In the Matter of Penichet and Corroon

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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

10th Circuit Court-Hampton Family Division
Case No. 2023-0678
Citation: In the Matter of Penichet and Corroon, 2025 N.H. 8

IN THE MATTER OF MARIA CRISTINA JARERO PENICHET AND
KENNETH CORROON

Argued: September 10, 2024
Opinion Issued: February 7, 2025

McLane Middleton, P.A., of Manchester (Peter D. Anderson on the brief
and orally, and Jacqueline A. Leary on the brief), for the petitioner.

Shaheen & Gordon, P.A., of Concord (Tracey Goyette Cote on the brief
and orally), for the respondent.

COUNTWAY, J.

¶1 The petitioner, Maria Cristina Jarero Penichet (mother), appeals orders
of the Circuit Court (Pendleton, J.) granting the motion of the respondent,
Kenneth Corroon (father), to deny registration of a foreign child support order
pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), see RSA ch. 546-
B (2021), after concluding that a Mexico court did not have personal jurisdiction
over the father, and denying the mother’s request to reopen the record. We
affirm.
 I. Background

¶2 The following facts are drawn from the circuit court’s orders and the
record. The mother and the father are unmarried parents. They have one minor
child, who was born in New York in 2016.

¶3 After the child was born, the parties executed a Stipulation of
Paternity, Custody and Access (the stipulation) in New York. The stipulation gave
the mother sole legal and physical custody of the child and gave her the right to
relocate anywhere with the child, including her native home of Mexico. It
required the parties to cooperate in registering the child and obtaining the child’s
Mexican and American citizenships and passports, and also required the father
to provide documents and information to the mother when requested. When the
parties executed the stipulation, the mother was living in New York and the
father was living in New Hampshire.

¶4 The mother and the child moved to Mexico in September 2016.
Around that time, the father started to provide monthly child support, which
increased between then and 2019. The father never lived in Mexico with the
child or while providing support for the child. He does not own property or do
business in Mexico. The father has not been to Mexico since he attended the
child’s baptism in 2017.

¶5 The mother filed an ex parte petition in Mexico City requesting child
support from the father. In October 2022, the Mexico court entered a temporary
order of support (the “Mexico order”) and then summoned the father. Prior to the
Mexico order, there was no child support order between the parties. The mother
then filed a request to register foreign order in New Hampshire, requesting the
registration and enforcement of the Mexico order. The father filed a motion to
contest validity of registered foreign child support order, and a hearing was held
in July 2023.

¶6 Following the hearing, the circuit court granted the father’s motion to
deny registration. It found that the father does not have minimum contacts
sufficient to justify the Mexico court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. The
circuit court issued temporary orders to protect the interests of the minor child.
The mother filed a motion for reconsideration, to which the father objected. The
mother advanced new facts to support her allegation that Mexico had personal
jurisdiction over the father. The father also offered new facts to rebut the
mother’s factual assertions but argued that the court should not reopen the
record to consider the new facts.

¶7 The circuit court declined to reopen the record, and in the alternative,
concluded that the additional facts asserted by the mother did not support a
finding that the Mexico court had personal jurisdiction over the father. The trial

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court also denied the mother’s motion to reconsider. The mother appealed to this
court.

II. Analysis

¶8 Resolving the issues in this appeal requires us to interpret UIFSA.
Our review of the circuit court’s interpretation of UIFSA is de novo. In the Matter
of Ball & Ball, 168 N.H. 133, 137 (2015). “UIFSA is a model act adopted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at the behest of
Congress.” In the Matter of Scott & Pierce, 160 N.H. 354, 358 (2010) (quotation
omitted). Codified in New Hampshire as RSA chapter 546-B (2021), UIFSA
“governs the procedure for establishing, enforcing, and modifying child and
spousal support orders and for determining parentage when more than one state
is involved in these proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted).

¶9 To interpret UIFSA, we rely upon our ordinary rules of statutory
construction. Ball, 168 N.H. at 137. We first look to the language of the statute
itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary
meaning. Id. We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall
purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Id.

¶10 We also rely upon the official comments to UIFSA, later amendments
to UIFSA when they provide insight into the intended meaning of New
Hampshire’s existing statute, and the interpretation of UIFSA by other
jurisdictions. Id.; see RSA 546-B:56 (providing that “consideration must be given
to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter
among states that enact it”). “When interpreting a uniform law, such as UIFSA,
the intention of the drafters of a uniform act becomes the legislative intent upon
enactment.” Ball, 168 N.H. at 137 (quotation omitted).

¶11 New Hampshire courts generally “recognize and enforce . . . a
registered support order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction.” RSA 546-B:41,
III. RSA 546-B:45, I, provides that “[a] party contesting the validity or
enforcement of a registered support order or seeking to vacate the registration
has the burden of proving” one or more of the defenses enumerated in the
statute, including, inter alia, that “[t]he issuing tribunal lacked personal
jurisdiction over the contesting party.” RSA 546-B:45, I(a). Here, the father
objected to the mother’s registration of the Mexico order, in part, on the basis
that Mexico lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The trial court agreed with the
father after concluding that the father did not have sufficient minimum contacts
with Mexico to justify the Mexico court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over
him. The mother asserts that RSA 546-B:3 does not apply in this case, that the
trial court erred in shifting the burden of proving that the Mexico court had
personal jurisdiction over the father to her, and that the trial court erred as a

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matter of law when it determined that Mexico lacked personal jurisdiction over
the father. We disagree.

¶12 We begin with RSA 546-B:3, which enumerates eight grounds for
establishing jurisdiction over a nonresident party in relation to child support and
paternity claims. RSA 546-B:3, I, states:

In a proceeding to establish or enforce a support order or to
determine parentage of a child, a tribunal of this state may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual or the individual’s
guardian or conservator if:

a. The individual is personally served with notice within this
state;
b. The individual submits to the jurisdiction of this state by
consent in a record, by entering a general appearance, or by
filing a responsive document having the effect of waiving any
contest to personal jurisdiction;
c. The individual resided with the child in this state;
d. The individual resided in this state and provided prenatal
expenses or support for the child;
e. The child resides in this state as a result of the acts or
directives of the individual;
f. The individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this state
and the child may have been conceived by that act of
intercourse;
g. The individual asserted parentage of a child in the putative
father registry maintained in this state by the department of
health and human services; or
h. There is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of
this state and the United States for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction.

¶13 We disagree with the mother that RSA 546-B:3 has no relevance in
this case because it addresses jurisdiction in New Hampshire over “non-
residents” only. RSA 546-B:3 is identical to Section 201 of the model act. See
Unif. Interstate Family Support Act § 201 (2008), 9-1B U.L.A. 273, 290 (2019).
The official comment following Section 201 of UIFSA provides insight into the
intended meaning of the New Hampshire statute in the circumstances presented
by this case. It states:

[U]nder certain fact situations involving a request to recognize and
enforce or modify a foreign support order, a state tribunal may be
called upon to determine the applicability of long-arm jurisdiction
under UIFSA to the facts of the case in order to decide the

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 enforceability of the foreign support order. . . . [A] state tribunal may
be called upon to determine whether the facts underlying the
support order would have provided the issuing foreign tribunal with
personal jurisdiction over the respondent under the standards of
this section. In effect, the question is whether the foreign tribunal
would have been able to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with
Section 201.

Comment to Unif. Interstate Family Support Act (2008) § 201, id. at 290.
Accordingly, we conclude that RSA 546-B:3 required the trial court to determine
whether the facts underlying the Mexico order would have provided Mexico with
personal jurisdiction over the father in accordance with RSA 546-B:3. See Ball,
168 N.H. at 137.

¶14 RSA 546-B:3, I(h) is a catch-all provision that permits a forum state
to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident party “to the full extent
permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution,” and the State Constitution. Pahnke v. Pahnke, 88 A.3d
432, 440 (Vt. 2014); see Hilyard v. Johnston, 992 N.W.2d 287, 288 (Mich. 2023).
The father does not argue that the Mexico court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction
violates the New Hampshire State Constitution. Accordingly, we turn to whether
the requirements of the federal Due Process Clause are satisfied.

¶15 While a plaintiff or petitioner typically bears the burden of
demonstrating facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction, see Staffing
Network v. Pietropaolo, 145 N.H. 456, 457 (2000), UIFSA places the burden of
proof on the party contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered support
order. See RSA 546-B:45, I. Accordingly, the father in this case bore the burden
of demonstrating that the Mexico court lacked personal jurisdiction over him.
The mother asserts that the trial court ruled that the father had met his burden
and “at the same time shifted the burden to [the mother].” We disagree. The trial
court order states that “the [father] established he has no minim[um] contacts
with Mexico.” The trial court’s subsequent statement that the mother “did not
establish[] that the [father] has minim[um] contact sufficient to justify a Foreign
Country’s exercise of personal jurisdiction” makes clear that the trial court
concluded, not that the mother failed to carry the initial burden, but, rather, that
the father had made a prima facie case that he did not have sufficient minimum
contacts with Mexico, and that the mother failed to rebut the prima facie case.
Having concluded that the trial court did not impermissibly shift the burden of
proof to the mother, we now consider whether the trial court erred as a matter of
law when it determined that Mexico lacked personal jurisdiction over the father.

¶16 As we have explained in the context of civil lawsuits, “[p]ursuant to
the Federal Due Process Clause, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant if the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum,

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such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.” Vt. Wholesale Bldg. Prods. v. J.W. Jones Lumber
Co., 154 N.H. 625, 628 (2006) (quotation omitted). “Personal jurisdiction can be
‘general,’ where the defendant’s contacts with the forum State are continuous
and systematic, or ‘specific,’ where the cause of action arises out of or relates to
the defendant’s forum-based contacts.” Fellows v. Colburn, 162 N.H. 685, 691
(2011) (quotation omitted). Only specific jurisdiction is at issue here.

¶17 Whether sufficient minimum contacts for specific personal
jurisdiction exist involves a tripartite inquiry. See Skillsoft Corp. v. Harcourt
General, 146 N.H. 305, 308 (2001). We analyze whether: (1) the contacts relate
to the cause of action; (2) the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the
protections of the forum state’s law; and (3) it would be fair and reasonable to
require the defendant to defend the suit in the forum state. Id. All three factors
must be satisfied for the exercise of jurisdiction to be constitutional. Red Oak
Apartment Homes v. Holmes Carpet Ctr., 173 N.H. 529, 534 (2020). Because we
conclude that the evidence presented at the July hearing demonstrated that the
father did not purposefully avail himself of the laws and protections of Mexico, we
need not consider whether prongs (1) and (3) have been satisfied. See Fellows,
162 N.H. at 696.

¶18 For a defendant to be found to have purposefully availed himself of
the laws and protections of the forum state, “the defendant’s in-state contacts
must represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in
the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protection of that state’s laws
and making the defendant’s involuntary presence before the state’s courts
foreseeable.” Seward v. Richards, 174 N.H. 401, 412 (2021).

¶19 Purposeful availment “requires both foreseeability and voluntariness.”
Id. Foreseeability requires that “the contacts must be of a nature such that a
defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in the forum state.
Id. (brackets omitted). Voluntariness requires that “a defendant’s contacts with
the forum state proximately result from actions by the defendant.” Id. (brackets
omitted). The contacts must be deliberate and cannot be based on the unilateral
actions of another party or be merely fortuitous, but rather, the defendant must
have purposefully directed actions at the forum state. Id.

¶20 Applying the foregoing principles here, we conclude that the evidence
the father presented at the circuit court hearing demonstrated that he did not
purposefully direct actions at Mexico, and that his being haled into court in
Mexico was not foreseeable. The child was conceived in New Hampshire, not in
Mexico. Shortly after the child’s birth in 2016, while the father was living in New
Hampshire and the mother and child in New York, the parties entered into a
stipulation. The stipulation gave the mother sole legal and physical custody of
the child, and the right to relocate with the child, including to her native home of

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Mexico. The stipulation also provided that the parties would cooperate in
registering the child and obtaining the child’s Mexican and American citizenship
and passports, and that the father would provide documents and information to
the mother when requested. Shortly after the parties entered into the
stipulation, the mother and child relocated to Mexico. Although there was no
child support order in place, the father began to make child support payments.
While the father attended the child’s baptism in Mexico, he has not traveled to
Mexico since, and he does not own property or do business in Mexico.

¶21 The mother argues that by executing a formal stipulation “providing
for his son to live in Mexico, and having no child support agreement in place, [the
father] should have anticipated a child support action being brought in Mexico,
where his child and [the mother] live.” We disagree.

¶22 The United States Supreme Court has addressed purposeful
availment in the child support context. See Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92-96 (1978). In Kulko, the parents’ divorce decree incorporated
terms of their separation agreement providing that the children would remain
with their father in New York during the school year but would spend vacations
with their mother, who had moved to California. Id. at 87. Their daughter then
decided she wanted to live with her mother in California, which her father
allowed. Id. at 87-88. Thereafter, the mother commenced an action in the
California Superior Court seeking to modify the divorce decree. Id. at 88. The
father moved to quash service of the summons, asserting that he had insufficient
minimum contacts with California to warrant the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over him. Id. The trial court denied the motion, and the California
Supreme Court affirmed. Id. In an appeal from the decision denying the father’s
motion to quash, the United States Supreme Court stated that it could not
“accept the proposition that [the father’s] acquiescence in [the child’s] desire to
live with her mother conferred jurisdiction over [the father] in the California
courts in [that] action.” Id. at 94. The Court reasoned that “[a] father who
agrees, in the interests of family harmony and his children’s preferences, to allow
them to spend more time in California than was required under a separation
agreement can hardly be said to have purposefully availed himself of the benefits
and protections of California’s laws.” Id. (quotation omitted). Accordingly, a
child’s presence in a state will not, without more, confer personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident parent in a child support matter. See id. at 93.

¶23 The mother argues that Kulko is factually distinguishable from this
case. The mother notes that the only contacts the father in Kulko had with
California were that he married his former wife there, acquiesced to sending the
child to California to live with the mother, and had two additional “transitory”
contacts in California. By contrast, the mother argues, the father did more than
acquiesce to his child relocating to Mexico, because he executed a stipulation
that provides for his child to live in Mexico. The mother argues that these facts,

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in addition to there being no existing child support order in place, support the
conclusion that the father should have foreseen a child support action being
brought in Mexico. We disagree.

¶24 The stipulation gives the mother sole custody and permits her to live
anywhere with the child, “including, but not limited to, Mexico.” By signing the
stipulation, the father merely acquiesced in the mother’s decision to move with
the child. This mere acquiescence does not confer jurisdiction over the father
wherever the mother chooses to live. See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 94. We find the
cases the mother cites in support of her argument inapposite. In each case, the
court found that the nonresident parent or parents did not merely acquiesce to
the child’s presence in the state, but took affirmative action to establish the
child’s residence in the forum state. See In re Marriage of Highsmith, 488 N.E.2d
1000, 1002-04 (Ill. 1986); In re Parentage of W.J.B., 68 N.E.3d 977, 979-80, 985
(Ill. App. Ct. 2016); Daknis v. Burns, 719 N.Y.S.2d 134, 135 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000); Chautaqua County Dept. of Social Services ex. rel Colleen A.Y. v. Rita
M.S., 943 N.Y.S.2d 332, 335-37 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).

¶25 Finally, while there is no child support agreement in place, the father
has been paying child support since 2016. Cf. Daknis, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 135
(noting there was no mention of child support in the stipulation and thereafter
petitioner paid no child support to the respondent, and concluding that the court
had personal jurisdiction over the respondent). As the father has been paying
child support for years, we do not find the lack of a child support agreement
makes it foreseeable that he would be required to defend an action in Mexico.

¶26 For all the above reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err
when it concluded that the father did not have sufficient minimum contacts with
Mexico to justify Mexico’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the father. We
now consider whether the circuit court unsustainably exercised its discretion
when it denied the mother’s implicit request to reopen the record in her motion
for reconsideration.

¶27 We uphold a trial court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration
absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion. In the Matter of Geraghty &
Geraghty, 169 N.H. 404, 419 (2016). A trial court’s discretion likewise includes
whether to reopen a matter. See Smith v. Shepard, 144 N.H. 262, 265 (1999).
In its order on the mother’s motion for reconsideration, the circuit court ruled
that it was exercising “its discretion to deny the request to reopen the record,”
where the mother raised “factual allegations for the basis of personal jurisdiction
over [the father] after the [c]ourt informed the parties that it found New
Hampshire is the appropriate jurisdiction for the child support [p]roceeding.”

¶28 When a party raises an issue for the first time in its motion for
reconsideration, the trial court has “the discretion to either not consider the issue

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or re-open the record and allow the parties to present evidence.” Smith, 144 N.H.
at 265. Trial courts may refuse to reopen the record on the basis that no
grounds are shown as to why the new information could not have been presented
to the court at the original hearing. See id. (trial court did not unsustainably
exercise its discretion when it refused to consider new documents because no
reasons had been shown why the information could not have been presented to
the court at the hearing). The mother offered no reason why the information
contained in her post-trial and post-decision pleadings could not have been
presented at the July hearing. The mother had notice that the father contested
personal jurisdiction since February 2023. Upon this record, we cannot
conclude that the circuit court unsustainably exercised its discretion by denying
the motion for reconsideration, and by not reopening the record.

¶29 The circuit court did not err in ruling that the father lacked sufficient
minimum contacts in Mexico, and did not err in denying the mother’s motion to
reconsider and request to reopen the record. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

MACDONALD, C.J., and BASSETT and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

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