceedings to enjoin its erection or to prevent the occupancy of the building erected on the premises.

Carter v. Nashua, 113 N.H. 407, 308 A.2d 847 (1973); Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 524 (1950, Supps.

Absent specific legislative intent to plainly and unmistakably deprive the commission of the benefits of advice of counsel, the commission’s receipt of legal advice cannot be deemed a violation of RSA 91-A:3 (Supp. 1973).

The first policy is that of the Right to Know Law which is to protect the democratic process by making public the decisions and considerations on which government action is based.

There is no question that a final vote was taken by the school board on March 12, 1973, in reference to the non-renewal of the plaintiff’s contract for the 1973-74 school year, and thus that meeting cannot be classified as an “executive session.” Herron v. Northwood, 111 N.H. 324, 326-27, 282 A.2d 661, 663 (1971); cf. Carter v. Nashua, 113 N.H. 407, 308 A.2d 847 (1973).

RSA 31:78; Carter v. Nashua, 113 N.H. 407, 308 A.2d 847 (1973); Bois v. Manchester, 113 N.H. 339, 306 A.2d 778 (1973).