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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980); cf. Ainsworth v. Claremont, 108 N.H. 55, 56, 226 A.2d 867, 869 (1967) (collateral estoppel only applicable to those matters “directly in issue”).

The issue before the department, however, was one of Gilpatric’s condition some eight months later.

Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 570, 534 A.2d 689, 693 (1987); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1980); cf. Ainsworth v. Claremont, 108 N.H. 55, 56, 226 A.2d 867, 869 (1967) (eollataral estoppel only applicable to those matters “directly in issue”).

Ainsworth v. Claremont, 108 N.H. 55, 56, 226 A.2d 867, 869 (1967), quoted in R. Wiebusch, 5 New Hampshire Practice, Civil Practice and Procedure § 1871, at 391 (1984).

Ainsworth v. Claremont, 108 N.H. 55, 226 A.2d 867 (1967); Metcalf v. Gilmore, 63 N.H. 174 (1884).

The significance of this question lies in the fact that the judgment in the prior appeals operates as an estoppel as to the matters then in issue but not to those points which were merely matters in evidence.

The issue is res judicata, long since barred by his failure in any way to attack the decree until the plaintiff sought to enforce it several years later.

The claim by the defendant town of the benefits of this doctrine is inapt, since the claim in the instant case is for a different *354 tax year and results from a different assessment, and therefore involves a different cause of action.

Current usage gives the term res judicata a broad meaning covering all the various ways in which a judgment in one action will have a binding effect in another action.

The heart of the doctrine of res judicata is that a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive upon the parties in a'subsequent litigation involving the same cause of action.

Works, 114 N.H. 392, 324 A.2d 713 (1974); Ainsworth v. Claremont, 108 N.H. 55, 226 A.2d 867 (1967); Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1410, 1423 (1961).

Lougee v. Beres, 113 N.H. 712, 714, 313 A.2d 422, 423 (1973); Ainsworth v. Claremont, 108 N.H. 55, 226 A.2d 867 (1967); Restatement of Judgments § 65 (1) (1942); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 61 (Tent.

Bottomly v. Parmenter, 85 N.H. 322, 159 A. 302 (1932); Ainsworth v. Claremont, 108 N.H. 55, 226 A.2d 867 (1967); Restatement of Judgments §65 (1) (1942); Restatement (Second) of Judgments §61 (Tent.

We need not quarrel with this proposition (see Ainsworth v. Claremont, 108 N.H. 55, 226 A.2d 867 (1967)), to reach the conclusion that the two causes of action could properly be found by the trial court to be capable of joinder in a single proceeding as a matter of convenience in trial.

Ainsworth v. Claremont, 108 N.H. 55, 56, 226 A.2d 867, 869 (1967); F. James, Civil Procedure § 11.9, at 549, 550 (1965); Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Introductory Note at 1 (Tent.

Nor would the court’s decree constitute a collateral estoppel preventing him from litigating that issue.

However, in order for plaintiff to be barred by collateral estoppel the issue must be the same and here it is not.