Cited by

Tanguay, 127 N.H. at 578 (“Prior to [Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388 (1973)], a landlord was not liable, except in certain limited situations, for injuries caused by defective or dangerous conditions in the leased premises.”).

In Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 391 (1973), we abolished specialized tests for landlord negligence because they immunized individuals occupying the position of “landlord” from the “simple rules of reasonable conduct which govern other persons in their daily activities.” We noted that “[t]he ground of liability upon the part of a landlord when he de

Immunity is the rare exception.” Merrill v. Manchester, 114 N.H. 722, 728 (1974) (citation omitted); see also Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 396 (1973).

Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 557, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (1976); see also Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 397-99, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973).

See, e.g., Tanquay v. Marston, 127 N.H. 572, 577, 503 A.2d 834, 837 (1986); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 553, 364 A.2d 631, 632 (1976); Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 397, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973).

Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 390, 308 A.2d 528, 529 (1973) (holding landlord liable for death of girl who fell on steep stairway with insufficient railing).

On one hand lies the accepted maxim that all persons, including landlords, have a duty to exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm.

A landlord must act as a reasonable person under all of the circumstances including the likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such injuries, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk.” Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 397, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973).

Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 391, 308 A.2d 528, 530 (1973); Fissette v. Railroad, 98 N.H. 136, 141, 96 A.2d 303, 306 (1953); Robinson v. Railroad, 85 N.H. 474, 475-76, 160 A. 473, 474 (1932).

This rule has not been modified in any way by Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973), which is limited to on-the-premises conditions.

- Unlike the situation in Papakalos, the accident did not occur on a part of the premises over which the lessor retained control or otherwise as to which he had the duty at common law to use reasonable care to keep in reasonably safe condition.

The plaintiffs argued that in Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973), this court had strongly indicated an intention to abolish judicially determined status distinctions as the sole determinant of the standard of care owed by an occupier of land to an entrant on the land.

Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 399, 308 A.2d 528, 535 (1973); Morley v. Clairmont, 110 N.H. 12, 14, 259 A.2d 136, 137 (1969); Hood & Sons v. Boucher, 98 N.H. 399, 404, 101 A.2d 466, 469-70 (1953).

Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 90, 276 A.2d 248, 250 (1971); Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).