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In addition, although “the husband’s ability to pay is a vital factor to be considered by the court,” Calderwood, 114 N.H. at 653, 327 A.2d at 706, this is not a case where “the trial judge has the problem of dividing the meager loaves and fishes without the aid of a miracle.” Comer v. Comer, 110 N.H. 505, 507, 272 A.2d 586, 587 (1970).

Such discretion is especially great in a libel for divorce where minor children are involved.

There can be no question that the husband’s ability to pay is a relevant factor in determining alimony in cases such as this.

y with one party since before the marriage, Grandmaison supra, or its recent acquisition through one party’s family relationship, Henderson v. Henderson, 121 N.H. 807, 810, 435 A.2d 133, 135 (1981); the parties’ relative abilities to support themselves, Buckner v. Buckner, 120 N.H. 402, 404-05, 415 A.2d 871, 873 (1980); the need of one party to provide a home for minor children, Comer v. Comer, 110 N.H. 505, 508, 272 A.2d 586, 587-88 (1970); the need to assure both parties’ security for the futu

ecognized that Robert did reside with the defendant, but nonetheless refused to award support benefits for him, based upon a finding that he was “an emancipated child, not in need of support or a custodial placement.” In determining a child’s need for support, a trial judge must consider all relevant factors and then make a determination “within the bounds of judicial discretion.” Comer v. Comer, 110 N.H. 505, 507, 272 A.2d 586, 587 (1970).

Grandmaison v. Grandmaison, 119 N.H. 268, 271, 401 A.2d 1057, 1059 (1979); Azzi v. Azzi, 118 N.H. 653, 656, 392 A.2d 148, 150 (1978); see Comer v. Comer, 110 N.H. 505, 507-08, 272 A.2d 586, 587-88 (1970).

Additionally, particularly when the parties possess meager assets, the husband’s ability to support his former wife and their children must be given careful consideration.

Grandmaison v. Grandmaison, 119 N.H. 268, 271, 401 A.2d 1057, 1059 (1979); Azzi v. Azzi, 118 N.H. 653, 656, 392 A.2d 148, 150 (1978); see Comer v. Comer, 110 N.H. 505, 508, 272 A.2d 586, 587-88 (1970).

We also note that *649 the court should consider all relevant factors, Comer v. Comer, 110 N.H. 505, 507, 272 A.2d 586, 587 (1970), and this includes all of the assets and income sources of both parties, such as wages, pensions, bank certificates, etc. Thayer v. Thayer, 119 N.H. 871, 409 A.2d 1326 (1979).

In setting alimony the court could properly have considered as relevant factors the income of the husband and the assets of the parties, the length of time they were married, the contributions of the wife as homemaker and mother, and the present needs of the wife and her ability to meet them.

Prior to the adoption of RSA 458:7-a (Supp. 1975) in 1971, fault, was a recognized factor under our decisions to be considered in determining property division and support payments.

Twomey v. Twomey, 116 N.H. 29, 33, 351 A.2d 66, 69 (1976); Popik v. Popik, 115 N.H. 668, 670, 348 A.2d 341, 342-43 (1975); Labrie v. Labrie, 113 N.H. 255, 257, 305 A.2d 687, 688 (1973); Comer v. Comer, 110 N.H. 505, 507, 272 A.2d 586, 587 (1970).

The award of the house in Moultonboro was not made solely in satisfaction of the husband’s arrearage on the support order but was based upon other relevant factors.

Comer v. Comer, 110 N.H. 505, 272 A.2d 586 (1970); Collette v. Collette, 108 N.H. 469, 238 A.2d 598 (1968).

As to these orders, it is fundamental in such cases that the court has broad discretion (Comer v. Comer, 110 N.H. 505, 507, 272 A.2d 586, 587 (1970)) and that its decision will not be set aside unless “the evidence demonstrates clearly an abuse” of such discretion.

Co. v. Hopkins, 105 N.H. 231, 196 A.2d 66 (1963); cf. Comer v. Comer, 110 N.H. 505, 272 A.2d 586 (1970).

Ford v. Ford, 112 N.H. 270, 293 A.2d 605 (1972); Comer v. Comer, 110 N.H. 505, 272 A.2d 586 (1970).

This court has not restricted or delimited this discretion when exercised within proper bounds.

All too often “the trial judge has the [unenviable] problem of dividing the meager loaves and fishes without the aid of a miracle.” Comer v. Comer, 110 N.H. 505, 507, 272 A.2d 586, 587 (1970).

Mindful that we have left it to the trial court to “consider all factors relevant to the decision” of a request for support and alimony and to attribute weight to each, we have not restricted or delimited this discretion when exercised within proper bounds.

We have recently rejected a formula approach to either division of property or support orders in domestic relation cases (Comer v. Comer, 110 N.H. 505, 272 A.2d 586 (1970)) and in the present case weighing all the factors which might properly be considered by the court the property division was within his dis - cretion and power.

We have recently rejected the contention that we should lay down specific guidelines to be followed by trial judges in exercising their discretion with respect to the division of property in divorce proceedings (Comer v. Comer, 110 N.H. 505, 272 A.2d 586 (1970)), and the same consideration leads us to also reject such a course with respect to custody and visitations.