Cited by

to arrest under the criteria enunciated in Albers for blockage of the sidewalk or interference with traffic.” See State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 137-38 (1973); see also Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 906 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[A]n alternative must be more than merely theoretically available.

A statute that fails under either test violates the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process.

He argues it should not be construed to prohibit legitimate contact without a “purpose to harass, intimidate, or otherwise abuse the complainant.” To further this argument, the defendant cites RSA 633:3-a, 11(a) (Supp. 2003) as an example of a legitimate purpose exception explicitly carved out by the legislature, and State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132 (1973), and State v. Smith, 127 N.H. 433 (1985), as examples of statutes that we have construed to avoid conflict with constitutional rights.

In State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 135-36 (1973), we noted that the literal language of New Hampshire’s then-existing “mob action” statute, which criminalized “the assembly of two or more persons to do an unlawful act,” would outlaw peaceful assemblies for the purpose of undertaking unlawful civil acts, such as torts and contract breaches.

protected freedoms.” State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 134, 303 A.2d 197, 199 (1973) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Pike, 128 N.H. 447, 450-51, 514 A.2d 1279, 1281 (1986).

State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 139, 303 A.2d 197, 202 (1973); cf. State v. Nickerson, 120 N.H. 821, 824-27, 424 A.2d 190, 192-94 (1980).

Opinion of the Justices, 128 N.H. 46, 509 A.2d 749 (1986); State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 303 A.2d 197 (1973).

State v. Nickerson, 120 N.H. 821, 824, 424 A.2d 190, 192 (1980); State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 134, 303 A.2d 197, 199 (1973).

State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 27, 458 A.2d 95, 100 (1983) (citing State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 134, 303 A.2d 197, 199 (1973)).

“A criminal statute is void for vagueness if it 'forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to *207 its application.’” State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 26, 458 A.2d 95, 100 (1983) (quoting State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 133, 303 A.2d 197, 199 (1973)).

A criminal statute is void for vagueness when it ‘“forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’” State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 26, 458 A.2d 95, 100 (1983) (quoting State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 133, 303 A.2d 197, 199 (1973)) (citation omitted).

An assertion that the ordinance failed to give him fair notice that the use was prohibited is a different and constitutional claim, expressing the due process concept that the vagueness of a statute or ordinance may render it void or unenforceable in the circumstances.

State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 133, 303 A.2d 197, 199 (1973); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).

A criminal statute is void for vagueness if it “forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 133, 303 A.2d 197, 199 (1973) (quoting Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926)).

State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 133-34, 303 A.2d 197, 199 (1973); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. at 390.

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); see State v. Nickerson, 120 N.H. 821, 824, 424 A.2d 190, 193 (1980); State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 133, 303 A.2d 197, 199 (1973).

Moreover, “[l]aws which by their broad or vague language leave to the police unfettered discretion in enforcement are invalid, particularly when their potential for use in the suppression of first amendment rights is great.” State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 134, 303 A.2d 197, 199 (1973).

State v. Cutting, 114 N.H. 200, 202, 317 A.2d 553, 554 (1974); see State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 133-34, 303 A.2d 197, 199 (1973).

State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 139, 303 A.2d 197, 202 (1973); State v. Derrickson, 97 N.H. 91, 93, 81 A.2d 312, 313 (1951); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).

Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1951); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); cf. State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 303 A.2d 197 (1973).

State v. Cutting, 114 N.H. 200, 202, 317 A.2d 553, 554 (1974); State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 303 A.d 197 (1973).

In State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 139, 303 A.2d 197, 202 (1973), we construed RSA 609-A:l II as limited to proscribing gatherings assembled for the specific purpose of imminently committing a crime in concert.

State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 133, 303 A.2d 197, 199 (1973); Zaimi v. United States, 476 F.2d 511, 524 (D.C.

For example, the test for vagueness is always applicable to statutes which create and define criminal offenses.