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[¶13] When faced with a choice between conflicting substantive laws, we have previously “conduct[ed] an analysis based upon five choice-of-law influencing considerations.” Bartlett, 167 N.H. at 526; see Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 353-55 (1966) (setting forth the five considerations).

The choice-influencing considerations adopted by this court in Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351 (1966), are: (1) predictability of results; (2) maintenance of reasonable orderliness and good relationship among the states in our federal system; (3) simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement by the court of its own state’s governmental interests rather than those of other states; and (5) the court’s pref

Applying the choice-of-law factors set forth in Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 353-55 (1966), and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 131 N.H. 6, 13 (1988), the trial court determined that Connecticut’s limitations period, Conn. Gen.

Conflict of law cases are governed by the choice-influencing considerations we adopted in Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).

The choice-influencing considerations adopted by this court in Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966), control the choice of law analysis.

The trial court applied the choice-influencing considerations adopted by this court in Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 353-55, 222 A.2d 205, 208-09 (1966), and ruled that New Hampshire law should apply.

In determining which jurisdiction’s law governs a particular matter, this court has rejected the application of mechanical rules.

results; (2) the maintenance of reasonable orderliness and good relationships among the States in the federal system; (3) simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the governmental interest of the forum; and (5) the court’s preference for what it regards as the sounder rule of law.” LaBounty v. American Insurance Co., 122 N.H. 738, 741, 451 A.2d 161, 163 (1982); see Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 353-55, 222 A.2d 205, 208-09 (1966).

The probate court applied the choice influencing considerations adopted by this court in Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 353-55, 222 A.2d 205, 208-09 (1966), and held that New Hampshire law should apply to the distribution of the death claim benefits.

Since our opinion sixteen years ago in Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966), adopting Dean Robert A. Leflar’s choice-influencing considerations as this State’s conflicts rule of law, we have decided a line of cases refining the analysis set forth in Clark.

Gordon v. Gordon, 118 N.H. 356, 358, 387 A.2d 339, 340 (1978); Doiron v. Doiron, 109 N.H. 1, 3, 241 A.2d 372, 373 (1968); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 354-55, 222 A.2d 205, 208-09 (1966).

Choice of law governing interspousal immunity is controlled by the relevant considerations summarized in Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966) and Doiron v. Doiron, 109 N.H. 1, 241 A.2d 372 (1968).

Co., 114 N.H. 589, 325 A.2d 778 (1974); Doiron v. Doiron, 109 N.H. 1, 241 A.2d 372 (1968); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).

Since this court abandoned the place of accident rule as the sole determinative factor for choice of law in tort actions in Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966), parties and trial judges have shown an understandable reluctance to make a final choice of law in advance of trial.

Plaintiff argues that this court has already adopted such an approach of assessing and giving effect to changing considerations when it departed from the former rigidity which characterized the law of torts when residents of different States were involved.

Additionally, New Hampshire law will govern this action.

This court has concluded that choice-of-law decisions such as the present one ought to be based directly upon five relevant considerations.

Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 353, 222 A.2d 205, 208 (1966); Doiron v. Doiron, 109 N.H. 1, 2, 241 A.2d 372, 373 (1968).

The injury which furnishes the bases of the counts on strict liability occurred here and we find no reason to apply any- other law but ours.

This court has decided that choice of law decisions in such cases ought to be based on relevant choice-influencing considerations.