Cited by

As a general rule, provisions of a final divorce decree relating to a property settlement cannot be modified due to a change of circumstances.

Tardif v. Tardif, 124 N.H. 345, 348, 469 A.2d 1342, 1344 (1983); see also Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 43, 242 A.2d 78, 80 (1968).

Had the parties acted under the decree to value the premises, calculate the net equity and cast the interests of each in stone, there would be no room for the court, *238 absent fraud, to take another equitable look.

[and] is not subject to judicial modification on account of changed circumstances.” Stebbins v. Stebbins, 121 N.H. 1060, 1063, 438 A.2d 295, 297 (1981) (citations omitted); see Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 43, 242 A.2d 78, 80 (1968) (court lacks authority to modify property settlement portion of divorce decree).

This right was an element of a property settlement, and the value of that element is not subject to retroactive modification.

Finally, the defendant contends that the court’s interpretation of the stipulation amounts to an impermissible modification of a property settlement.

Since inflation is obviously to be considered in assessing the continuing adequacy of any award, and since the defendant’s illness has recently prevented her from contributing at the level reached in her healthier years, there is no plausible basis to argue that the revised order reflects an abuse of discretion that would justify reversal.

A modification of a support order “will be set aside only if it clearly appears on the evidence that there has been an abuse of judicial discretion.” 123 N.H. at 75, 455 A.2d at 1053 (quoting Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 42, 242 A.2d 78, 79 (1968)).

Upon review in this court, “[a] modification of a support order ‘will be set aside only if it clearly appears on the evidence that there has been an abuse of judicial discretion.’” Noddin, supra at 75, 455 A.2d at 1053 (quoting Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 42, 242 A.2d 78, 79 (1968)).

at 75, 455 A.2d at 1053; Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 42, 242 A.2d 78, 79 (1968).

Stebbins v. Stebbins, 121 N.H. 1060, 1063, 438 A.2d 295, 297 (1981); Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 43, 242 A.2d 78, 80 (1968).

A modification of a support order “will be set aside only if it clearly appears on the evidence that there has been an abuse of judicial discretion.” Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 42, 242 A.2d 78, 79 (1968) (citations omitted).

Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 43, 242 A.2d 78, 80 (1968), although reformation may be had for mutual mistake.

We must also decide whether the rule of Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 242 A.2d 78 (1968), precludes the court from exercising this power with respect to any property that the person received pursuant to a property settlement.

Twardosky v. Twardosky, 113 N.H. 438, 439, 309 A.2d 217, 217 (1973); Lawton v. Lawton, 113 N.H. 429, 431, 309 A.2d 150, 151 (1973); Mamalis v. Bornovas, 112 N.H. 423, 429, 297 A.2d 660, 663 (1972); Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 43, 242 A.2d 78, 80 (1968).

We suggest that if there is “[a]ny remedy that is available [it] is in the superior court, not here.” Mayo v. Mayo, 119 N.H. 697, 699, 406 A.2d 719, 720 (1979).

Relying on Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 242 A.2d 78 (1968), the court ruled that the inability of the defendant to comply with the order was in itself grounds to change the order.

It appears that the master and the trial court ruled that under Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 242 A.2d 78 (1968), no modification of a property settlement could be made.

Transferred by Douglas, J. The plaintiff argues first that provisions of a 1973 stipulation between the parties, which amended an earlier decree of May 31, 1972, and which were approved by the court, were in the nature of a property settlement and cannot be amended.

the exercise of the power involves practicalities as well as principles.” Doughs v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 43-44, 242 A.2d 78, 80 (1968).

The trial court first modified the original decree by ordering certain items returned to the defendant but on rehearing held that, based on the rule in Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 242 A.2d 78 (1968), the court was without jurisdiction to modify its original decree.

*439 Grimes, J. The question in this case is whether the rule of Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 242 A.2d 78 (1968), which prohibits retroactive modification of a property settlement decree, applies to the decree in this case with respect to the occupancy of the family home.

The question transferred without ruling by Loughlin, J. is whether or not this provision is a property settlement which under Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 242 A.2d 78 (1968), is not subject to modification.

Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 242 A.2d 78 (1968); Collette v. Collette, 108 N.H. 469, 238 A.2d 598 (1968); Fortuna v. Fortuna, 103 N.H. 547, 176 A.2d 708 (1961); Kibbee v. Kibbee, 99 N.H. 215, 108 A.2d 46 (1954).

Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 242 A.2d 78 (1968); see Benjamin v. Benjamin, 99 N.H. 117, 119-20, 106 A.2d 187, 189 (1954).

2A Nelson, Divorce and Annulment,.s. 17.06 (1961 Rev.).” Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 43, 242 A.2d 78, 80 (1968); Annot., 166 A.L.R.

The distinction between single factor decisions and those complicated by wealth and involved circumstances (Guggenheimer v. Guggenheimer, 99 N.H. 399, 112 A.2d 61 (1955); Madsen v. Madsen, 109 N.H. 457, 255 A.2d 604 (1969); Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 242 A.2d 78 (1968)) is not merely a multiplication of relevant factors.

Kibbee v. Kibbee, 99 N.H. 215, 108 A.2d 46 (1954); Stritch v. Stritch supra; Douglas v. Douglas, 109 N.H. 41, 242 A.2d 78 (1968); Wallace v. Lougee, 107 N.H. 251, 221 A.2d 780 (1966); Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 1060, 1087 (1953).