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We have previously recognized that an “expansive construction” of the language in RSA 91-A:5, IV 8 that establishes exemptions would allow “the exemption to swallow the rule and is inconsistent with the purposes and objectives of the right-to-know law.” Mans v. Lebanon School Bd., 112 N.H. 160, 162 (1972); see Herron v. Northwood, 111 N.H. 324, 327 (1971) (observing that the legislature “has placed a high premium on the public’s right to know”).

Although the statute does not provide for unrestricted access to public records and proceedings, to best effectuate the statutory and constitutional objective of facilitating access to all public documents and proceedings, we resolve questions regarding the Right-to-Know Law with a view to providing the utmost information.

However, the question of mootness is not subject to rigid rules, but is regarded as one of convenience and discretion.

See, e.g., Fenniman, 136 N.H. at 626, 620 A.2d at 1040; Herron v. Northwood, 111 N.H. 324, 326, 282 A.2d 661, 663 (1971).

91-A’s scope and application each time it has amended the statute.

Cognizant that RSA ch. 91-A, the “right to know law,” is designed “to permit freedom of access to public records and proceedings,” Hardiman v. Dover, 111 N.H. 377, 380, 284 A.2d 905, 907 (1971), quoting Herron v. Northwood, 111 N.H. 324, 326, 282 A.2d 661, 663 (1971), we conclude that the recess of the hearing did not adversely affect the rights of the defendant.

We hold that there is a pressing public interest that the *415 present issue be decided without delay and will do so.

Herron v. Northwood, 111 N.H. 324, 282 A.2d 661 (1971); Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So.

Mans v. Lebanon School Bd., 112 N.H. 160, 290 A.2d 866 (1972); Herron v. Northwood, 111 N.H. 324, 282 A.2d 661 (1971).

“[T]rue the question of mootness is one of convenience and discretion not subject to hard and fast rules” (Dolcino v. Thalasinos, 114 N.H. 353, 354, 321 A.2d 107 (1974)), nevertheless for us to disregard apparent mootness there must be some pressing interest such as the avoidance of future litigation.

There is no question that a final vote was taken by the school board on March 12, 1973, in reference to the non-renewal of the plaintiff’s contract for the 1973-74 school year, and thus that meeting cannot be classified as an “executive session.” Herron v. Northwood, 111 N.H. 324, 326-27, 282 A.2d 661, 663 (1971); cf. Carter v. Nashua, 113 N.H. 407, 308 A.2d 847 (1973).

Trustees, 114 N.H. 123, 127, 316 A.2d 183, 185 (1974); Herron v. Northwood, 111 N.H. 324, 327, 282 A.2d 661, 663 (1971); Hood & Sons v. Boucher, 98 N.H. 399, 401, 101 A.2d 466, 468 (1953)), we are of the opinion that the issues raised in this case should be determined in a true controversy which affects the legal relations of the parties to the litigation.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has applied its opinions and decisions prospectively whenever it has thought justice to be better served by doing so (e.g., Herron v. Northwood, 111 N.H. 324, 282 A.2d 661 (1971) (budget committee’s violation of right-to-know law); Madbury v. Durham, 108 N.H. 474, 240 A.2d 760 (1968) (allocation of foundation aid to component school districts of cooperative school district); Rix v. Asadoorian, 103 N.H. 330, 171 A.2d 925 (1961) (constitutional amendment on avail

or future litigation may be avoided.” State v. Swift, 101 N.H. 340, 342, 143 A.2d 114, 116 (1958); Herron v. Northwood, 111 N.H. 324, 327, 282 A.2d 661, 663 (1971).

We have recently noted that amendments to the “right to know” law in Laws 1969, 482:2 and Laws 1971, ch. 327 “indicate a disposition to broaden the statute’s scope and application” (Herron v. Northwood, 111 N.H. 324, 325, 282 A.2d 661, 662 (1971)) and our intention to resolve questions “with a view to providing the utmost information”.

The trial court properly found and ruled that the taking of the vote by the board in executive session was a violation of RSA ch. 91-A (Supp. 1972).

or future litigation may be avoided.” State v. Swift, 101 N.H. 340, 342, 143 A.2d 114, 116 (1958); Herron v. Northwood, 111 N.H. 324, 327, 282 A.2d 661, 663 (1971).

Though one of the principal purposes for rendering declaratory judgments has been to avoid future litigation, a decree at this time on this record could only spawn controversy.

Kenison, C.J. The issue presented in this case is whether RSA ch. 91-A(supp.), popularly referred to as the right-to-know law (Herron v. Northwood, 111 N.H. 324, 282 A.2d 661 (1971)), entitles plaintiff, a resident taxpayer of Lebanon, to access to the name and salary of each schoolteacher in Lebanon School District.

We have held that RSA 91 - A:3(supp.) must be interpreted broadly to effectuate the “primary purpose of the statute to permit freedom of access to public records and proceedings.