State v. Freese

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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

Hillsborough-northern judicial district
Case No. 2025-0028
Citation: State v. Freese, 2026 N.H. 18

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

v.

DONALD FREESE

Argued: March 10, 2026
Opinion Issued: April 24, 2026

John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor
general (Sam M. Gonyea, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for
the State.

Stephanie Hausman, chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief
and orally, for the defendant.

PER CURIAM.

¶1 Through this interlocutory appeal, the defendant, Donald Freese,
challenges the order of the Superior Court (Delker, J.) reinstating indictments

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against him that had been dismissed after the court found the defendant not
competent to stand trial and subsequently found that he had not regained
competency after twelve months. See RSA 135:17-a (2021). We reverse and
remand.

I. Background

¶2 We accept the statement of facts as presented in the interlocutory
appeal statement and rely upon the record for additional facts as necessary.
See In the Matter of Landgraf & Landgraf, 176 N.H. 724, 725 (2024), 2024 N.H.
41, ¶2. The defendant was charged with several crimes arising from an
incident in September 2020. On August 21, 2023, the Trial Court (Nicolosi, J.)
entered an order finding the defendant not competent to stand trial with the
potential to be restored within twelve months.

¶3 On May 28, 2024, the Trial Court (Delker, J.) ordered that the
defendant be evaluated to determine whether he had been restored to
competency. The court held a contested evidentiary hearing on August 19,
2024, at which the evaluator testified. On September 4, 2024, the trial court
issued an order finding that the defendant had not been restored to
competency. Accordingly, the court dismissed the criminal charges against the
defendant without prejudice pursuant to RSA 135:17-a, IV. The court further
found that the defendant was dangerous and ordered that he remain in
custody for ninety days to allow the State to pursue civil commitment.

¶4 As part of the civil commitment process, on September 24, 2024, the
trial court granted the State’s petition for further evaluation of the defendant.
On November 5, 2024, the evaluator concluded that the defendant does not
have a mental illness and is not dangerous. Based on that evaluation, the
State moved to reconsider the court’s September 4 finding that the defendant is
not competent to stand trial. Following a hearing, on December 2, 2024 the
trial court found that “there is a substantial question about whether the
defendant ever was incompetent to stand trial or whether he has been
malingering.” Accordingly, the court reconsidered its September 4 decision
finding the defendant not competent and not restored, vacated its dismissal of
the indictments under RSA 135:17-a, IV, and reinstated the indictments. The
court determined that “[i]n order to finally resolve the status of the defendant’s
competency to stand trial,” a further evidentiary hearing would be required and
it scheduled “a status conference to address whether additional competency
evaluations are necessary.” On January 9, 2025, the trial court granted the
defendant’s motion for an interlocutory appeal. We accepted the appeal. See
Sup. Ct. R. 8.

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II. Analysis

¶5 The question presented is:

Whether the trial court erred by reinstating the indictments after
they were dismissed by operation of law pursuant to RSA 135:17-
a, IV, based on new information calling into question whether the
defendant was actually incompetent to stand trial when that new
information came to light during the dangerousness evaluation
conducted pursuant to RSA 135:17-a, V and RSA 135-C:34.

¶6 This question requires that we engage in statutory interpretation.
We review the trial court’s statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Cormiea,
__ N.H. __, __ (2025), 2025 N.H. 50, ¶7. We first look to the language of the
statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and
ordinary meaning. Id. We give effect to every word of a statute whenever
possible and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add
language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We also construe all
parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose. Id. However, we do
not construe statutes in isolation; instead, we attempt to construe them in
harmony with the overall statutory scheme. Id.

¶7 RSA 135:17-a sets out the procedures to be followed by the trial
court after it makes an initial determination that the defendant is not
competent to stand trial. See State v. Salimullah, 172 N.H. 739, 743 (2020). If
the court determines that the defendant is not competent to stand trial, it
“shall order treatment for the restoration of competency” unless it determines
by clear and convincing evidence that there is no reasonable likelihood that the
defendant can be restored to competency through appropriate treatment within
twelve months. RSA 135:17-a, I.

¶8 After the defendant is committed for treatment, the court, “[e]xcept
for good cause shown,” shall hold a hearing to determine the defendant’s
competency “no later than 12 months after the order committing the defendant
for treatment.” RSA 135:17-a, III. Prior to the hearing, a further evaluation
shall be conducted. See id. Following the hearing, if the trial court determines
“that the defendant has not regained competency, the case against the
defendant shall be dismissed without prejudice.” RSA 135:17-a, IV.

¶9 If the charges are dismissed and the defendant has been found
dangerous, the trial court “shall order the person to remain in custody for a
reasonable period of time, not to exceed 90 days, to be evaluated for the
appropriateness of involuntary treatment pursuant to RSA 135-C:34 or RSA
171-B:2.” RSA 135:17-a, V. During that time, the court may order
examinations of the person “for the purpose of evaluating appropriateness and
completing the certificate for involuntary admission” to a state facility. Id.

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[¶10] If the person is ordered to be involuntarily admitted, the court may,
“during the period of the involuntary admission and before expiration of the
limitations period applicable to the underlying criminal offense, order a further
competency evaluation.” RSA 135:17-a, VI. Such evaluation may be ordered if
the court finds that “there is a reasonable basis to believe that the person’s
condition has changed such that competency to stand trial may have been
affected.” Id.

¶11 Under the plain language of the statute, the State is allowed twelve
months to restore a defendant to competency to stand trial. See RSA 135:17-a,
I, III, IV. When, as here, the trial court finds the defendant not competent to
stand trial and not restored within the twelve-month period, the criminal case
“shall be dismissed without prejudice.” RSA 135:17-a, IV; cf. State v. Doyle, 156 N.H. 306, 309 (2007) (explaining that the general rule of statutory
construction is that the word “shall” requires mandatory enforcement). We
construe the legislature’s mandate that the case be dismissed as expressly
limiting the trial court’s inherent authority to take further action as to the
criminal matter. Cf. State v. Demesmin, 159 N.H. 595, 598 (2010) (explaining
that because the trial court “never dismissed the original indictment against
the defendant” under RSA 135:17-a, the State “was not required to re-indict
[the defendant] to continue prosecuting him”).

¶12 Trial courts may not exercise their inherent authority when doing
so contravenes clear statutory or constitutional limitations on that authority or
jurisdiction. See State v. Southern N.H. Builders Assoc., 121 N.H. 852, 854
(1981); Torr v. Dover, 107 N.H. 501, 503 (1967). In Torr, for example, we held
that a trial court could not exercise its inherent authority to extend a statutory
limitations period on eminent domain compensation appeals. Torr, 107 N.H. at
501-03. We emphasized that “for the court to invoke its inherent power in the
face of a clear statutory limitation would circumvent the intent and purpose of
such statutes of limitation.” Id. at 503; cf. In the Matter of Stapleton &
Stapleton, 159 N.H. 694, 697 (2010) (explaining that a trial court may invoke
its inherent authority and extend a statutory deadline when the statutory
scheme “implicitly contemplates that a court may issue a permanent order that
differs from any temporary order it may have issued”).

¶13 Once the trial court has dismissed the indictments, RSA 135:17-a
serves as a statutory limitation on the court’s further authority to determine
whether the person presents a danger, and, if so, to issue a 90-day detention
order for evaluation of the propriety of involuntary treatment. See RSA 135:17-
a, V; cf. Southern N.H. Builders Assoc., 121 N.H. at 854 (explaining that
dismissal of an indictment “effectively ends a case under that indictment” when
statutes are controlling). Neither the trial court’s statutory nor inherent
authority extends to reinstating the dismissed criminal indictments at any time
after they have been dismissed under RSA 135:17-a, IV.

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[¶14] As a result, we conclude that the trial court lacked statutory
authority to reinstate the indictments against the defendant after they were
dismissed pursuant to RSA 135:17-a, IV. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

Reversed and remanded.

DONOVAN, COUNTWAY, GOULD, and WILL, JJ., concurred;
MACDONALD, C.J., sat for oral argument but subsequently disqualified himself
and did not participate in further review of the case.