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ovisions gave birth to the remedy of strict liability.”2 Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 54 (1972); see, e.g., Thibault, 118 N.H at 806 (explaining that before the adoption of strict liability, a consumer’s only recourse was an action “based either on the negligence of the manufacturer or, additionally or alternatively, on breach of warranty” (quotation omitted)); Elliot v. Lachance, 109 N.H. 481, 484- 85 (1969) (recognizing generally the adoption of the remedy of strict liability);

In undertaking this analysis, we caution that the term “unreasonably dangerous” should not be interpreted so broadly as to impose absolute liability on manufacturers or make them insurers of their products.

Rather, it is “imposed by law on the basis of public policy.” Elliott v. Lachance, 109 N.H. 481, 483, 256 A.2d 153, 155 (1969).

.”); Elliott v. Lachance, 109 N.H. 481, 483, 256 A.2d 153, 155 (1969) (“Such warranties [referring to UCC merchantability] are not created by agreement.

Heath supra; Wood v. Public Serv.

It remains a matter of contract and, as such, is subject to the requirement of privity.

Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, 38, 260 A.2d 111, 113 (1969); see also Elliott v. Lachance, 109 N.H. 481, 256 A.2d 153 (1969).

Elliott v. Lachance, 109 N.H. 481, 484, 256 A.2d 153, 155 (1969); RSA 382-A:2-315, Uniform Laws Comments; see 83 A.L.R.3d 669.

Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969); Elliott v. Lachance, 109 N.H. 481, 256 A.2d 153 (1969).

They arise by operation of law because of the relationship between the parties, the nature of the transaction, and the surrounding circumstances.” Elliott v. Lachance, 109 N.H. 481, 483-84, 256 A.2d 153, 155 (1969).

Sellers are not insurers nor are they subject to absolute liability (Elliott v. LaChance, 109 N.H. 481, 484, 256 A.2d 153, 156 (1969)) and the court so instructed the jury in this case; see Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1066 (1967).

Elliott v. Lachance, 109 N.H. 481, 484-85, 256 A.2d 153, 156 (1969); McLaughlin v. Sears, Roebuck, 111 N.H. 265, 281 A.2d 587 (1971).

Elliott v. LaChance, 109 N.H. 481, 484, 256 A.2d 153, 155 (1969); Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969); see McLaughlin v. Sears Roebuck 8c Company, 111 N.H. 265, 281 A.2d 58V (19V1).

at 39, 260 A.2d at 113; Elliott v. Lachance, 109 N.H. 481, 484-85, 256 A.2d 153, 155-56 (1969); Restatement (Second) of Torts, Comment 9 (1965).

It arises by operation of law because of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the transaction, and the surrounding circumstances.

This approach was recently presaged in Elliott v. Lachance, 109 N. H. 481, 256 A. 2d 153.