Cited by

[¶24] We begin by noting that we have long recognized a right of privacy in this state.

We note, however, that we have yet to recognize the false light variation of the invasion of privacy tort under New Hampshire law.

that the matter published concerning the plaintiff is not true.”); see also Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 110-11 (1964) (observing that false light “requires falsity or fiction”).

In Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107 (1964), we recognized that “invasion of the right of privacy is not a single tort but consists of four distinct torts,” including: “(1) intrusion upon the plaintiffs physical and mental solitude or seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the publi

into three numbered sections: the first was captioned “Parties,” the second, “Statement of Facts,” and the third, “Defamation — Libel and Slander.” In June 2003, he filed a motion to amend, seeking to add a claim based upon “invasion of privacy — false light.” We have not yet addressed, whether the tort of invasion of privacy — false light is recognized in New Hampshire, see Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107 (1964), and we need not do so at this time.

“It is only where, the intrusion has gone beyond.the limits of decency that liability accrues.” Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 111 (1964) (quotation omitted); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment d at 380 (1977).

The plaintiff counters that her writ states a claim for invasion of privacy under our ruling in Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107 (1964).

In Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 110, 206 A.2d 239, 241 (1964), we recognized that a tort action based upon an intrusion upon the plaintiff’s physical and mental solitude or seclusion must relate to “something secret, secluded or private pertaining to the plaintiff.” Furthermore, “liability exists only if the defendant’s conduct was such that he sh

The defendant objected to these new claims for invasion of privacy on the basis of surprise, and moved for dismissal of these claims as a matter of law.

Sawyer v. Boufford, 113 N.H. 627, 630, 312 A.2d 693, 695 (1973); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964).)

generally Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 Geo.

The benefit which would result to the plaintiff from a disclosure by facilitating the decision to settle *630 or go to trial is considerably outweighed by the unwarranted invasion of the defendant’s right of privacy in this area.

We conclude that it was the determination of the legislature that disclosure of salaries of schoolteachers is not a disclosure of those intimate details which “would constitute invasion of privacy.” RSA 91-A:5(IV)(supp.);see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965) (the constitutional right to privacy); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964).