The Executive LLC v. Jennifer Blanchette & a.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2023-0643, The Executive LLC v. Jennifer
Blanchette & a., the court on March 19, 2024, issued the
following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on
appeal and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct.
R. 20(2). The defendants, Jennifer and Christopher Blanchette, appeal an order
of the Circuit Court (Greenhalgh, J.) issuing the plaintiff, The Executive, LLC, a
writ of possession. We reverse.

The following facts either were found by the trial court or derive from the
record submitted on appeal. Defendants leased an apartment unit in Berlin, New
Hampshire that, according to the final order, is classified as restricted property.
See RSA 540:1-a, I-II (2021). The trial court determined that eviction was
permissible because “landlord [is] not renewing lease and lease expired.”

Possessory actions require landlords who lease “restricted property” to
bring an eviction for cause. RSA 540:2, II (2021). The statutory bases that
constitute “cause” do not include expiration of a lease. RSA 540:2, II. Although
RSA 540:2, II(e) allows eviction for “other good cause,” which the trial court found
existed here, in AIMCO Properties, LLC v. Dziewisz, 152 N.H. 587 (2005), this
court held that expiration of the lease alone does not constitute good cause for an
eviction from restricted property. See also, e.g., Kalikuddy v. Alicea, No. 2021-
0218 (non-precedential order at 2), 2021 WL 6333055 (N.H. Dec. 20, 2021)
(“[T]he only reason the landlord gave for terminating the tenancy is that the lease
expired, which suffices to terminate a tenancy involving nonrestricted property,
but does not constitute good cause sufficient to terminate a tenancy involving
restricted property.”); Berkovich v. Jakubowski, No. 2014-0095 (non-precedential
order at 1), 2015 WL 11071118 (N.H. Jan. 23, 2015) (“[E]xpiration of a lease, by
itself, does not constitute good cause for an eviction as required by RSA 540:2,
II”).

Because the record before this court does not suggest that the trial court
premised its RSA 540:2, II(e) “other good cause” determination upon any finding
other than the expiration of the parties’ lease and the landlord’s desire not to
renew, the basis for the court’s order does not satisfy RSA 540:2, II, and is
therefore reversed. See Rule 16-A (“A plain error that affects substantial rights
may be considered even though it was not brought to the attention of the trial
court or the supreme court.”).

Reversed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Bassett, Hantz Marconi, Donovan, and Countway,
JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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