Adrien Auclair v. Colton Harvey & a.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2024-0186, Adrien Auclair v. Colton Harvey &
a., the court on July 22, 2025, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, has considered the oral arguments of the parties, and has
determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(3). The
defendants, Colton Harvey and Benjamin Harvey (Harveys), appeal, and the
plaintiff, Adrien Auclair, cross-appeals, orders from the Circuit Court (Gardner,
J.) determining that the Harveys violated RSA 540-A:3, I (2021) by willfully
interrupting Auclair’s utility services. On appeal, the Harveys contend, inter
alia, that the trial court erred in determining that they were landlords and
Auclair was a tenant. We agree, and accordingly, reverse.

The trial court found, or the record supports, the following facts. The
Harveys are the sons of Jennifer Levasseur, and Auclair is her stepfather. In
the past, they all had a close relationship and lived near each other. In
February 2022, Auclair sold his house in Rollinsford to the Harveys. Based
upon concerns about Auclair’s ability to live alone, the parties entered into a
familial arrangement to share the home such that Benjamin agreed to live with
Auclair in the residence, and Auclair agreed to pay a portion of the Harveys’
mortgage. Levasseur handled Auclair’s mortgage payments from a joint
checking account that she shared with him. Benjamin and Auclair lived
together for a period of time until Auclair became verbally abusive to Benjamin
to the point that Benjamin decided to move out.

After he moved out, Auclair forwarded the cable and Wi-Fi bill for the
residence to Benjamin. Eventually, Benjamin entered the residence,
disconnected and removed the Wi-Fi router and cable box, and returned the
equipment to the cable provider. In response, Auclair filed a tenant’s petition
under RSA 540-A:4, alleging that he was a tenant, the Harveys were his
landlords, and they unlawfully removed his internet and television access
without prior court permission on May 8, 2023.1 The next day, the Circuit
Court (Lown, J.) entered a temporary order requiring the Harveys to
immediately restore “all utility services as provided by the tenant’s rental
agreement with the landlord” and restraining the Harveys from entering the
leased premises without Auclair’s permission or consent or a prior court order.

1 In a separate action, Auclair claims that he has a life estate in the residence. That action was
pending as of oral argument.
On August 23, Levasseur installed a new Wi-Fi router and cable box at the
residence.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing over four days from June 6 to
December 11, 2023. The Circuit Court (Gardner, J.) ruled that the Harveys
violated RSA 540-A:3, I, by entering the residence, disconnecting the Wi-Fi
router and cable box, and returning the equipment to the cable provider. The
court then awarded Auclair $1,000 in damages plus attorney’s fees. The trial
court also ordered the Harveys to restore the cable and Wi-Fi services. Auclair
moved to reconsider, arguing, inter alia, that the court’s damage award should
have included $1,000 for each of the 105 days that he was denied cable and
Wi-Fi services. The Harveys objected. The trial court reconsidered certain
aspects of its order and ultimately ordered the Harveys to pay Auclair $105,000
for the continuing violation in addition to the initial $1,000 award for damages.
The Harveys appealed, and Auclair cross-appealed.

“We review the trial court’s legal rulings de novo, but defer to its findings
of fact if supported by the record.” Evans v. J Four Realty, 164 N.H. 570, 572
(2013) (quotation omitted). Both parties agree that this case hinges upon
whether the Harveys were landlords and whether Auclair was a tenant
pursuant to RSA chapter 540-A. To resolve this issue, we must interpret the
pertinent statutory provisions. When examining the language of the statute,
we ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used. Id. We interpret
the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have
said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We also
interpret a statute in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in
isolation. Id.

RSA chapter 540-A “regulates the relationship between landlords and
tenants of residential premises.” Anderson v. Robitaille, 172 N.H. 20, 23 (2019)
(quotations omitted). It defines a landlord as one who “rents or leases
residential premises,” and a tenant as one “to whom a landlord rents or leases
residential premises.” RSA 540-A:1, I, II (Supp. 2024).2 A lease is a form of
contract, governed by the standard rules of contract interpretation. Tulley v.
Sheldon, 159 N.H. 269, 272 (2009). As with any contract, the formation of an
enforceable lease agreement requires a meeting of the minds as to all of the
essential terms of the lease. See Syncom Indus. v. Wood, 155 N.H. 73, 82
(2007). A meeting of the minds occurs when the parties assent to the same
terms. Id. Whether the parties assented to the same essential terms of the
lease is a question of fact to be analyzed under an objective standard. See id.

2 Although the definition of “tenant” has been amended, compare RSA 540-A:1, II (2021), with

RSA 540-A:1, II (Supp. 2024), RSA 540-A:1 (2021) is applicable here because this is the version of
the statute that was in effect at the time that the Harveys disconnected the utility services.

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 Here, the record fails to objectively support the conclusion that the
parties came to a meeting of the minds or that they assented to the same
essential terms of any agreement. First, the Harveys were not landlords under
RSA chapter 540-A. They did not receive rent from Auclair and no written
rental or lease agreement between the parties existed. Rather, Benjamin
moved in with Auclair to care for him due to concerns about Auclair’s ability to
live alone. Although Auclair agreed to pay a portion of the Harveys’ mortgage,
the evidence does not specify if they agreed to a specific amount or what
consideration may have attached to these payments. The parties further
dispute whether they reached an agreement as to how long Auclair would be
permitted to occupy the residence. Overall, the evidence rebuts the proposition
that the Harveys were landlords because they did not rent or lease the
residence to Auclair.

Second, Auclair was not a tenant under RSA chapter 540-A. Auclair
lived with Benjamin based upon an informal family arrangement to share the
residence. That arrangement continued until Auclair became verbally abusive
to Benjamin. After Benjamin moved out, Auclair continued to live there alone
without any formal rental or lease agreement and without making rental
payments to the Harveys. Thus, the conduct of the parties demonstrated that
they lacked the requisite meeting of the minds necessary to create a landlord-
tenant relationship. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that
Auclair was a tenant.

Nevertheless, Auclair asserts that the Harveys admitted that they were
landlords and he was a tenant in several motions in which the Harveys referred
to themselves as landlords and Auclair as a tenant. In the Harveys’ objection
to Auclair’s motion for contempt, they stated that the mortgage payments
constituted rent. In its March 2024 order on the motion for reconsideration,
the trial court explained that the parties entered into a “family arrangement”
under which Auclair lived in the residence with Benjamin, but that “a tenancy
was created as asserted by the plaintiff” based upon “the defendants vacating
the home . . . and the eviction action commenced by the defendants.”

Filing an eviction notice does not automatically create a tenancy because
eviction notices can be served upon occupants of a residence who are not
tenants. See RSA 540:12. We have concluded that a recipient of an eviction
notice was an occupant, rather than a tenant under RSA chapter 540-A. See
Colburn v. Saykaly, 173 N.H. 162, 163-64, 166-67 (2020). In Colburn v.
Saykaly, 173 N.H. 162 (2020), we did not conclude that filing an eviction notice
against that occupant created a tenancy, because “RSA chapter 540, the
chapter governing residential evictions in New Hampshire, expressly provides
that possession may be recovered ‘from a lessee, occupant, mortgagor, or other
person in possession.’” Id. Similarly, here, filing an eviction notice against
Auclair did not create a tenancy, nor imply that one existed.

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 We further note that the eviction notice was filed on a standard,
statutorily prescribed form, which denotes the parties as either landlord or
tenant. See RSA 540:3 (Supp. 2024). Relying upon the fixed terms of a
standard, statutorily prescribed form does not demonstrate that a landlord-
tenant relationship existed. To conclude otherwise would elevate form over
substance. See In re Morrison Estate, 106 N.H. 388, 390 (1965) (declining to
adopt a description that would “exalt form over substance”). For similar
reasons, the use of the terms landlord and tenant in other filings does not
demonstrate that the parties maintained a landlord-tenant relationship.
Instead, using those terms was consistent with the standard terms from the
resulting action. In addition, filing an eviction notice also does not prevent the
Harveys from denying the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship. See
Robinson v. Morgan, 58 N.H. 412, 412-13 (1878) (concluding that a real
property owner was not estopped from denying the existence of such a
relationship despite bringing a landlord action). In sum, we conclude that the
Harveys’ filing the eviction notice did not create or substantiate a finding of a
tenancy, and the trial court’s conclusion that it did was error.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that a
landlord-tenant relationship existed between the Harveys and Auclair. See
Evans, 164 N.H. at 576 (reversing trial court’s determination that owner of
property was a landlord because no evidence demonstrated that owner ever
rented or leased the occupant’s apartment to her or that owner could have
been determined to do so by law).

Given our conclusion, we need not reach any additional issues raised in
the Harveys’ appeal or Auclair’s cross-appeal. See Antosz v. Allain, 163 N.H.
298, 302 (2012) (declining to address other arguments where a conclusion on
one issue is dispositive). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the
parties did not have a landlord-tenant relationship. Accordingly, we reverse.

Reversed.

MACDONALD, C.J., and BASSETT, DONOVAN, and COUNTWAY, JJ.,
concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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