Cited by

State v. Henderson, 154 N.H. 95, 97 (2006); Evans, 127 N.H. at 505; State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 842 (1978); State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 24 (1973).

Our precedents interpreting RSA 651:2 establish that a sentencing court “has broad discretion to assign different sentences, suspend [a] sentence, or grant probation in order to achieve the goals of punishment, deterrence, protection of society and rehabilitation.” State v. Evans, 127 N.H. 501, 505 (1985); cf. State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 24 (1973) (recognizing need for “options to adapt [a] sentence to a particular individual in the manner best suited to accomplish the constitutional object

State v. Smith, 119 N.H. 674, 675 (1979); State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 22 (1973); State v. Valrand, 103 N.H. 518, 519 (1961).

The legislature has vested in the trial court the power to adapt sentencing to best meet “the constitutional objectives of punishment, rehabilitation and deterrence.” State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 24, 300 A.2d 315, 317 (1973).

RSA 651:2 (1986 & Supp. 1991) and RSA 651:20 (current version at RSA 651:20 (Supp. 1991)) “demonstrate a continuing intent by the legislature to provide the sentencing judge with options to adapt his [or her] sentence to a particular individual in the manner best suited to accomplish the constitutional objectives of punishment, rehabilitation and deterrence.” State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 24, 300 A.2d 315, 317 (1973).

In State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 300 A.2d 315 (1973), we found that RSA 651:20 “demonstrate^] a continuing intent by the legislature to provide the sentencing judge with options to adapt his sentence to a particular individual in the manner best suited to accomplish the constitutional objectives of punishment, rehabilitation and deterrence.” Id.

Against these claims the State urges us to follow “the principle of judicial discretion in the sentencing of those found guilty of crime,” State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 23, 300 A.2d 315, 316 (1973), and argues that in the absence of legislative direction, the trial court has inherent authority to call forward a conviction or a sentence at any time.

State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 23, 300 A.2d 315, 316 (1973); LaVallee v. Perrin, 124 N.H. 33, 38-39, 466 A.2d 932, 936 (1983).

In State v. Mullen we held that the second offense of driving while intoxicated statute, which provides for a minimum seven-day sentence, did not abrogate all statutory and inherent judicial powers of suspension.

Although we have long recognized “the common-law power of the courts to suspend either the imposition or execution of a sentence,” State v. Valrand, 103 N.H. 518, 520, 176A.2d 189, 191 (1961); accord, State v. Dean, 115 N.H. 520, 345 A.2d 408 (1975); State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 300 A.2d 315 (1973); State v. Thomson, 110 N.H. 190, 263 A.2d 675 (1970), this court has held that the common law power does not extend to instances such as the present *676 case where the term of the court that sent

“Is the sentencing provision of RSA 262-A:62 I as amended unconstitutional for failure to set forth a maximum jail sentence?” Question I Question No. I is answered by reference to the cases of State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 300 A.2d 315 (1973), and State v. Dean, 115 N.H. 520, 345 A.2d 408 (1975).

Nonetheless, “[t]he intention of the legislature is to be determined from the language of the statute as a whole and not from the use of a particular word or phrase.” State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 25, 300 A.2d 315, 317 (1973).

State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 22, 300 A.2d 315, 316 (1973); State v. Valrand, 103 N.H. 518, 519-20, 176 A.2d 189, 191 (1961); E. Page, Judicial Beginnings in New Hampshire 1640-1700, at 114 (1959).

Defendant maintains that our opinion in State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 300 A.2d 315 (1973), sustains his position that the district court has such authority.

Pilot Institute on Sentencing, supra at 379; State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 300 A.2d 315 (1973); N.H. Const. pt.

The record shows that the court considered the factors set out in State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 300 A.2d 315 (1973), in the light of the recommendations of the prosecutor and of defendant’s counsel, the probation report, and the evidence at the trial.

The defendant’s position is not aided by the phrase “issued or delivered” in RSA 268:15 (Supp. 1973).

treatment of offenders make it more necessary now than a century ago for observance of the distinctions in the evidential procedure in the trial and sentencing processes”; and that with the practice of “individualizing punishments, investigational techniques have been given an important role.” Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 248, 249, 93 L. Ed. at 1343, 69 S. Ct. at 1084; State v. Burroughs, 113 N.H. 21, 300 A.2d 315 (1973); see Note, 81 Harv.