Cited by

tton, 467 U.S. at 1027 (voir dire took ten days, seven jury panels, 292 prospective jurors, and 1,186 pages of testimony); United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 804 (8th Cir. 2001) (court assembled a jury pool three times the normal size, mailed questionnaires to prospective jurors inquiring about exposure to pretrial publicity, and increased the number of peremptory strikes); cf. State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 484 (1961) (fact that it took several weeks to select a jury indicates “the extreme ca

State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 484 (1961) (requiring three weeks to pick jury in widely publicized case not evidence of prejudice but rather shows court’s “extreme care” in obtaining an impartial jury); see also Patton, 467 U.S. at 1027 (jury selection took ten days and generated 1,186 pages of testimony).

rouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 303 (1977) (“One who is reasonably suspected of murdering [her husband] cannot expect to remain anonymous.”); State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 484, 175 A.2d 814, 818 (1961) (“The very nature of the charges...

State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 484, 175 A.2d 814, 819 (1961) (failure to exhaust peremptory challenges was factor considered in deciding whether pretrial publicity prevented impanelling of impartial jury), cert.

Such a high burden of proof is not even required in first degree murder cases, the proof therein being “beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 486, 175 A.2d 814, 822 (1961), cert.

Thus, there may be a joint trial of several counts of one indictment, each alleging a different method of committing a given offense, State v. Canterbury, 28 N.H. 195, 226-27 (1854), or a joint trial of two separate indictments alleging different methods, State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 485, 175 A.2d 814, 819 (1961), cert.

“It is settled law that the burden is on the State to establish the defendant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but this burden does not apply to every evidentiary fact in the case.” State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 486, 175 A.2d 814, 820 (1961), cert.

In view of these facts and of our earlier conclusion that the evidence gave rise to an inference of tax fraud, we hold that the trial court committed no error in ruling that the State did not transgress the bounds of legitimate advocacy when it referred to tax fraud as a possible motive for the defendants’ actions.

Although the language challenged by the defendant somewhat resembled a statement that the prosecution made in its closing argument, we find that it neither “lent credence to the State’s argument” nor “unduly emphasize[d] the theory of the prosecution.” The challenged wording clearly constituted an accurate statement of the law.

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970); see State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 489, 175 A.2d 814, 822 (1961), cert.

The difference between murder and manslaughter is the presence or absence of malice aforethought.

Whether the defendant’s silence is evidence of assent to those statements depends upon whether opportunity and motive to deny the truth of the accusations existed.

State v. Gaiolas, 116 N.H. 216, 356 A.2d 695 (1976); see State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 175 A.2d 814 (1961), cert.

He appealed numerous issues unsuccessfully to this court.

State v. Gomes, 116 N.H. 113, 352 A.2d 713 (1976); State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 175 A.2d 814 (1961), cert.

Whether a defendant has the requisite intent for a crime may be established by circumstantial evidence.

State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 490, 175 A.2d 814, 822-23 (1961); State v. Cornwell, 97 N.H. 446, 448, 91 A.2d 456, 458 (1952).

On November 15, 1959, Martineau and Nelson were convicted of first degree murder “with capital punishment”.

RSA 601:6; State v. Millette, 112 N.H. 458, 460-61, 299 A.2d 150, 152 (1972); State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 489, 175 A.2d 814, 822, cert.

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961); Ignacio v. Guam, 413 F.2d 513, 518 (9th Cir. 1969); State v. Schmid, 109 Ariz. 349, 353, 509 P.2d 619, 623 (1973); State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 483-84, 175 A.2d 814, 819-20 (1961).

In State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 484, 175 A.2d 814, 818-19 (1961), this court held that in balancing constitutional freedom of the press against the defendants’ right to a fair trial, the trial court was not required to take the extreme measure of dismissing indictments, but could use less drastic measures to guard against prejudice from publicity.

State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 175 A.2d 814 (1961); Jewett v. Siegmund, 110 N.H. 203, 263 A.2d 678 (1970); State v. Geldart, 111 N.H. 219, 279 A.2d 588 (1971); see State v. Millette supra.

Malice aforethought, long established as an indispensable element of the crime of murder by our cases (State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870); State v. Greenleaf, 71 N.H. 606, 54 A. 38 (1902); State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 489, 175 A.2d 814, 822, *461 cert.

State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 175 A.2d 814 (1961); State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 260 A.2d 547 (1969), rev’d on other grounds, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971).

State v. Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 175 A.2d 814 (1961); see State *279 v. Nelson, 105 N.H. 184, 196 A.2d 52 (1963); Nelson v. New Hampshire, 369 U.S. 879, 8 L. Ed. 2d 282, 82 S. Ct. 1153 (1962); Martineau v. New Hampshire, 369 U.S. 881, 8 L. Ed. 2d 283, 82 S. Ct. 1155 (1962).

State v. Nelson, 103 N. H. 478, 486, 175 A.2d 814, 820; State v. Wills, 107 N. H. 107, 108-109, 218 A.2d 47, 48.