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Public record · Human review · No verdicts asserted

Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite Pepin v. Beaulieu, 151 A.2d 230.

22 citing documents.

  • Appeal of Franklin Lodge of Elks 1280 BPOE 864 A.2d 325 N.H. 2004
    “It was early held that ‘every statute, which takes away or impairs vested rights, acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, *568 imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective----’ ” Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 89 (1959) (quoting Woart v. Winnick, 3 N.H. 473, 479 (1826)).
  • Opinion of the Justices 627 A.2d 92 N.H. 1993
    Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 89, 151 A.2d 230, 235 (1959) (quotation omitted).
  • Slovenski v. State 561 A.2d 1072 N.H. 1989
    Furthermore, they argue that, because the amendments were remedial legislation, they are presumed to apply retroactively.
  • Norton v. Patten 480 A.2d 190 N.H. 1984
    “[A] retrospective Statute does not contravene the provision of Art. 23d, Bill of Rights, N.H. Constitution, if it affects the remedy only and is not oppressive or unjust.” Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 89-90, 151 A.2d 230, 235 (1959); see Gelinas v. Mackey, 123 N.H. 690, 695, 465 A.2d 498, 501 (1983); Wallace v. Stearns, 96 N.H. 367, 369, 77 A.2d 109, 111 (1950).
  • State v. Ballou 481 A.2d 260 N.H. 1984
    already past....’” State v. Vashaw, supra at 637, 312 A.2d at 693 (quoting Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 89, 151 A.2d 230, 235 (1959) (quoting Woart v. Winnick, 3 N.H. 473, 479 (1826))).
  • Gelinas v. MacKey 465 A.2d 498 N.H. 1983
    Lozier v. Brown Co., 121 N.H. 67, 70, 426 A.2d 29, 31 (1981); Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 89-90, 151 A.2d 230, 235 (1959).
  • Harris v. Adams 459 A.2d 241 N.H. 1983
    “The presumption that a statute applies prospectively only is reversed when its purpose is remedial or a contrary intent is shown.” Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 89, 151 A.2d 230, 235 (1959).
  • Michael v. City of Rochester 407 A.2d 819 N.H. 1979
    Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 151 A.2d 230 (1959); Woart v. Winnick, 3 N.H. 473 (1826).
  • Lessard v. City of Manchester Fire Department 382 A.2d 365 N.H. 1978
    Furthermore, to apply the subsequent amendments of RSA ch. 281 to an injury sustained in 1968 would be to apply the amendments so as to “create a new obligation, impose a new duty or attach a new disability in respect to past transactions.” Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 90, 151 A.2d 230, 236 (1959); compare Shannon v. Foster, 115 N.H. 699, 701, 349 A.2d 591, 593 (1975).
  • North American Manufacturing, Inc. v. Crown International, Inc. 335 A.2d 660 N.H. 1975
    The result would be to take away or impair “ ‘vested rights, acquired [by the defendants] under existing laws.’” Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 89, 151 A.2d 230, 235 (1959); State v. Vashaw, 113 N.H. 636, 312 A.2d 692 (1973); 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 41.06, at 269 (4th ed. C. Sands 1972, Supp. 1974).
  • Estate of Kennett v. State 333 A.2d 452 N.H. 1975
    More than a century later, this court, in Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 89, 151 A.2d 230, 235 (1959), cited the following passage from this same Woart v. Winnick, 3 N.H. 473, 479 (1826), as to what constitutes a retrospective law pertaining to civil matters.
  • Smith v. Sampson 325 A.2d 796 N.H. 1974
    Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 90, 151 A.2d 230, 236 (1959); New Eng.
  • Hayes v. LeBlanc 316 A.2d 187 N.H. 1974
    Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 89, 151 A.2d 230, 235 (1959); 1 A. Sutherland, Statutory Construction §§ 22.35-.36 (4th ed. C. Sands 1972).
  • Mihoy v. Proulx 313 A.2d 723 N.H. 1973
    I, art. 23; see Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 89, 151 A.2d 230, 235 (1959); see Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 1105 (1964).
  • State v. Vashaw 312 A.2d 692 N.H. 1973
    already past----’”Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 89, 151 A.2d 230, 235 (1959) (quoting Woart v. Winnick, 3 N.H. 473, 479 (1826)).
  • Opinion of the Justices 306 A.2d 55 N.H. 1973
    Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 89-90, 151 A.2d 230, 235 (1959); *291 Hartford Accident & Indent.
  • Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Duvall 300 A.2d 732 N.H. 1973
    Moreover since the requirement *31 of the statute affects the remedy only, it will not conflict with article 23, part I of the constitution provided it is not oppressive or unjust.
  • Hobart v. Duvall 297 A.2d 667 N.H. 1972
    Ewing v. Frank, 103 R.I. 96, 234 A.2d 840 (1967); see Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 151 A.2d 230 (1959).
  • Property Owners Ass'n at Suissevale, Inc. v. Sholley 284 A.2d 915 N.H. 1971
    The presumption that a statute applies prospectively is reversed when its purpose is remedial.
  • State v. Peter Salvucci & Sons, Inc. 281 A.2d 164 N.H. 1971
    Laws 1963, ch. 293; RSA 524:1-b (supp.) Hanchett v. Brezner Tanning Co., 107 N.H. 236, 241, 221 A.2d 246, 249 (1966); Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 89, 151 A.2d 230, 235 (1959).
  • Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester v. Nyhan 270 A.2d 906 N.H. 1970
    The defendant’s right to interest is not open to serious question.
  • Jackson v. Emile J. Legere, Inc. 265 A.2d 18 N.H. 1970
    Plaintiff’s physician, although a general practitioner and not a cardiologist, was nevertheless qualified to give his opinion (Ricker v. Mathews, 94 N.H. 313, 53 A.2d 196; Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 151 A.2d 230) and the fact that his testimony did not establish a causal relationship between plaintiff’s work and his heart attack with absolute certainty and contained some cause *255 for doubt does not as a matter of law remove it from the court’s consideration.