Cited by

Thibault, 118 N.H at 806 (explaining that before the adoption of strict liability, a consumer’s only recourse was an action “based either on the negligence of the manufacturer or, additionally or alternatively, on breach of warranty” (quotation omitted)); Elliot v. Lachance, 109 N.H. 481, 484- 85 (1969) (recognizing generally the adoption of the remedy of strict liability); Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, 38 (1969) (noting that a plaintiff may proceed on both an implied warranty claim and one

Citing Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36 (1969), and Trull v. Volkswagen of America, 145 N.H. 259 (2000), the court reasoned that “[t]he New Hampshire Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed its willingness to provide plaintiffs with a less stringent burden of proof where they face a ‘practically impossible burden,’” and that “[g]iven this willingness, the co

In New Hampshire, “[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to [strict] liability for physical harm thereby caused” if, inter alia, “the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS *332 § 402A (1965); see Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, 38-39, 260 A.2d 111, 113 (1969) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A).

We have adopted the tort of strict liability as set out in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.

.■.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1) (1965); see Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, 38-39, 260 A.2d 111, 113 (1969).

Such a change was precipitated, for example, a quarter century ago, when Clifton Buttrick’s car went off the road after its headlights failed, and we adopted the doctrine of strict liability in tort.

I. Necessity of Instruction on “Failure to Warn” We begin our analysis by acknowledging the confusion that has been generated by the doctrine of strict products liability.

Thibault, supra at 806, 395 A.2d at 846; Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, 39, 260 A.2d 111, 113 (1969) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment f (1966) for the proposition that manufacturer’s responsibility to public is basis for strict liability).

Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402-A (1965).

Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, 38, 260 A.2d 111, 113 (1969); see also Elliott v. Lachance, 109 N.H. 481, 256 A.2d 153 (1969).

In Stephan, we gave retroactive effect to our decision in Buttrick v. Lessard & Sons, Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969), in which we held that an action in strict liability in tort may be maintained against the manufacturer of a defective product.

New Hampshire’s doctrine of products liability applies to persons engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption.

In New Hampshire, we adopted the doctrine of strict liability in tort fourteen years ago in Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 39, 260 A.2d 111, 113 (1969).

tort for a defective design may have several defenses against liability; for example, product misuse or abnormal use, McLaughlin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 N.H. 265, 268, 281 A.2d 587, 588 (1971), and what was formerly termed contributory negligence or unreasonable assumption of the risk, Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., *465 118 N.H. at 810, 395 A.2d at 848-49; Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, 40, 260 A.2d 111, 114 (1969).

Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969); Elliott v. Lachance, 109 N.H. 481, 256 A.2d 153 (1969).

McLaughlin v. Sears, Roebuck, 111 N.H. 265, 281 A.2d 587 (1971); Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969).

Torts 2d § 402A(1), should the definition of ‘unreasonably dangerous’ be framed in terms of the five-year old child who uses the pajamas or in terms of the child’s parent who purchases them?” On the issue of strict liability, the case was tried and submitted to the jury under the rule of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402 A (1) (1965) as being the law of New Hampshire under Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969).

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Philip, 112 N.H. 282, 294 A.2d 211 (1972); see Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969); Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.H. 248, 266 A.2d 855 (1970).

This court has adopted the doctrine of strict liability for injuries caused by defective products of manufacturers or sellers.

Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, *53 39, 260 A.2d 111, 113 (1969); Prosser, Law of Torts s. 75, at 494 (4th ed. 1971).

Our adoption of the rule of strict liability in actions against manufacturers and sellers of products (Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969)) included the fundamental requirement that the plaintiff must establish that the accident was caused by a delect present in the product at time of purchase.

The policy considerations that dictated the strict liability rule we adopted in Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969), are not present here.

The questions raised by the demurrers to count three have recently been answered in Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 and Stephan v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110 N.H. 248, 266 A.2d 855.

The questions whether the counts based on strict liability in tort state causes of action and whether contributory negligence is a defense to such an action are answered in the affirmative by the recent decision in Buttrick v. Lessard & Sons, Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111, decided after this case was argued.

Buttrick v. Lessard & Sons, 110 N. H. 36, 260 A.2d 111; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791; Donovan, Products Liability, 19 Me. L. Rev. 181.