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“Such an abuse of [sentencing] discretion will also occur if the trial court fails to consider all the relevant factors necessary to the exercise of its discretion.” State v. Stone, 122 N.H. 987, 989, 453 A.2d 1272, 1274 (1982); State v. Streeter, 113 N.H. 402, 407, 308 A.2d 535, 538 (1973).

State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. at 23, 300 A.2d at 316 (“[T]he legislature has demonstrated in many instances its accord with the principle of judicial discretion in the sentencing of those found guilty of crime.”); State v. Streeter, 113 N.H. 402, 406, 308 A.2d 535, 538 (1973) (supreme court is not prepared to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court that disparity of sentences was not justified).

Such an abuse of discretion will also occur if the trial court fails to consider all the relevant factors necessary to the exercise of its discretion.

We find no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed.

Our sentencing statute, RSA ch. 651, and our case law, see, e.g., State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 395 A.2d 858 (1978) and State v. Streeter, 113 N.H. 402, 308 A.2d 535 (1973), make clear that sentencing is within the discretion of the trial court unless the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime.

Even if the crimes were identical, the defendants may not be.” State v. Church, 115 N.H. 537, 538, 345 A.2d 392, 393 (1975); State v. Robbins, 114 N.H. 427, 321 A.2d 583 (1974); State v. Streeter, 113 N.H. 402, 308 A.2d 535 (1973).

We held in State v. Streeter, 113 N.H. 402, 405, 308 A.2d 535, 537 (1973) that: “A convicted criminal should generally receive the same punishment as another with a like background who has committed the same crime.” We are not prepared to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court and hold as a matter of law that the sentences were inappropriate or e

While we have noted the possible effect of disparate sentencing for the same crime without a rational basis (State v. Streeter, 113 N.H. 402, 308 A.2d 535 (1973)), we have never indicated that a trial judge on the basis of facts available to him may not structure different sentences for the same crime to achieve the goals of punishment, deterrence, protection of society and rehabilitation.

Even if the crimes were identical, the defendants may not be.

State *340 v. Streeter, 113 N.H. 402, 407, 308 A.2d 535, 538 (1973); ABA Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, §§ 2.1 (d), 3.1 (c) (Approved Draft (1968)).

State v. Streeter, 113 N.H. 402, 403, 308 A.2d 535, 536 (1973); State v. Petkus, 110 N.H. 394, 398, 269 A.2d 123, 125 (1970); State v. Comparone, 110 N.H. 398, 399, 269 A.2d 131, 132 (1970).

Compare State v. Streeter, 113 N.H. 402, 308 A.2d 535 (1973) and Pilot Institute on Sentencing, 26 F.R.D.

“It is the rule in criminal cases that the trial court in the exercise of sound discretion may reopen a case for the purpose of admitting testimony in behalf of either the prosecution or the defense.” State v. Comparone, 110 N.H. 398, 399, 269 A.2d 131, 132 (1970); State v. Streeter, 113 N.H. 402, 403, 308 A.2d 535, 536 (1973); State v. Petkus, 110 N.H. 394, 397-98, 269 A.2d 123, 125 (1970).

State v. Streeter, 113 N.H. 402, 308 A.2d 535 (1973); State v. Ferbert, 113 N.H. 235, 306 A.2d 202 (1973); see Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970).

Although.the codefendant’s sentence is relevant, it is not determinative of excessiveness.

We do not hold that the sentence was an abuse of the court’s discretion.