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It has long been true in this State that agreements between parties in a divorce proceeding, although binding upon them, are not binding upon the trial court, see Bossi, 131 N.H. at 265; Mortner, 168 N.H. at 429; Miller, 133 N.H. at 590; Narins, 116 N.H. at 202; Madsen v. Madsen, 109 N.H. 457, 459 (1969); see also In re Marriage of Rettke, 696 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing, in a divorce proceeding, “a [trial] court has a duty to protect the interests of both parties and all

In addition, she contends that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding alimony that failed to take into account the standard of living that the parties established during their marriage, the present and anticipated financial status of both parties, and legal fault.

Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159, 161-62, 525 A.2d 267, 269 (1987); Madsen v. Madsen, 109 N.H. 457, 459, 255 A.2d 604, 605 (1969).

See, e.g., Grandmaison v. Grandmaison, 119 N.H. 268, 401 A.2d 1057 (1979); Madsen v. Madsen, 109 N.H. 457, 255 A.2d 604 (1979).

Madsen v. Madsen, 109 N.H. 457, 255 A.2d 604 (1969); Symmes v. Symmes, 118 N.H. 488, 387 A.2d 1181 (1978) (per curiam).

Appeals to this court will not be successful absent a showing that there has been an abuse of that discretion, Madsen v. Madsen, 109 N.H. 457, 255 A.2d 604 (1969).

Ford v. Ford, 112 N.H. 270, 293 A.2d 605 (1972); Madsen v. Madsen, 109 N.H. 457, 255 A.2d 604 (1969).

The award should also take into account “the standard of living established during her marriage and the financial status of both plaintiff and defendant.” Madsen v. Madsen, 109 N.H. 457, 460, 255 A.2d 604, 605 (1969).

Such stipulations are entitled to consideration in the formulation of the decree, even though they are not binding on the court.

Most commonly, the husband’s ability to pay is a vital factor to be considered by the court, and “in many of these cases, the financial productivity of the parties is not sufficient to meet the needs of everyone.” Fortuna v. Fortuna, 103 N.H. 547, 550, 176 A.2d 708, 710 (1961); Madsen v. Madsen, 109 N.H. 457, 255 A.2d 604, 605 (1969).

Taylor v. Taylor, 108 N.H. 193; Madsen v. Madsen, 106 N.H. 267, 269 [hereinafter cited as Madsen I]; Collette v. Collette, 108 N.H. 469.” Madsen v. Madsen, 109 N.H. 457, 459, 255 A.2d 604, 605 (1969) (hereinafter cited as Madsen II); accord, Madsen v. Madsen, 111 N.H. 315, 282 A.2d 667 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Madsen III).

f not more than three years at a time; and may compel the husband to disclose, under oath, the situation of his property; and before or after the decree, may make such orders and use such process as may be necessary.” The three-year provision of this statute requires a reexamination and readjustment of an alimony decree in the light of the changing needs and financial circumstances of the parties.

RSA 458:19; see Madsen v. Madsen, 106 N.H. 267, 209 A.2d 728 (1965); Madsen v. Madsen, 109 N.H. 457, 255 A.2d 604 (1969).

Bradley v. Bradley, 92 N.H. 70, 24 A.2d 605 (1942); Madsen v. Madsen, 109 N.H. 457, 255 A.2d 604 (1969); Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. Northern Oil Co., 126 Vt. 160, 164, 225 A.2d 60, 63 (1966).

The distinction between single factor decisions and those complicated by wealth and involved circumstances (Guggenheimer v. Guggenheimer, 99 N.H. 399, 112 A.2d 61 (1955); Madsen v. Madsen, 109 N.H. 457, 255 A.2d 604 (1969); Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 242 A.2d 78 (1968)) is not merely a multiplication of relevant factors.