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We have long held that “[t]he possibility that injury may result from an act or omission is sufficient to give the quality of negligence to the act or omission; but possibility [of injury] is insufficient to impose any liability or give rise to a cause of action.” White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 274 (1941) (emphases added).

“[T]here is no cause of action unless and until there has been an injury.” White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 274 (1941).

see White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 274 (1941) (explaining that negligence that results in only nominal damages does not give rise to a right of action).

[T]here is no cause of action unless and until there has been an injury.” White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 274, 18 A.2d 185, 186 (1941).

White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 274, 18 A.2d 185, 186 (1941) (recognizing the distinction between foreseeable result and proximate cause).

RSA 508:4, I. *21 The district court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss is summarized in the certification order as follows: “[T]he injuries suffered by plaintiff directly after the accident were negligible; the Supreme Court of the State of New Hampshire repudiated the theory that there may be a right of action for negligence resulting in merely nominal damages in White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273 [, 18 A.2d 185 ] (1941); there was no indicia that plaintiff would be subject to recurring seizures

The elements of negligence are a breach of a duty of care by the defendant, which proximately causes the plaintiff’s injury.

White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941); Prosser & Keeton, supra § 30, at 164-65.

Id., 320 P.2d at 505; City of Phoenix v. Camfield, 97 Ariz. 316, 323, 400 P.2d 115, 120 (1965); see White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 275, 18 A.2d 185, 186 (1941).

However, in some cases there may be a delay between the breach of duty and the injury, e.g., White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941), or between the injury and the plaintiff’s discovery of the cause of his injury, e.g., Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J.

White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 275, 18 A.2d 185, 186 (1941); Berry v. Branner, 245 Ore.

White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 275, 18 A.2d 185, 186 (1941); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 30 (4th ed. 1971).

Causes of action for negligence do not arise at the occurrence of the negligent act but rather when the damages result.

Plaintiff relies upon White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941), in support of the date of discovery as being the date the cause of action accrued.