Lawrence Gormley v. Jennifer Rief

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2024-0521, Lawrence Gormley v. Jennifer Rief,
the court on September 19, 2025, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the limited record
submitted on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this
order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(3). The plaintiff, Attorney Lawrence Gormley,
appeals an order of the Circuit Court (Pendleton, J.) awarding him $21,788 in
damages for legal fees owed by the defendant, Jennifer Rief, plus costs and
statutory interest. The plaintiff argues that: (1) the trial court erred when it
declined to apply the interest rate set forth in the parties’ contract; (2) the trial
court erred when it calculated interest as of the date the complaint was filed,
rather than the date the plaintiff demanded payment; and (3) post-judgment
interest should be calculated using the interest rate set forth in the parties’
contract. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The trial court found the following facts. The plaintiff provided legal
services to the defendant, and the two had a representation agreement. After
the plaintiff stopped working on the defendant’s case, she made no payments
on her outstanding bills. The plaintiff sent a demand letter via email on
October 5, 2022. In June 2023, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit
court.

The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment after
the defendant acknowledged that she owed a substantial amount for the legal
services provided. The trial court held a damages hearing because the parties
contested the total amount owed. The plaintiff has not provided a transcript of
that hearing. Although the trial court found the defendant’s testimony that she
was unhappy with the plaintiff’s legal services to be credible, it concluded that
her lay opinion was insufficient to show that his billing invoices were not
reasonable or appropriate. Accordingly, the trial court ordered the defendant
to pay the plaintiff the full amount of legal fees in the amount of $21,788,
interest in the amount of $988.19, and costs in the amount of $195.00. Noting
that it did not “believe it [could] award contract interest above the jurisdictional
limits of the Court” and that the plaintiff did not claim a specific amount of
contractual interest, the trial court “[chose] to apply the statutory judgment
interest from the date of filing.”

The plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider. In that motion, the plaintiff set
forth the amount of interest he claimed was due and the basis for its
calculation under the parties’ contract. The plaintiff claimed that the “proper
award” was $27,670.76 including interest. The trial court denied the motion.
This appeal followed.

Our review is limited to the trial court’s consideration of the interest
issue at the damages hearing. We will uphold the trial court’s factual findings
and rulings unless they lack evidentiary support or are legally erroneous.
Gaucher v. Waterhouse, 175 N.H. 291, 295 (2022). We review the trial court’s
application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. As the appealing party, the
plaintiff has the burden of providing this court with a record sufficient to
decide his issues on appeal. See Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248,
250 (2004); Sup. Ct. R. 15. In the absence of a trial transcript, we assume that
the evidence at trial supports the trial court’s findings. Id.

The plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in finding that it could not
award contractual interest above the jurisdictional limits of the court. We need
not reach this issue because the plaintiff failed to meet his burden to establish
the amount of interest due under the parties’ agreement. That agreement
provided that “interest shall be charged at the rate of 1-1/2% per month,
simple interest, on any accrued balance more than thirty (30) days old.” The
trial court found that the plaintiff failed to provide a “specific figure” at the
damages hearing. Because we do not have a transcript of the damages
hearing, there is no record of what evidence, if any, the plaintiff offered with
respect to the elements of the interest calculation under the agreement. As
noted, the plaintiff did submit a specific number and the purported basis for its
calculation in a motion for reconsideration. The trial court was not required to
consider this new evidence. See Lillie-Putz Trust v. DownEast Energy Corp., 160 N.H. 716, 726 (2010) (“Whether to receive further evidence on a motion for
reconsideration rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.”). We conclude
that the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiff did not meet his burden of
establishing contractual interest is not legally erroneous. See Gaucher, 175
N.H. at 295. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly concluded
that the statutory rate of interest applied.

Next, we turn to the plaintiff’s argument that interest accrues from the
date of demand. RSA 524:1-a provides that “[i]n the absence of a demand prior
to the institution of suit, in any action on a debt or account stated or where
liquidated damages are sought, interest shall commence to run from the time
of the institution of suit.” RSA 524:1-a (2021). “Under RSA 524:1-a, if a
demand has been made before suit, interest accrues from the time of the
demand.” J & M Lumber & Constr. Co. v. Smyjunas, 161 N.H. 714, 729
(2011). The plaintiff made a demand via email in October 2022, prior to the
institution of the suit in June 2023. Accordingly, we conclude that statutory
interest applies from the date of the plaintiff’s demand, and thus the trial court
erred in applying it only from the date of filing.

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 Finally, the plaintiff argues that post-judgment interest should be
calculated using the contractual rate. Given our conclusion that the trial court
did not err in ruling that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of establishing
contractual interest, we conclude that the plaintiff is not entitled to the
contractual interest rate in calculating his post-judgment interest.

We affirm the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiff did not meet his
burden to establish contractual interest; we reverse its ruling that interest
accrued only from the date of filing and conclude that interest was applicable
from the date of the demand letter. We direct the trial court, upon remand, to
recalculate the plaintiff’s damages award in accordance with this order.

Affirmed in part; reversed
in part; and remanded.

MACDONALD, C.J., and DONOVAN and COUNTWAY, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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