Petition of Addison
Petition of Addison, 2026 N.H. 37 (Oct. 6, 2026).
The holding in the court’s own words
Because we hold that the statute does not authorize successive comparative proportionality reviews, the petition is dismissed. We hold that, under the plain language of RSA 630:5, X and XI, we are authorized to conduct only one comparative proportionality review as part of our mandatory appellate review of the judgment of conviction and sentence of death.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State of New Hampshire v. Michael Addison (Capital Murder – Proportionality Review) 167 N.H. 562
- State v. Addison 165 N.H. 381
- 176 N.H. 410 not in our corpus
- In re Guardianship of J.H. 2024 N.H. 3
- State v. Addison 160 N.H. 732
- 177 N.H. 654 not in our corpus
- 2025 N.H. 50 not in our corpus
- Appeal of Martino 138 N.H. 612
Opinion text
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well
as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers
are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One
Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in
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Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their
release. The direct address of the court’s home page is:
https://www.courts.nh.gov/our-courts/supreme-court.
THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
___________________________
Original
Case No. 2025-0273
Citation: Petition of Addison, 2026 N.H. 37
PETITION OF MICHAEL ADDISON
Argued: March 26, 2026
Opinion Issued: October 6, 2026
Cohen and Winters, PLLC, of Concord (Jonathan Cohen on the brief),
and Wiseman, Schwartz, Cioschi & Trama, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
(Michael Wiseman and Jon Cioschi on the brief, and Michael Wiseman orally),
for the petitioner.
John M. Formella, attorney general (Samuel Garland, deputy solicitor
general, and Audriana Mekula, assistant attorney general, on the brief, and
Audriana Mekula orally), for the Warden, New Hampshire State Prison.
American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire, of Concord (Gilles R.
Bissonnette and Henry R. Klementowicz on the brief), and American Civil
Liberties Union, of Durham, North Carolina (Brian W. Stull and Megan D.
Byrne on the brief), for the American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire,
the American Civil Liberties Union, James R. Acker, Sandra Babcock, Frank R.
Baumgartner, Eric M. Freedman, Jeffrey Fagan, Samuel Gross, Catherine M.
Grosso, Michael L. Radelet, Austin Sarat, and Carol Steiker, as amici curiae.
COUNTWAY, J.
[¶1] This court accepted this petition for original jurisdiction filed
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 11 by the petitioner, Michael Addison, to
determine whether he is entitled to a comparative proportionality review of his
sentence of death pursuant to RSA 630:5, X and XI(c) (2016). We previously
conducted a comparative proportionality review of the petitioner’s death
sentence pursuant to the same statute. See State v. Addison (Capital Murder -
Proportionality Review), 167 N.H. 562, 564, 571-73 (2015) (per curiam).
Because we hold that the statute does not authorize successive comparative
proportionality reviews, the petition is dismissed.
I. Background
¶2 In 2008, the petitioner was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death. See State v. Addison (Capital Murder), 165 N.H. 381, 415-
16 (2013) (per curiam). This court reviewed the petitioner’s capital murder
conviction and death sentence, which included conducting a mandatory
appellate review of the petitioner’s sentence pursuant to RSA 630:5, X and XI
(2016). See id. at 411-12, 653-56; Addison (Capital Murder - Proportionality
Review), 167 N.H. at 564, 571-73. Upon completion of that review, we affirmed
the petitioner’s conviction of capital murder and his death sentence. See
Addison (Capital Murder), 165 N.H. at 412, 653-56; Addison (Capital Murder -
Proportionality Review), 167 N.H. at 564, 572.
¶3 In 2016, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
superior court challenging his conviction and sentence. In 2018, he filed a
supplement to, and amendment of, his initial petition. On May 30, 2019, after
those filings, New Hampshire repealed the death penalty. See Laws 2019, ch.
42 (eff. May 30, 2019). The repeal “shall apply to persons convicted of capital
murder on or after the effective date of this act.” Laws 2019, ch. 42:2. Persons
convicted of capital murder on or after the effective date of the act “shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility for parole.” RSA
630:1, III (Supp. 2025); see also Laws 2019, ch. 42:1.
¶4 In 2020, the petitioner filed a second supplement to, and
amendment of, his petition for writ of habeas corpus in superior court arguing
that his sentence is unconstitutional as a result of the legislature’s decision to
repeal the death penalty and, alternatively, seeking a “renewed” comparative
proportionality review of his death sentence pursuant to RSA 630:5, X and
XI(c). The respondent, the Warden of the New Hampshire State Prison, filed a
motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the Superior Court (St. Hilaire, J.)
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concluded that this court has exclusive jurisdiction over the statutory
comparative proportionality review and, considering our preference for
resolving cases on constitutional grounds only when necessary, stayed ruling
on the respondent’s motion to dismiss pending resolution of the petitioner’s
statutory claims in this court. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of J.H., 176 N.H.
410, 412 (2024), 2024 N.H. 3, ¶6 (“We follow a strong policy against reaching a
constitutional issue in a case that can be decided on a nonconstitutional
ground.”). The petitioner filed a petition for original jurisdiction in this court.
We accepted the case for review.
II. Analysis
¶5 The sole issue before us is whether the petitioner is entitled to a
renewed comparative proportionality review of his death sentence and, if so,
whether his sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases. See RSA 630:5, X, XI(c). The petitioner argues that because
New Hampshire repealed the death penalty after his capital murder conviction
and death sentence, his sentence is now excessive and disproportionate. He
asserts that, in light of this change in the law after our first review of his death
sentence, we must perform a renewed comparative proportionality review of his
sentence.
¶6 The respondent counters that we must dismiss the petition because
we previously conducted a comparative proportionality review of the petitioner’s
death sentence pursuant to RSA 630:5, X and XI(c) and held that the
petitioner’s sentence is not excessive or disproportionate. See Addison (Capital
Murder - Proportionality Review), 167 N.H. at 564, 571-73. The respondent
argues that we are not authorized by statute to conduct successive
comparative proportionality reviews.
¶7 Comparative proportionality review is not a constitutional mandate,
but, rather, is a creature of statute. Id. at 566; see also State v. Addison, 160
N.H. 732, 779 (2010); RSA 630:5, X, XI(c); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51
(1984) (holding that comparative proportionality review is not required by the
United States Constitution and is not “required in every case in which the
death penalty is imposed and the defendant requests it”). Accordingly, our
task is to construe RSA 630:5, X and XI(c). See Addison, 160 N.H. at 754.
This is a matter of statutory interpretation that we determine de novo. Id. The
constitutionality of the statute is not before us. The sole issue before us is one
of statutory interpretation.
¶8 In matters of statutory interpretation, we first look to the language of
the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain
and ordinary meaning. State v. Cormiea, 177 N.H. 654, 656 (2025), 2025 N.H.
50, ¶7. We give effect to every word of a statute whenever possible and will not
consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the
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legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We also construe all parts of a statute
together to effectuate its overall purpose. Id. However, we do not construe
statutes in isolation; instead, we attempt to construe them in harmony with the
overall statutory scheme. Id. We construe provisions of the Criminal Code
“according to the fair import of their terms and to promote justice.” RSA 625:3
(2016).
¶9 RSA 630:5, X provides:
In all cases of capital murder where the death penalty is imposed,
the judgment of conviction and the sentence of death shall be
subject to automatic review by the supreme court within 60 days
after certification by the sentencing court of the entire record
unless time is extended for an additional period not to exceed 30
days by the supreme court for good cause shown. Such review by
the supreme court shall have priority over all other cases and shall
be heard in accordance with rules adopted by said court.
With regard to the death sentence, “the supreme court shall determine . . .
[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” RSA
630:5, XI(c).
¶10 Comparative proportionality review under RSA 630:5, XI(c) is one
part of the appellate process afforded defendants in this state convicted of
capital murder and sentenced to death. Addison, 160 N.H. at 779. Defendants
have a right to appeal the merits of the conviction and sentence. Id.
Additionally, as part of our mandatory appellate review, RSA 630:5, XI(a) and
(b) require that we focus upon the specific jury, evidence, and sentencing
verdict in the defendant’s case to determine whether the sentence was
supported by the evidence and not imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. See id. at 761, 779-80. RSA 630:5,
XI(c) then requires us to take a broader view of the defendant’s case in relation
to other sentencing verdicts rendered by juries who have convicted similar
defendants of similar crimes to determine whether the sentence is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. See id. at 761, 780.
Comparative proportionality review is, thus, the final step in a full appellate
process encompassing a defendant’s direct appeal and mandatory appellate
review of both the capital murder conviction and the death sentence. Id. at
780.
¶11 The plain language of RSA 630:5, X mandates an “automatic
review” of the conviction and sentence. It does not explicitly authorize
successive mandatory appellate “reviews” by this court. See RSA 630:5, X.
The use of “review” in its singular form, however, does not necessarily prohibit
multiple reviews. This conclusion rests with the legislature’s instruction that
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in construing all statutes, “[w]ords importing the singular number may extend
and be applied to several persons or things,” RSA 21:3 (2020), “unless such
construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature
or repugnant to the context of the same statute,” RSA 21:1 (2020).
Accordingly, to determine whether multiple mandatory appellate reviews of a
defendant’s capital murder conviction and death sentence are permitted under
RSA 630:5, X and XI, including multiple comparative proportionality reviews,
see RSA 630:5, XI(c), we must determine whether that “construction would be
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or repugnant to the
context of the same statute,” RSA 21:1.
¶12 Here, the statute provides that in all capital murder cases where
the death penalty is imposed, the conviction and sentence shall be subject to
“automatic review” by this court within a mandatory time period. RSA 630:5,
X. Specifically, RSA 630:5, X provides that the conviction and death sentence
“shall be subject to automatic review by the supreme court within 60 days after
certification by the sentencing court of the entire record unless time is
extended for an additional period not to exceed 30 days by the supreme court
for good cause shown.” Id.; see Appeal of Martino, 138 N.H. 612, 615 (1994)
(noting that where the legislature has selected the word “shall,” we have
generally held the statutory prescription to be mandatory, and construing
statute providing that a board shall make a decision within thirty days as
providing a mandatory deadline). In addition, RSA 630:5, X provides that our
mandatory appellate review “shall have priority over all other cases.”
¶13 Accordingly, we are required by statute to provide automatic
appellate review of a defendant’s capital murder conviction and death sentence
within a mandatory timeframe and on a priority basis. See RSA 630:5, X.
These statutory requirements are not consistent with permitting successive
comparative proportionality reviews, at the request of parties or otherwise. The
statute provides that in “all cases of capital murder where the death penalty is
imposed,” the conviction and sentence shall be subject to “automatic review” by
this court. Id. In other words, RSA 630:5, X requires us to automatically
review the conviction and sentence in every case to which the statute applies.
See id. It does not give parties the right to request subsequent reviews of the
conviction and sentence pursuant to the same statute. See id. Moreover, the
statute sets a mandatory time period during which the conviction and sentence
will be subject to automatic review, and it would be inconsistent with the
mandatory time period set forth in the statute for this court to conduct
additional comparative proportionality reviews after this statutory time period
has passed. See id. Finally, it would conflict with the purpose of requiring this
court to prioritize our mandatory appellate review over all other cases — that
being, to expedite our review — if, after we have done so, the parties could
simply request more of the same reviews. See id. Thus, considering the
mandatory statutory timeframe and the priority consideration owed to our
automatic review, it would be “repugnant to the context of the same statute” to
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construe RSA 630:5, X and XI as permitting successive comparative
proportionality reviews. RSA 21:1; cf. Cormiea, 177 N.H. at 658, 2025 N.H. 50,
¶¶12-15 (applying RSA 21:3 to construe a statute’s language authorizing
parties to request “an extension” as permitting parties to request multiple
extensions of time because that construction was consistent with the statute as
a whole).
¶14 Further, the legislature stated that the repeal of the death penalty
“shall apply to persons convicted of capital murder on or after the effective date
of this act.” Laws 2019, ch. 42:2. The petitioner was convicted of capital
murder before the effective date of the act, and the repeal therefore does not
apply to him. See Addison (Capital Murder), 165 N.H. at 415-16; Laws 2019,
ch. 42:2. Thus, construing RSA 630:5, X and XI to permit a successive
comparative proportionality review in order to consider the legislature’s repeal
of the death penalty in our analysis would be “inconsistent with the manifest
intent of the legislature.” RSA 21:1; see Laws 2019, ch. 42:2.
¶15 As we have previously held, comparative proportionality review is
“the final step in a full appellate process encompassing a defendant’s direct
appeal and mandatory appellate review of both the capital murder conviction
and the death sentence.” Addison, 160 N.H. at 780 (emphases added). If the
legislature intended to provide successive comparative proportionality reviews
for defendants convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death prior to the
effective date of the act repealing the death penalty, it could have included that
in the legislation, but it did not. See RSA 630:1, III; Laws 2019, ch. 42. We
“will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the
legislature did not see fit to include.” Cormiea, 177 N.H. at 656, 2025 N.H. 50,
¶7. We hold that, under the plain language of RSA 630:5, X and XI, we are
authorized to conduct only one comparative proportionality review as part of
our mandatory appellate review of the judgment of conviction and sentence of
death. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.
Petition dismissed.
DONOVAN and GOULD, JJ., concurred.
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