In the Matter of Nat King Rosa and Jennifer Rosa

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2025-0540, In the Matter of Nat King Rosa and
Jennifer Rosa, the court on September 24, 2026, issued the
following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(3). The respondent, Jennifer Rosa, appeals an order of the
Circuit Court (Rauseo, J.) finding her in contempt of the final divorce decree
between her and the petitioner, Nat King Rosa, and ordering her to sell the
marital home. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the respondent is in
contempt of the divorce decree, reverse the court’s order that she sell the
marital home, and remand.

I. Background

The trial court found, or the record supports, the following facts. The
parties were married and later divorced. In the divorce decree, the trial court
granted the respondent all right, title and interest in the marital home. The
divorce decree required the petitioner to transfer his interest in the marital
home to the respondent within thirty days of the issuance of the divorce decree.
The court awarded “[the respondent] 60% of the value of the marital residence
and [the petitioner] 40% of the value of the marital residence” and ordered that
“[the respondent] shall pay $122,304.00 to [the petitioner] within 120 days of
the issuance of the Decree of Divorce.”

The petitioner moved to hold the respondent in contempt for failing to
pay him forty percent of the value of the marital home. After a hearing, the
trial court found the respondent in contempt of the divorce decree because she
“willfully violated the Court order which required her to make a payment of
$122,304.00 to [the petitioner] within 120 days of the issuance of the Divorce
Decree.” Although the respondent claimed that she made efforts to refinance
the marital home to comply with the order, the court did “not find [the
respondent’s] testimony that she was unable to refinance credible” because
“[h]er credit report does not reference any denial to refinance.” The respondent
also asserted that “she could not proceed with refinancing until [the petitioner]
transferred his interest [in the property] to her.” The court, however, did not
find that explanation credible because the respondent “failed to provide any
corroborating evidence stating that the proposed lenders required the Deed
transfer to her prior to filing a refinance application” and, “[f]urther, she only
raised the issue after the deadline to refinance expired.”

Having found the respondent in contempt, the court ordered her to
“immediately list the property for sale with a real estate agent mutually
agreeable to [the petitioner].” The order further required that the petitioner
“provide [the respondent] with the names of three real estate agents for listing
the property for sale” and ordered the respondent to “make a selection within
ten (10) days of receiving the request.” If the respondent failed to make a
selection within ten days, the trial court ordered that the petitioner “may select
a real estate agent of his choosing from the list he provided to [the
respondent].” In addition, the court ordered that “[p]ending the sale of the
house, [the petitioner] shall sign a Quitclaim Deed, which shall be held in
escrow at his current attorney’s office, or with [the respondent’s attorney], if
[the petitioner] terminates services with his current attorney.” The respondent
unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the respondent argues that the trial court unsustainably
exercised its discretion when it found her in contempt of the divorce decree
because: (1) the court did not consider the petitioner’s failure to transfer his
interest in the property to her; (2) the court’s contempt finding was legally
erroneous; and (3) the court granted the petitioner equitable relief even though
he has unclean hands in the transaction. The respondent also argues that the
trial court impermissibly modified the divorce decree by ordering her to sell the
marital home. We address these arguments in turn.

The contempt power is discretionary and the proper inquiry is not
whether we would have found the respondent in contempt, but whether the
trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in doing so. See Holt v. Keer, 167 N.H. 232, 239 (2015). To show an unsustainable exercise of discretion,
the respondent must demonstrate that the trial court’s ruling was clearly
untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of her case. See id.

The respondent first argues that, in finding her in contempt, the trial
court did not consider the petitioner’s failure to transfer his interest in the
property to her. We disagree. The trial court expressly considered, and
rejected, the argument that the petitioner’s failure to provide a quitclaim deed
precluded any efforts to refinance the property. Specifically, the trial court
found that the respondent presented no corroborating evidence to establish
that a quitclaim deed from the petitioner was a prerequisite to applying for
refinancing. The court also noted that the respondent first raised the issue
only after the deadline to pay the petitioner had passed.

The respondent next argues that the trial court applied an incorrect legal
standard when it found her in contempt. She asserts that the court erred
because it did not find that she “willfully” violated the order. See Stone v.
Stone, 111 N.H. 167, 168 (1971) (“The basis for a finding of contempt is the

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wilful disobedience by the party charged of an existing court order.”). Instead,
the respondent argues, the trial court only found that she failed to act with
“due diligence” or in “good faith.”

The interpretation of a court order is a question of law, which we
review de novo. In the Matter of Sheys & Blackburn, 168 N.H. 35, 39
(2015). In construing a court order, we look to the plain meaning of the words
used in the document. Id. We construe subsidiary clauses so as not to conflict
with the primary purpose of the trial court’s decree. Id. at 39-40. As a general
matter, we construe a court decree or judgment with reference to the issues it
was meant to decide. See id. at 40.

The trial court found that the respondent “willfully violated the Court
order.” As a basis, the court concluded that even accepting the respondent’s
contention that she could not refinance the property without a quitclaim deed
from the petitioner, the respondent’s counsel provided the deed for signature
only when the petitioner’s counsel inquired about the status of the payment
after the deadline to pay the petitioner had passed. The trial court did not find
that the respondent took any meaningful steps to obtain the funds necessary
to satisfy the court’s order. We conclude that the trial court applied the correct
standard when it found the respondent in contempt and based that ruling
upon sufficient factual findings.

The respondent also claims that the trial court’s finding of contempt is
legally erroneous because the divorce decree was insufficiently clear. See
Dover Veterans Council v. City of Dover, 119 N.H. 738, 740 (1979) (“It is a
prerequisite to the exercise of the civil contempt power that the underlying
order clearly describe what the alleged contemnor must do to avoid the
sanction.”). Specifically, she asserts that the divorce decree was unclear
because it “ordered payment within 120 days but was silent on methods (sale,
refinance, or other) or consequences/remedies for non-payment.”

We cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that the order was insufficiently
clear about the respondent’s obligation: the order required her to pay the
petitioner $122,304.00 within 120 days of the issuance of the divorce decree.
By its silence on the issue, the order was equally clear that it placed no
limitation on how the respondent should acquire the funds. Although we do
not agree that the order lacked clarity, we note that the respondent had ample
opportunity to seek clarification from the court. In sum, we conclude that the
trial court did not err in finding the respondent in contempt.

The respondent nonetheless argues that the doctrine of unclean hands
precluded the trial court’s entry of equitable relief — that is, its finding of
contempt and the resulting order that she sell the marital home. See RSA 490-
D:3 (2010) (authorizing the family division to enter equitable relief in cases
within its subject matter jurisdiction); see also RSA 490-F:3 (Supp. 2025)

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(granting the circuit court the jurisdiction and powers previously conferred
upon the family division); RSA 490-F:18 (Supp. 2025) (providing that references
in statutes to the jurisdiction of the family division “shall be deemed” to include
the circuit court). Specifically, she points to the petitioner’s failure to transfer
his interest in the home within thirty days.

Equitable relief will be denied if one comes to the court with unclean
hands. Polonsky v. Town of Bedford, 173 N.H. 226, 238 (2020). The party to a
suit, complaining that his or her opponent is in court with unclean hands
because of the latter’s conduct must show that he or she has been injured by
such conduct, to justify application of the principle to the case. See id.

We review the trial court’s decision whether to grant equitable relief for
an unsustainable exercise of discretion. Id. In doing so, we determine whether
the record establishes an objective basis to sustain the discretionary judgment
made. Id. The party asserting that a trial court order is unsustainable must
demonstrate that the ruling was unreasonable or untenable to the prejudice of
his or her case. Id. at 238-39.

The respondent has failed to establish that the trial court erred. The
court had an objective basis to conclude that the respondent was not injured
by the petitioner’s failure to provide a quitclaim deed within thirty days. See
id. at 238; cf. In the Matter of Aube & Aube, 158 N.H. 459, 466 (2009) (“We
must assume that the trial court made subsidiary findings necessary to
support its general ruling.” (quotation omitted)). As noted above, the
respondent presented no corroborating evidence to establish that such a
transfer was a prerequisite to applying for refinancing.

Finally, the respondent argues that even if the trial court sustainably
exercised its discretion when it found her in contempt, it cannot order a
remedy that has the effect of modifying the divorce decree. A property
settlement in a divorce decree is a final distribution of a sum of money or a
specific portion of the spouses’ property and is not subject to judicial
modification on account of changed circumstances. In the Matter of Taber-
McCarthy & McCarthy, 160 N.H. 112, 117 (2010). A court may modify a
property distribution only if the complaining party shows that the distribution
is invalid due to fraud, undue influence, deceit, misrepresentation, or mutual
mistake. See id. A party’s recalcitrance in meeting his or her obligation under
the divorce decree does not provide a basis on which to alter the finality of a
property settlement. See Johnson v. Coe, 142 N.H. 182, 188 (1997).

The trial court’s divorce decree did not order the sale of the marital
home. Instead, the court awarded the respondent all right, title and interest in
the marital home and ordered her to pay the petitioner forty percent of the
value of the marital home. The respondent’s failure to timely meet her
obligation in making that payment does not alter the finality of the decree. See

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id. at 187-88 (holding that the trial court erred by allowing a defendant in a
divorce proceeding to retain her interest in a home that had been awarded to
the plaintiff after the plaintiff failed to meet his obligations under the divorce
decree); see also Bonneville v. Bonneville, 142 N.H. 435, 439 (1997) (explaining
that a party’s “inability, and reluctance, to timely pay the cash settlement does
not justify amending the final terms of the [divorce] decree”). Thus, we
conclude that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion by ordering
a forced sale of the marital home, contrary to the terms of the divorce decree.
See Johnson, 142 N.H. at 187-88.1

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the respondent is in
contempt of the divorce decree, reverse to the extent that the court ordered her
to sell the marital home, and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this order. We have considered the respondent’s remaining arguments, and we
conclude that they do not require further discussion. See Vogel v. Vogel, 137
N.H. 321, 322 (1993).

Affirmed in part; reversed in
part; and remanded.

DONOVAN, COUNTWAY, GOULD, and WILL, JJ., concurred;
MACDONALD, C.J., did not participate in the final vote.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

1 We note that the legislature recently addressed whether a finding of contempt can be used to

modify a divorce decree. See RSA 458:51-a, I (Supp. 2025) (“Upon motion or petition by a party
for enforcement of a final property settlement or decree of divorce, or for contempt related to any
proceeding under this chapter, the court shall enforce such settlement or decree according to its
terms . . . .”); RSA 458:51-a, II (Supp. 2025) (“In the enforcement of any such final decree, the
court shall fashion remedies that place the parties in the position as if the decree had been fully
performed according to its terms.”). RSA 458:51-a does not apply in this appeal because it
became effective on January 1, 2026, after the petitioner filed his petition for contempt. See RSA
458:51-a, III (Supp. 2025) (providing that this section shall apply to motions or petitions filed after
the effective date of this section); Laws 2025, ch. 178 (eff. Jan. 1, 2026).

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