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Such an interpretation yields an inequitable result, and could not reasonably be found to have been within the intention of the parties.

In this State, antenuptial agreements are governed by the same rules of construction as apply to other contracts, and accordingly, the proper interpretation of an antenuptial agreement is one that speaks to the intention of the parties at the time they enter the contract.

Since the time of our first contract decision couched in terms of good faith, Griswold v. Heat Corporation, 108 N.H. 119, 229 A.2d 183 (1967), we have relied on such an implied duty in three distinct categories of contract cases: those dealing with standards of conduct in contract formation, with termination of at-will employment contracts, and with limits on discretion in contractual performance, which is at issue in the instant case.

Griswold v. Heat Corporation, 108 N.H. 119, 125, 229 A.2d 183, 187-88 (1967); 3 J. Dooley, Modern Tort Law § 44.09, at 219 (1977).

between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1979); see Griswold v. Heat Corporation, 108 N.H. 119, 124, 229 A.2d 183, 187 (1967).

In our search for the interpretation that will best reflect the parties’ intention, the court considers ‘the written agreement of [the] parties, all of its provisions, its subject matter, the situation of the parties at the time, and the object intended.’ ” Thiem v. Thomas, 119 N.H. 598, 602, 406 A.2d 115, 117-18 (1979), quoting Griswold v. Heat, Inc., 108 N.H. 119, 123, 229 A.2d 183, 186 (1967).

Testimony of Campton’s conduct in paying certain of 93’s creditors was admissible to indicate Campton’s understanding of the agreement and its intention to be bound by its terms.

Moreover, the parties’ prior course of dealings would lead an insured to expect that he had coverage for such damage.

*634 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, comment i (1979); Griswold v. Heat Inc., 108 N.H. 119, 125, 229 A.2d 183, 187 (1967).

In our search for the interpretation that will best reflect the parties’ intention, the court considers “the written agreement of these parties, all of its provisions, its subject matter, the situation of the parties at the time, and the object intended.” Griswold v. Heat Inc., 108 N.H. 119, 123, 229 A.2d 183, 186 (1967).

The question here, therefore, is a narrow one: what did the parties intend by use of the words “[plaintiff] agrees to perform such duties in the general area of consultation in matters relating to the management of motel enterprises at such times as shall be mutually agreed between the parties during the term of this agreement”?

Kilroe v. Troast, 117 N.H. 598, 601, 376 A.2d 131, 133 (1977); Griswold v. Heat Corp., 108 N.H. 119, 123, 229 A.2d 183, 186 (1967).

Co. v. City of Rochester, 118 N.H. 129, 130, 383 A.2d 707, 708 (1978), citing Griswold v. Heat Inc., 108 N.H. 119, 124, 229A.2d 183, 187(1967).

The fundamental rule of interpretation of a contract is that the contract should receive that interpretation which will best effectuate the intention of the parties when it was made, Griswold v. Heat Corp., 108 N.H. 119, 123, 229 A.2d 183, 186 (1967); L. Simpson, Contracts § 102, at 210 (1965).

The court’s inquiry should focus on the intent of the parties in agreeing to the arbitration clause.

enter into or continue a business relation with another is liable to the other for the harm caused thereby.” Restatement of Torts § 766; Griswold v. Heat Corp., 108 N.H. 119, 124, 229 A.2d 183, 187 (1967); Russell v. Croteau, 98 N.H. 68, 69, 94 A.2d 376, 377 (1953).

In every agreement there exists an implied covenant that each of the parties will act in good faith and deal fairly with the other.

191, 188 S.E.2d 342 (1972); see Griswold v. Heat Incorporated, 108 N.H. 119, 122, 229 A.2d 183, 186 (1967).

AFL-CIO v. Dover, 109 N.H. 299, 301, 249 A.2d 681, 683 (1969); Griswold v. Heat Corporation, 108 N.H. 119, 123, 229 A.2d 183, 187 (1967); Bogosian v. Fine, 99 N.H. 340, 342, 111 A.2d 190, 192 (1955).

The interpretation urged by the board would place the teachers at the mercy of the board and “should, if at all possible, be avoided.” Griswold v. Heat Corporation, 108 N.H. 119, 124, 229 A.2d 183, 187 (1967).

In determining what are the “outstanding obligations” of Motors, the intention of the parties is necessarily controlling, even though the contrary positions of the parties and the conflicting evidence makes the task of ascertaining that intent more difficult.

The law is well established “that the proper interpretation of a contract is that which will make it speak the intention of the parties atthe time it was made”.