Thomas Quarles & a. v. Town of Brookline & a.
Opinion text
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2024-0235, Thomas Quarles & a. v. Town of
Brookline & a., the court on April 16, 2025, issued the following
order:
The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(3). The plaintiffs, Thomas Quarles and Karen Simms, appeal an
order of the Superior Court (Temple, J.) affirming the approval of a site plan
application submitted by the intervenor, Jay Chrystal, to the Planning Board of
the Town of Brookline (the Board). We affirm.
The record reflects the following facts. The intervenor applied for site
plan approval to construct a Housing for Older Persons (HOP) development on
a parcel of land in Brookline (the property). The plaintiffs are abutters to the
property and participated in the Board’s public hearings. The Board
conditionally approved the intervenor’s application.
Prior to approving the application, the Board requested the intervenor to
provide a “traffic study that will take safety concerns into account, not just
traffic numbers.” The intervenor submitted to the Board a study which
concluded that there would be negligible increases in prevailing traffic
operations in the area as a result of the HOP development and that the existing
roadway could safely and efficiently accommodate the proposed HOP
development. Plaintiff Quarles also asked why, given the large amount of
material that would need to be removed from the property to complete the
project, the project was proceeding without an excavation permit. The Board
approved the intervenor’s application, and did not require the intervenor to
obtain an excavation permit before granting his application.
The plaintiffs appealed the Board’s decision to the trial court. The
plaintiffs argued that the Board’s decision should be reversed because the
Board failed to require the intervenor to obtain an excavation permit and
because the traffic study submitted by the intervenor was insufficient. The
plaintiffs further argued that the Board erred in granting the application
because the proposed driveway did not comply with local ordinances. Finally,
the plaintiffs argued that the proposed development did not comply with
several of the Town of Brookline’s ordinance provisions regarding HOP
developments and that the application did not comply with the Town of
Brookline’s site plan regulations.
The trial court concluded that an excavation permit was not required and
that the Board did not err when it found the traffic study submitted by the
intervenor was sufficient. The court further concluded that the local
ordinances regarding the location of the proposed driveway were preempted by
state law. The trial court found the plaintiffs’ remaining arguments to be
without merit and affirmed the Board’s decision. The plaintiffs filed a motion
for reconsideration. The trial court denied the motion. This appeal followed.
The trial court’s review of a planning board’s decision is governed by RSA
677:15 (2016), which provides that the trial court “may reverse or affirm,
wholly or partly, or may modify the decision brought up for review when there
is an error of law or when the court is persuaded by the balance of
probabilities, on the evidence before it, that [the board’s] decision is
unreasonable.” RSA 677:15, V. Thus, the trial court’s review is limited.
Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Town of Hanover, 171 N.H. 497, 504 (2018).
The trial court must treat the factual findings of the planning board as prima
facie lawful and reasonable and cannot set aside its decision absent
unreasonableness or an identified error of law. Id. The appealing party bears
the burden of persuading the trial court that, by the balance of probabilities,
the board’s decision was unreasonable. Id. The trial court determines not
whether it agrees with the planning board’s findings, but whether there is
evidence upon which its findings could have reasonably been based. Id.
Our review is similarly limited. Id. We will reverse a trial court’s
decision on appeal only if it is not supported by the evidence or is legally
erroneous. Id. We review the trial court’s decision to determine whether a
reasonable person could have reached the same decision as the trial court
based upon the evidence before it. Id.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it failed to
reverse the Board’s approval of the site plan application because: (1) the Board
did not require the intervenor to obtain an excavation permit before granting
the application; (2) the Board did not receive a sufficient traffic study from the
intervenor prior to granting the application; (3) the Board granted the
application despite the intervenor’s proposed driveway not complying with
Town of Brookline ordinances; (4) the Board did not find that the intervenor’s
site plan complied with all of the provisions of the Town of Brookline’s HOP
ordinance and the site plan did not comply with all of the provisions of the HOP
ordinance; and (5) the Board granted the application when it did not comply
with the Town of Brookline’s site plan regulations. The defendants counter
that the plaintiffs’ arguments that the Board erred in failing to require an
excavation permit, in approving the site plan despite the noncompliant
driveway, and in approving the site plan when the intervenor’s application did
not comply with the Town of Brookline’s site plan regulations, are not
preserved.
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We assume, without deciding, that all of the plaintiffs’ arguments are
preserved. As the appealing parties, the plaintiffs have the burden of
demonstrating reversible error. Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014).
Based upon our review of the trial court’s order, the plaintiffs’ challenges to it,
the relevant law, and the record submitted on appeal, we conclude that the
plaintiffs have not demonstrated reversible error, and we affirm the trial court’s
decision. See id.; Sup. Ct. R. 25(8).
Affirmed.
MACDONALD, C.J., and BASSETT, DONOVAN, and COUNTWAY, JJ.,
concurred.
Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk
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