Cited by

Cassady, 140 N.H. at 49, 662 A.2d at 958; State v. Morrill, 123 N.H. 707, 712, 465 A.2d 882, 886 (1983); State v. Bowles, 113 N.H. 571, 574, 311 A.2d 300, 302 (1973).

The Supreme Court in Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938), acknowledged that “Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission; for the double jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense.” See also State v. Bowles, 113 N.H. 571, 573, 311 A.2d 300, 302 (1973) (stating that “where the procedure is civil no question of double jeopardy arises”).

RSA 262:18; State v. Canney, 132 N.H. 189, 192, 562 A.2d 1315, 1316 (1989); State v. Ward, 118 N.H. 874, 878, 395 A.2d 511, 513 (1978) (discussing RSA 262-B:1, the precursor to RSA 262:18); State v. Bowles, 113 N.H. 571, 572, 311 A.2d 300, 301 (1973) (also discussing RSA 262-B:1).

Some of our own cases do contain language supporting the argument that revocation is considered a safety measure rather than a penalty, see State v. Greenwood, 115 N.H. 117, 119, 335 A.2d 644, 646 (1975); State v. Bowles, 113 N.H. 571, 574, 311 A.2d 300, 302 (1973); Cedergren v. Clarke, 99 N.H. 421, 423, 112 A.2d 882, 883-84 (1955), but these cases did not directly address the point in issue here.

State v. Perreault, 113 N.H. 588, 311 A.2d 303 (1973); Stale v. Bowles, 113 N.H. 571, 311 A.2d 300 (1973); see State v. Vashaw, 113 N.H. 636, 638, 312 A.2d 692, 693 (1973).

These results are civil rather than criminal in nature, State v. Bowles, 113 N.H. 571, 311 A.2d 300 (1973).

It is well established that “denial of the right to drive is not a criminal sanction when exercised by the State to remove irresponsible drivers from the highways of the State for the protection of the public.” State v. Bowles, 113 N.H. 571, 574, 311 A.2d 300, 302 (1973); see State v. Greenwood, 115 N.H. 117, 119, 335 A.2d 644, 646 (1975).

“The penalty for operating a motor vehicle in violation of an order under this statute is mandatory imprisonment in State prison for not more than five years nor less than one year ____” State v. Bowles, 113 N.H. 571, 572, 311 A.2d 300, 301 (1973) (emphasis added).

The defendant concedes, as he must, that the rule against double jeopardy is not applicable when one of the two proceedings is civil.

Defendant was found to be a habitual offender and his exceptions were transferred by Flynn, J. Defendant’s contention that proceedings under RSA ch. 262-B (Supp. 1972) are criminal and not civil has been decided against him in State v. Bowles, 113 N.H. 571, 311 A.2d 300 (1973), and we have had nothing presented to us in this case which induces us to depart from that decision.

This issue was settled adversely to the defendant in State v. Bowles, 113 N.H. 571, 311 A.2d 300 (1973) and State v. Despres, 107 N.H. 297, 220 A.2d 758 (1966), and we are not disposed to overrule those cases.

The primary purpose of the habitual offender statute is to foster safety on the highways.

State v. Despres, 107 N.H. 297, 220 A.2d 758 (1966); State v. Bowles, 113 N.H. 571, 574, 311 A.2d 300, 302 (1973).

In this case the defendant was twice convicted for drunken driving before the effective date of RSA ch. 262-B (Supp. 1972) and had his license revoked for three years in order to protect the public from his demonstrated inability to drive safely.

This case is governed by State v. Bowles, 113 N.H. 571, 311 A.2d 300 (1973), decided this day, holding that proceedings pursuant to RSA ch. 262-B (Supp. 1972) are civil in nature and are not criminal prosecutions.