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rather, a doctrine regarding the equitable remedy of subrogation, it does not depend upon feudal principles under which “a lease was considered primarily as a conveyance of lands for a certain term or at will,” and the “tenant was considered both an owner and occupier in order to provide him with the remedies with which to protect his interest against the landlord and others.” Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 90 (1971) (citations omitted).

7 tenants pleaded this claim under the common law theory, see Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92-93 (1971), the trial court premised its award of $608 upon the statutory defense to violations of the standards of fitness for health and safety codified in RSA 540:13-d.

Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92-93 (1971) (establishing an implied warranty of habitability in every residential lease on the basis of public policy).

Assoc., 146 N.H. 130, 133 (2001) (upholding district court’s award of restitution of real estate commission where defendant was not a licensed real estate broker and, thus, lacked authority to collect commission); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 93 (1971) (noting that basic contract remedies, including rescission, are available to tenants in district court for landlord’s breach of implied warranty).

Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92 (1971) (stating implied warranty of habitability in every lease requires landlord to maintain essential facilities in condition that makes property livable).

Sargent, 113 N.H. at 394 (“[T]he landlord is best able to remedy dangerous conditions.”); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92 (1971) (“Common experience demonstrates that the landlord has a much better knowledge of the conditions of the premises than the tenant.”).

Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 91 (1971) (“The importance of a lease of an apartment today is not to create a tenurial relationship between the parties, but rather, to arrange the leasing of a habitable dwelling.”).

Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92-93 (1971) (recognizing implied warranty of habitability in residential leases; explaining that a tenant may obtain basic contract remedies of damages, reformation, and rescission by instituting an action for breach of warranty or by offsetting his damages against a claim made against him by the landlord; and setti

We need not reconsider whether to extend the warranty of habitability to commercial leases because Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92 (1971), the decision in which we first recognized an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases, does not support the proposition the defendant would have us apply, namely, that breach of the warranty of habitability allows a tenant to withhold rent and defeat an eviction action.

A defect that renders premises unsafe or unsanitary, and thus unfit for living therein, constitutes a breach of the implied warranty of habitability.

Any claim that the plaintiff may have regarding the defective roof would be against his son, as a lessor, for breach of implied warranty of habitability.

Neither the implied warranty of habitability that we recognized in Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971), nor the statutory language of RSA chapter 205-A or RSA 540:13-d, immunizes a manufactured housing park tenant who withholds rent without a court order from an action for possession.

Compare Golub v. Colby, 120 N.H. 535, 536, 419 A.2d 397, 398 (1980) with Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 251 (1971).

that the apartment is habitable and fit for living,” and that “there are no latent defects in facilities vital to the use of the premises for residential purposes.” Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 251-52 (1971); see also Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C.

Although the court denied the second sentence, which quotes directly from Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 251 (1971), this part of the instruction, like the case from which it was taken, dealt with the implied warranty of habitability which is not at issue in this case.

As the seminal landlord-tenant case in this jurisdiction teaches, policy considerations are important in construing residential leases.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the court erred in granting defendant’s motion on the grounds that “New Hampshire law recognizes no implied warranty of safety in the rental of business premises.” The plaintiffs argue that the factors considered by this court in Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971), in a residential setting, are also appropriate and applicable to commercial leases.

A lease is a contract and gives rise to both express and implied covenants.

Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 90, 276 A.2d 248, 250 (1971); Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).

Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Clarke v. O’Connor, 435 F.2d 104, 111 (D.C.

We stated in Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 91, 276 A.2d 248, 251 (1971), that it granted “to municipalities the power to establish and enforce minimum standards for use and occupancy of dwellings.” The interpretation we place on the Dover Ordinance that it is intended to protect the occupants of dwellings cannot be construed as an “ex post facto” judicial in