In the Matter of Stansfield & Patti

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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

9th Circuit Court-Nashua Family Division
Case No. 2024-0715
Citation: In the Matter of Stansfield & Patti, 2026 N.H. 17

IN THE MATTER OF JILL STANSFIELD AND TODD PATTI

Submitted: October 15, 2025
Opinion Issued: April 23, 2026

Shanelaris Schirch & Warburton PLLC, of Nashua (Jennifer E.
Warburton on the brief), for the petitioner.

Todd Patti did not appear.

John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor
general (Mary A. Triick, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief), for the
New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, Bureau of Child
Support Services, as amicus curiae.

GOULD, J.

¶1 The petitioner, Jill Stansfield (mother), appeals an order of the
Circuit Court (Rauseo, J.) approving a parenting plan but ruling that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to both award child support and issue other
support-related orders. We reverse and remand.

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I. Background

¶2 The following facts are drawn from the trial court order and the
record. The mother and the respondent, Todd Patti (father), are the unmarried
parents of two children. The parties separated in January 2023. In March
2023, the father stopped depositing his pay into the parties’ joint account and
stopped contributing to any expenses. Sometime thereafter, the father
informed the mother that he was relocating to Florida. In October 2023, the
mother, a resident of New Hampshire, filed a parenting petition seeking final
orders, including an order requiring the father to pay child support.

¶3 The father did not file an appearance, and the trial court held a final
default hearing on August 12, 2024. The trial court then issued a final
parenting decree and a parenting plan but declined to issue a child support
order. The mother filed a motion to reconsider, and the court scheduled a
hearing. At the hearing, the trial court agreed that it had personal jurisdiction
over the father but stated that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award
child support because of language contained in RSA 546-B:31, a provision of
the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). See RSA 546-B:31 (2021).
In its narrative order denying the motion to reconsider, the trial court
explained that it “does not have subject matter jurisdiction under RSA 546-
B:31, which requires that a responding tribunal such as New Hampshire
having personal jurisdiction over its parties may only issue a Support Order if
the individual seeking the order resides outside of New Hampshire.” The
mother argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it declined to issue a
child support order for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We agree.

II. Analysis

¶4 A court does not have power to hear a case concerning subject
matters over which it lacks jurisdiction. Colburn v. Saykaly, 173 N.H. 162,
164 (2020). Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question
of law. Id. Our standard of review is de novo. Id.

¶5 Because the jurisdiction of the family division is conferred entirely by
statute, “we look to the relevant statutes to determine whether the family
division ha[s] subject matter jurisdiction.” In the Matter of Muller & Muller,
164 N.H. 512, 517 (2013). RSA 490-D:2 provides that the family division has
exclusive jurisdiction over “[p]etitions for divorce, nullity of marriage, alimony,
custody of children, support, and to establish paternity.” RSA 490-D:2 (Supp.
2025). By its plain language, RSA 490-D:2 provides the family division with
the authority to issue orders for child support, and with the creation of the
circuit court, RSA 490-F:3 conferred that authority on the circuit court. See
RSA 490-F:3 (Supp. 2025).

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[¶6] The question we address in this appeal is whether RSA 546-B:31
divests the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction conferred by RSA 490-
D:2 when a person seeks support from someone who resides in another state,
even when the trial court has personal jurisdiction over both parties. For the
reasons discussed below, we conclude that RSA 546-B:31 has no effect on the
circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction in this case.

¶7 We rely on our ordinary rules of statutory construction to interpret
UIFSA. In the Matter of Penichet & Corroon, 177 N.H. 227, 230 (2025).
Accordingly, we first look to the language of the statute itself and, if possible,
construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. In
doing so, we will not consider what the legislature might have said or add
language that the legislature did not see fit to include. In the Matter of Scott &
Pierce, 160 N.H. 354, 359 (2010). We consider words or phrases within the
context of the statute as a whole rather than in isolation, and we construe all
parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose. Id. at 359-60.
Doing so enables us to interpret statutory language in light of the policy or
purpose sought to be advanced by the statutory scheme. Id. at 360.

¶8 Because UIFSA is a uniform law, we may also take into account the
official comments to UIFSA, later amendments to UIFSA when “they provide
insight into the intended meaning of New Hampshire’s existing statute,” and
the interpretation of UIFSA by courts in other jurisdictions. In the Matter of
Ball & Ball, 168 N.H. 133, 137 (2015) (quotation omitted) (observing that
“uniform laws should be interpreted to effect their general purpose to make
uniform the laws of those states that enact them” (quotation omitted)); see RSA
546-B:56 (2021) (stating that, in applying and construing RSA chapter 546-B,
“consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with
respect to its subject matter among the states that enact it”).

¶9 “UIFSA is a model act adopted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at the behest of Congress. . . .” Scott &
Pierce, 160 N.H. at 358 (quotation omitted). It applies when more than one
jurisdiction is involved in child support proceedings, and its purpose is to avoid
conflicting child support orders issued by courts in different states. Ball, 168
N.H. at 138. UIFSA has been enacted in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia. Scott & Pierce, 160 N.H. at 359. It is divided into nine articles that
provide the procedural and jurisdictional rules for “establishing, enforcing, and
modifying child and spousal support orders and for determining parentage
when more than one state is involved in these proceedings.” Id. at 359-60.

¶10 We begin our analysis with the language of the provision on which
the trial court relied when it ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
issue a child support order in this case. RSA 546-B:31 (Establishment of

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Support Order) codifies Section 401 of the Uniform Act. It is found in Article 4
of UIFSA and provides in part:

I. If a support order entitled to recognition under this chapter has not
been issued, a responding tribunal of this state with personal
jurisdiction over the parties may issue a support order if:

(a) The individual seeking the order resides outside this state; or

(b) The support enforcement agency seeking the order is located
outside this state.

RSA 546-B:31, I; Unif. Interstate Family Support Act (2008) § 401 (amended
2015), 9 Part 1B U.L.A. 330 (2019). “Responding tribunal” is defined in UIFSA
as “the authorized tribunal in a responding state or foreign country.” RSA 546-
B:1, XXIV (2021). “Responding state” is defined as “a state in which a petition
or comparable pleading for support or to determine parentage of a child is filed
or to which a petition or comparable pleading is forwarded for filing from
another state or a foreign country.” RSA 546-B:1, XXIII (2021).

¶11 The trial court concluded that the “plain language” of RSA 546-
B:31 requires that where one of the parents before it resides in a state other
than New Hampshire, the nonresident parent must be the one who seeks an
order establishing child support for the court to have the authority to issue a
support order. The trial court read the language “may issue a support order”
to mean that a tribunal has the authority to issue a support order only if the
circumstances set forth in (a) or (b) exist. In isolation, this is a plausible
reading of the provision. Read in the context of the statute as a whole,
however, we conclude that the provision does not apply to the circumstances
presented in this case.

¶12 The trial court found that it had personal jurisdiction over the
father, a finding that is supported by the record. RSA 546-B:3 enumerates
eight grounds to establish jurisdiction over a nonresident party in relation to
support and paternity claims. See Penichet, 177 N.H. at 231; RSA 546-B:3, I
(2021). In this case, the father had resided with the children in this state;
consequently, at least one of the enumerated grounds existed to establish
jurisdiction over the father. See RSA 546-B:3, I(c). The official comments to
the corresponding section of the uniform act state that “[i]n situations in which
the long-arm statute can be satisfied, the petitioner . . . has two options: (1)
utilize the long-arm statute to obtain personal jurisdiction over the respondent,
or, (2) initiate a two-state proceeding under the succeeding provisions of UIFSA
seeking to establish a support order in the respondent’s state of residence.”
Unif. Interstate Family Support Act (2008), § 201 cmt. (amended 2015), 9 Part
1B U.L.A. at 291. The mother here pursued the first option. We therefore

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conclude that the circuit court was not a “responding tribunal” in a two-state
proceeding.

¶13 Rather, RSA 546-B:11-a governs the disposition of this case. See
RSA 546-B:11-a (2021). That statute, a part of the jurisdictional provisions of
UIFSA Article 2, provides that “[a] tribunal of this state exercising personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident in a proceeding under this chapter” may use
certain procedures provided in Article 3 for purposes of exercising its subject
matter jurisdiction but states that “[i]n all other respects, Articles 3 through 6
do not apply, and the tribunal shall apply the procedural and substantive law
of this state.” Id. According to the official comments to this provision of the
uniform law:

Assertion of long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident results in a
one-state proceeding without regard to the fact that one of the
parties resides in a different state or in a foreign country. On
obtaining personal jurisdiction the tribunal must apply the law of
the forum. Once personal jurisdiction has been asserted [by the
tribunal] over a nonresident, the issuing tribunal retains
continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify, and continuing
jurisdiction to enforce a support order in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.

Unif. Interstate Family Support Act (2008), § 201 cmt. (amended 2015), 9 Part
1B U.L.A. at 291. Hence, RSA 546-B:11-a makes clear that where, as here, a
resident petitioner initiates a support proceeding in a tribunal that has
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident respondent, Articles 3 through 6 have
no applicability except as stated in that provision. Consequently, RSA 546-
B:31, which is included in Article 4, does not apply under the circumstances of
this case.

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred
when it ruled that the language in RSA 546-B:31 precluded it from awarding
child support and issuing other support-related orders. We therefore reverse
and remand.

Reversed and remanded.

DONOVAN and COUNTWAY, JJ., concurred; MACDONALD, C.J., did not
participate in the final vote.