Cited by

Taken as a whole, this statute reflects the “long established principle under our law that towns are but subdivisions of the State and have only the powers the State grants to them.” Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 295 (1970) (quotation omitted).

thing to be worn by bathers and swimmers.” In addition, RSA 47:17, XV (2012) gives the city the power to “make any other bylaws and regulations which may seem for the well-being of the city” so long as “no bylaw or ordinance” is “repugnant to the constitution or laws of the state.” Moreover, the governmental authority known as the police power is an inherent attribute of state sovereignty.

Dow, 148 N.H. at 130; Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 299 (1970).

Compare RSA 674:39 with Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 299 (1970).

Without taking into account the developer’s completion of six houses, the court concluded that the developer had completed only about 3 percent of its project, and agreed with the planning board that this percentage was insufficient to constitute the “substantial construction” necessary to vest the right to complete the project under the common law standard of Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 299 (1970).

Under this standard, there is a presumption favoring the constitutionality of the regulation, and in determining the validity of a municipal ordinance, its reasonableness will be presumed.

As a matter of New Hampshire common law, an owner who, relying in good faith on the absence of any regulation, has done substantial construction on property or who has incurred substantial liabilities relating to property, or both, acquires a vested right to complete the project in spite of the subsequent adoption of an ordinance prohibiting the use.

Girard v. Town of Allenstown, 121 N.H. 268, 270, 428 A.2d 488, 489 (1981); Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 295, 266 A.2d 103, 106 (1970).

Chasse v. Town of Candia, 132 N.H. 574, 579, 567 A.2d 999, 1002 (1989); see also Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 299, 266 A.2d 103, 109 (1970).

Davis v. Town of Barrington, 127 N.H. 202, 210, 497 A.2d 1232, 1237 (1985); Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 299, 266 A.2d 103, 109 (1970).

A property owner acquires a vested right to complete his project in spite of the subsequent adoption of an ordinance prohibiting the same only when he has relied in good faith on the absence of any regulation that would prohibit his proposed project, and has made substantial construction on the property or has incurred substantial liabilities relating directly thereto.

mon-law rule that “an owner, who, relying in good faith on the absence of any regulation which would prohibit his proposed project, has made substantial construction on the property or has incurred substantial liabilities relating directly thereto, or both, acquires a vested right to complete his project in spite of the subsequent adoption of an ordinance prohibiting the same.” Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 299, 266 A.2d 103, 109 (1970).

A landowner who, relying in good faith on the absence of any regulation which would prohibit his proposed project, makes substantial construction on his property, acquires a vested right to complete the project despite the subsequent adoption of an ordinance prohibiting the same.

L. Grossman & Sons, Inc. v. Town of Gilford, 118 N.H. at 483, 387 A.2d at 1180; Metzger v. Brentwood, 117 N.H. 497, 502-03, 374 A.2d 954, 958 (1977); see Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 298, 266 A.2d 103, 108 (1970).

Navin v. Exeter, 115 N.H. 248, 251, 339 A.2d 12, 14 (1975); see Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 299, 266 A.2d 103, 109 (1970).

Our consideration of the question transferred must begin with a recognition that “[i]t is a long established principle under our law that towns are but subdivisions of the State and have only the powers the State grants to them.” Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 295, 266 A.2d 103, 106 (1970).

any regulation which would prohibit his proposed project, has made substantial construction on the property or has incurred substantial liabilities relating directly thereto, or both, acquires a vested right to complete his project in spite of the subsequent adoption of an ordinance prohibiting the same.” Gosselin v. Nashua, 114 N.H. 447, 451, 321 A.2d 593, 596 (1974) quoting Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 299, 266 A.2d 103, 109 (1970).

Towns are authorized under RSA 31:39 (Supp. 1979) to make by-laws for a variety of purposes which fall into the category of health, welfare and public safety.

Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 266 A.2d 103 (1970); State v. Zetterberg, 109 N.H. 126, 244 A.2d 188 (1968); State v. Jenkins, 102 N.H. 545, 162 A.2d 613 (1960).

We have held that municipalities have only those powers that are granted by the State.

The master found that the plaintiff’s investment in the store is substantial as defined in Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 266 A.2d 103 (1970).

Despite the fact that the selectmen referred to the wrong source of their power to enact the ordinance, it is still valid because there is in fact an alternative source of power.

Defendants rely on the “long established principle under our law that towns are but subdivisions of the State and have only the powers the State grants to them,” Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 295, 266 A.2d 103, 106 (1970); accord Bisson v. Milford, 109 N.H. 287, 288, 249 A.2d 688, 689 (1969), and contend that nowhere in New Hampshire’s zoning enabling legislation, RSA 31:60-89, is a town granted the authority to adopt rules governing procedure before the board of adjustment.

It follows that towns have such powers as are expressly granted to them by the legislature and such as are necessarily implied or incidental thereto.” Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 295, 266 A.2d 103, 106 (1970).

This in itself did not yield a right of access specifically for the seven lots.

ire has been that “an owner, who, relying in good faith on the absence of any regulation which would prohibit his proposed project, has made substantial construction on the property or has incurred substantial liabilities relating directly thereto, or both, acquires a vested right to complete his project in spite of the subsequent adoption of an ordinance prohibiting the same.” Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 299, 266 A.2d 103, 109 (1970); R.A.

The issue of the extent of land use regulations which may be enacted by a town pursuant to the police power without having to comply with the zoning enabling act is considered in light of Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 266 A.2d 103 (1970), and Bisson v. Milford, 109 N.H. 287, 249 A.2d 688 (1969).

The record before us reveals no showing by plaintiffs of substantial sums spent in contemplation of expansion of their parks beyond the number of units presently in existence.

Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 300, 266 A.2d 103, 109 (1970); Bosse v. Portsmouth, 107 N.H. 523, 532, 226 A.2d 99, 107 (1969); Winn v. Lamoy Realty Corporation, 100 N.H. 280, 124 A.2d 211 (1956).

Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N.H. 266, 275 (1856); Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 295, 266 A.2d 103, 106 (1970); Opinion of the Justices, 109 N.H. 396, 400, 254 A.2d 273, 276 (1969); see Annot., 105 A.L.R.

Brady v. Keene supra; Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 299, 266 A.2d 103, 109 (1970); New York St.

Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 296, 266 A.2d 103, 107 (1970), and cases cited; see Brown v. Carlisle, 336 Mass. 147, 142 N.E.2d 891 (1957).