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We again emphasize that probable cause is a commonsense rather than technical concept and “deals with the reasonable probabilities upon which officers must act quickly for the protection of society rather than with the proof beyond reasonable doubt which the State must have to *670 proceed to trial and conviction.” State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 287 (1967) (quotation omitted).

We have previously stated that, in the criminal context, RSA 642:2 applies to “other forms of seizures of the person falling short of a full-blown arrest.” State v. Fleury, 116 N.H. 577, 578, 579 (1976); see also State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 285-87 (1967).

It is well settled that police officers of a town can transfer probable cause to police officers of another town for crimes allegedly committed in the first town.

It is well established that, in this context, “reasonable ground” means substantially the same thing as “probable cause.” State v. Rodrigue, 127 N.H. 496, 498, 506 A.2d 299, 301 (1985); State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 287, 235 A.2d 117, 122 (1967).

In this context, “reasonable ground” means substantially the same thing as “probable cause.” State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 287, 235 A.2d 117, 122 (1967).

State v. McComb, 111 N.H. 312, 314, 282 A.2d 673, 675 (1971); State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 289, 235 A.2d 117, 123 (1967).

2d 505, 516, 147 N.W.2d 646, 651-52 (1967), this court later went even further to require “that to constitute an arrest there must exist an intent on the part of the arresting officer to take the person into custody and a corresponding understanding by the person arrested that he is in custody.” State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 285, 235 A.2d 117, 121 (1967) (emphasis added).

RSA 594:10, 11(b) provides that an arrest without a warrant is lawful when a peace officer “has reasonable ground to believe that the person arrested has committed a felony.” Reasonable ground and probable cause are synonymous.

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); see State v. Lemire, 121 N.H. 1, 4-5, 424 *1172 A.2d 1135, 1138 (1981); State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 287, 235 A.2d 117, 122 (1967).

Brinegar v. United States, supra at 175; State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 287, 235 A.2d 117, 122 (1967).

Second, Sergeant Lynch could have had probable cause to arrest the defendant.

The investigating officer had no identification or description connecting the defendant to the time and place of the burglary); State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 235 A.2d 117 (1967) (facts constituted probable cause where police had descriptions of automobile allegedly used in burglary and appearance of alleged burglars).

State v. Spero, 117 N.H. 199, 203, 371 A.2d 1155, 1157 (1977); State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 288, 235 A.2d 117, 123 (1967).

RSA 594:18; State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 288, 235 A.2d 117, 123 (1967); O’Connor v. Bucklin, 59 N.H. 589, 591 (1879).

elief in a fact is so uncertain that we would hesitate to undertake something of importance and seriousness equal to these cases upon the strength of it, then there is a reasonable doubt.” This is the accepted definition of reasonable doubt approved by this court (State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436, 362 A.2d 194 (1976); State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 761-62, 329 A.2d 376, 385 (1974); State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 289, 235 A.2d 117, 124 (1967)) and the United States Supreme Court (Holland v. United St

State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 235 A.2d 117 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750, 761-62, 329 A.2d 376, 385 (1974); State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 289, 235 A.2d 117, 124 (1967); Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954).

State v. Brodhead, 116 N.H. 39, 40, 351 A.2d 57, 58 (1976); State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 285, 235 A.2d 117, 121 (1967).

the first state police officer.” RSA 594:1 defines an arrest as “the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be forthcoming to answer for the commission of a crime.” “[T]o constitute an arrest there must exist an intent on the part of the arresting officer to take the person into custody and a corresponding understanding by the person arrested that he is in custody.” State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 285, 235 A.2d 117, 121 (1967).

His solitary confinement was not for the purpose of having him available to answer for the commission of this crime (RSA 594:1 (1965); State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 285, 235 A.2d 117, 121 (1967); State v. Murray, 106 N.H. 71, 73, 205 A.2d 29, 30 (1964)), but rather was a matter of prison discipline.

However, reasonable doubt is properly defined by equating it with whether or not one would hestitate to *762 undertake an important business or personal matter.

Probable cause has been defined as follows: where the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed.” State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 287, 235 A.2d 117, 122 (1967).

State v. Hutton, 108 N.H. 279, 287, 235 A.2d 117, 122 (1967); Commonwealth v. Pellier, 289 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Mass. 1972); Commonwealth v. Kenney, 449 Pa.

State v. Amero, 106 N. H. 134, 136, 207 A.2d 440, 442; State v. Hutton, 108 N. H. 279, 289, 235 A.2d 117; IX Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed.), 5.