Cited by

Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159, 161 (1987) (quotation omitted); see Taylor v. Taylor, 108 N.H. 193, 195 (1967).

in the light of all the circumstances then existing.” Taylor v. Taylor, 108 N.H. 193, 195 (1967) (citations omitted); see also Walker v. Walker, 133 N.H. 413, 417 (1990); Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159, 161-62 (1987); Healey v. Healey, 117 N.H. 618, 621 (1977).

Because divorce is statutory, the court has only such power in that field as is granted by statute.

We have previously held that this “shall be effective” language mandates automatic expiration by the use of the word “shall.” See Taylor v. Taylor, 108 N.H. 193, 194, 230 A.2d 737, 738 (1967) (interpreting an earlier version of RSA 458:19).

Taylor v. Taylor, 108 N.H. 193, 194, 230 A.2d 737, 738 (1967); Morphy v. Morphy, 112 N.H. 507, 509, 298 A.2d 580, 581 (1972); Clevesy v. Clevesy, 118 N.H. 112, 113, 383 A.2d 705, 706 (1978); see Laws 1985, 175:1, eff.

Taylor v. Taylor, 108 N.H. 193, 230 A.2d 737 (1967) (supplemental agreement by parties modifying alimony award was not binding on the court).

The trial court has wide discretion in determining matters of child support, Baker v. Baker, 120 N.H. 645, 651, 421 A.2d 998, 1002 (1980), and is especially suited to determine “what in the light of all the circumstances then existing would be just.” Morphy v. Morphy, 114 N.H. 86, 88, 315 A.2d 631, 632 (1974); see Taylor v. Taylor, 108 N.H. 193, 195, 230 A.2d 737, 739 (1967).

.” The transcript shows that the master relied primarily upon Taylor v. Taylor, 108 N.H. 193, 230 A.2d 737 (1967), and Stritch v. Stritch, 106 N.H. 409, 213 A.2d 426 (1965).

Lund v. Lund supra; Taylor v. Taylor, 108 N.H. 193, 230 A.2d 737 (1967); Morphy v. Morphy, 112 N.H. 507, 298 A.2d 580 (1972).

Morphy v. Morphy supra; Taylor v. Taylor, 108 N.H. 193, 230 A.2d 737 (1967).

At the hearing upon this petition to take Walter’s deposition, he resisted entry of the order made by offering the trial court his assurance that his financial circumstances are such that he can comply with whatever order may be entered; and by contending that Dorothy may thereby be relieved of the burden of establishing his ability to pay (Taylor v. Taylor, 108 N.H. 193, 195, 230 A.2d 737, 739 (1967)), thus simplifying the issues.

nce this case involves the question whether the order which was terminated under RSA 458:19 should be extended or renewed, the defendant does not have the burden of showing changed circumstances such as to justify a reduction or termination of the order, but rather the plaintiff has the burden of showing that “justice requires a renewal or extension, and if so, what justice requires as to amount”.

The order for support in this case therefore, not having been ‘renewed, modified or extended’ expired at the end of three years.” Taylor v. Taylor, 108 N.H. 193, 194, 230 A.2d 737, 738 (1967); accord, Stone v. Stone, 111 N.H. 167, 276 A.2d 924 (1971).

Madsen v. Madsen, 109 N.H. 457, 255 A.2d 604 (1969); Taylor v. Taylor, 108 N.H. 193, 230 A.2d 737 (1967); see Stone v. Stone, 111 N.H. 167, 276 A.2d 924.

The order sought to be enforced having expired by operation of RSA 458:19, there was no basis for a finding of contempt.